
Class 

Book.. 

Copyright N°_ 






COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 



TO THE PRESIDENT 

presenting a copy of the Report.] 

Authorized by the Interehurch World Movement to investi- 

Ldustry drifting toward unrestricted warfare. As Chnstmns 
we can do no other. ^^ ^ mM ^ Bishop Metho- 
dist Episcopal Church, 
Chairman, Commission of Inquiry. 
Daniel A. Poling, Associate General 
Secretary, Interehurch World Move- 

ment, 
yice-C^cxirma^ Commission of Inquiry. 

[The White House received the copy of the Report on July 27, 
1920.] 



CHRONOLOGY OF THE INVESTIGATION 

Establishment of an independent, representative Commission of 
Inquiry by the Industrial Relations Department of the 
Interchurch World Movement . . . Oct., 1919. 
Personnel: Bishop Francis J. McConnell (Methodist) 
Dr. Daniel A. Poling (United Evangelical) 
Mr. George W. Coleman (Baptist) 
Dr. Alva W. Taylor (Disciples) 
Dr. John McDowell (Presbyterian) 
Dr. Nicholas Van der Pyl (Congregationalist) 
Mrs. Fred Bennett (Presbyterian) 

Advisory 1 
Bishop William Melvin Bell (United Brethren) 
Bishop Charles D. Williams (Protestant Episcopal) 

Field investigation .... Oct., 1919— Feb., 1920. 

(Mediation effort, Nov. 28,— Dec. 5, 1919.) 
Report adopted unanimously by the Commission of Inquiry 

March 29-30, 1920. 
Report received by the Executive Committee of the Interchurch 

Movement . . May 10 

Recommended for publication by Sub-committee of Executive 

Committee June 25 

Personnel: Dr. Hubert C. Herring, (Congregationalist); 
Bishop James Cannon, Jr., (Methodist South) ; Mr. Warren S. 
Stone (Congregationalist). 

Adopted unanimously by the Executive Committee of the Inter- 
church Movement June 28, 1920 

1 The advisory members did not take part in the active field investiga- 
tion but signed the report after full examination of it and the evidence 
on which it was based. 



CONTENTS 



Letter to President Wilson 
Cheonology of the Investigation 
List of Sub-Reports 



1. 



Introduction . 

Inauguration of Inquiry 
Scope and Method 
Summarized Conclusions 
■ Recommendations 



II. 



III. 



IV. 



Ignorance 

Gary Testimony 

Espionage 

Bolshevism 

W. Z. Foster's Bed Book 

National and Local Strike-Leaders .... 

British Experience 

The Twelve-Hour Day in a No-Conference Industry 

Number on Eight-Hour Day 

Tables of Hours 

Diary of Carnegie Workman 

Senate Committee Testimony . • • • 
Testimony of Clergymen re Seven-Day Week 

Engineer's Findings 

Americanization 

Wages in a No-Conference Industry .... 
U. S. Steel's Wage and Salary Budget .... 
Comparison with Minimum Standards .... 

True Average Annual Earnings 

Open Hearth Schedule . . •• 

Family Budget— A. R. C 

Comparisons with Other Trades 

U. S. S. C. Housing 

Investigator's Findings . . • • 

Tables of Hours, Wages and Budgets .... 

Typical Cases 

V. Grievances and Control in a No-Conference Industry 
Carleton Parker's Conclusions 
U. S. S. C. Finance Committee Resolution 



Diary of Gary, Ind., Worker . 
Homestead Nationality Report 



Typical Grievances 
Senate Testimony 



PAGE 

iii 
v 

1 

3 

6-7 

8-10 
11-16 
16-19 

20 

23-26 
27-30 
31 
34-35 
37-38 
41-42 

44 
48-49 
52-53 
60-64 
67-68 
70-71 
77-78 
82-84 

85^ 

87-91 

92-95 

97 

98 

100-101 

102-103 

104 

105-107 

108-109 

110-118 

119 

125 

126 

129-131 

133 

138-141 

141-143 



viii CONTENTS 

PAGE 

VI. Obganizing fop. Conference 144 

List of 24 Unions in National Committee . . 145-146 

John Fitzpatrick . 147 

Foster's "Boring from Within" . . . . 156-159 

Testimony on Attitude of Slavs 161-164 

Fitzpatrick's Position 165-167 

Organizing of National Committee 169-170 

Attitude of New Recruits . . . . . . 171 

Attitude of International Unions 172 

Attitude of National Committee 176 

Causes of Failure 177-183 

Size of U. S. Steel Corporation 184-185 

Appendix to Section VI 189 

Report of National Committee 189-196 

VII. Social Consequences of Arbitrary Control . . 197 

Consequences for Employers 197 

Consequences for Communities 197 

Contents of Sub-Reports 198-199 

Conclusions (a and b) 199 

Causes of Steel Corporation's Policy .... 200 

Excerpts from Minutes of Steel Corporation . . 200-205 

Analysis of Minutes 206-207 

Mr. Gary's Testimony 210 

Discharge for Unionism 211-213 

Affidavits of Discharge 213-218 

Blacklists 219-220 

Espionage 221-224 

Testimony of Federal Official 225-226 

Agents — provocateurs 230 

Spying on Commission of Inquiry 233-234 

Abrogation of Civil Liberties 235-237 

Uses of Armed Forces 240-242 

j Pulpit and Press 242-243 

i . 

Concluding 245 

Christian Findings 246-250 

Appendix A — 

Standards of Living 255 

Ogburn Budget 256-257 

Chapin Budget 257-258 

N. Y. Factory Commission's Budget .... 258 

N. Y. Board of Estimate's Budget 259 

U. S. Bur. of Labor Statistics Budget .... 262-263 

Appendix B — 

Wages in Iron, Steel and Other Industries . . . 264 

Average Hourly Earnings 265-266 

Wages in Pittsburg District 267-268 

Sources of Data ' . 269 

Appendix C — 

Classification According to Skill 270-271 

Index 273 



EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE, 1919 

MAIN SUMMAEY 

Note. — This volume presents the Summary of industrial facts 
as drawn from all data before the Commission and adopted as the 
Keport of the Commission. On it a sub-committee of the Com- 
mission based the Findings, from the Christian viewpoint, which 
are printed at the conclusion of the book. 

Another volume will be required for the supporting reports and 
exhibits by the staff of field investigators: George Soule, David 
J. Saposs, Miss Marian D. Savage, M. Karl Wisehart, and Robert 
Littell. Heber Blankenhorn had charge of the field work and 
later acted as Secretary to the Commission. 

The principal sub-reports, frequently quoted in this Summary 
and awaiting full publication, deal with the following topics : 

Civil Liberties. 

Welfare Work, Pensions, Etc. 

Discharges for Unionism. 

The Press and the Strike. 

The Pulpit and the Strike. 

The Strike in Johnstown. 

The Strike in Bethlehem. 

Family Budgets and Living Conditions. 

Intellectual Environment of Immigrants. 

Bank and File View. 

Under-cover Men. 

History of the National Committee. 

The Steel Corporation's Labor Policy. 

The Negro in the Steel Industry. 



MAIN SUMMARY 

I 
IOTKODUCTION 

SUMMARIZED CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS 

The steel strike of September 22, 1919, to January 7, 
1920, in one sense, is not over. The main issues were not 
settled. The causes still remain. Moreover, both causes and 
issues remain uncomprehended by the nation. The strike, 
although the largest in point of numbers in the history of the 
country up to the first date, exhibited this extraordinary 
phase; the basic facts concerning the work and lives of the 
300,000 strikers were never comprehensively discovered to 
the public. 

The strike's real issues were swallowed up in other issues, 
some just as real as the actual causes of the strike, some 
unreal but in general quite characteristic of American indus- 
trial development. 

Moreover the little-known working conditions, which 
caused the strike, persist in the steel industry. Also the 
engulfing circumstances, nationally characteristic, persist. 

The following report, therefore, in attempting to analyze 
and publish the facts, though belated, finds peculiar justifi- 
cation in a central phase of the strike and of conditions left 
after the strike. If the steel industry is to find a peaceable 
way out of its present state, it must do so on the basis of 
a general understanding of such facts as are here set forth. 
If the country is to find peaceable ways out of the present 
industrial tension it must find them through an enlightened 

3 



4 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

public opinion based upon a more general understanding of 
those national conditions and trends here analyzed. 

In the months after the close of the strike no effort was 
being made to settle the issues raised by the strike in the 
steel industry through reasoned public discussion of the basic 
facts. Employers and employees began to wait for " the next 
strike " ; they and the public wondered, careless rather than 
fearful, whether " the next strike " would come in months 
or years, and whether it would be " without violence " as in 
1919 or with guns and flame as at Homestead in 1892. The 
steel industry continued in the same state as in the past, a 
state of latent war. It was expected that the next outbreak 
would be precipitated as was the last, by efforts for work- 
men's organization and collective bargaining. Meanwhile the 
civil liberties of entire communities were subordinated to the 
" necessities " of this state of war and the situation in the 
steel industry continued, in a peculiar way, to threaten 
the industrial peace of the nation. 

Kank and file strikes of such spontaneity, intensity and 
duration as to slow up the industry of the whole nation char- 
acterized the period succeeding the steel strike. Labor unions 
which had been striving toward internal reform by democra- 
tizing their organizations and by defining their responsibili- 
ties to the public ; employers who were working toward plans 
for industrial cooperation; those few government agencies 
and social institutions which had been at work on the nation's 
after-war industrial problem — all felt a set-back. Conditions 
of industrial disorganization set in, directly related to events 
in the steel industry. 

Put tersely, the public mind completely lost sight of the 
real causes of the strike, which lay in hours, wages and con- 
ditions of labor, fixed " arbitrarily," according to the head 
of the United States Steel Corporation, in his testimony at 
a Senatorial investigation. It lost sight of them because it 



INTRODUCTION 5 

was more immediately concerned with the actual outcome of 
the great struggle between aggregations of employers and 
aggregations of workers than it was with the fundamental 
circumstances that made such a struggle inevitable. This 
investigation and report deal primarily with the causative 
facts, — with abiding conditions in the steel industry — and 
only secondarily with conflicts of policies and their influence 
on national institutions and modes of thought. 

Out of the first set of undisputed facts, these may be cited 
in the beginning: 

(a) The number of those working the twelve-hour day is 
69,000. (Testimony of E. H. Gary, Senate Investiga- 
tion, Vol. I, p. 157.) 

(b) The number of those receiving the common labor or 
lowest rate of pay is 70,000. (Letters of E. H. Gary 
to this Commission.) 

This means that approximately 350,000 1 men, women and 
children are directly affected by the longest hours or the 
smallest pay in that part of the industry owned by the United 
States Steel Corporation, which fixes pay and hours without 
conference with the labor force. 

Since this corporation controls about half the industry, it 
is therefore a reasonably conservative estimate that the work- 
ing conditions of three quarters of a million of the nation's 
population have their lives determined arbitrarily by the 
twelve-hour day or by the lowest pay in the steel industry. 

This nub of the situation, the Commission found, was 
subordinated, and after the strike remained subordinate, to 
the industry's warfare over collective bargaining. Both sides 
were enmeshed. The huge steel companies, committed to a 
non-union system (and offering no alternative) and the masses 

1 The average American family, the so-called statistical family, con- 
sists of five persons. 



6 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

of workers, moving as workers do traditionally, seemed botH 
to be helpless. Espionage replaced collective bargaining or 
cooperative service. 

Inauguration of Inquiry: 

The data for this report were obtained by and for an 
independent Commission of Inquiry appointed at the request 
of the Industrial Relations Department of the Interchurch 
World Movement of North America after a National Indus- 
trial Conference in New York on October 3, 1919. The Con- 
ference rejected a resolution condemning one party to the 
strike for refusing to adopt the principle of collective bar- 
gaining but unanimously supported a resolution directing 
a thorough investigation of the strike and publication of the 
reports of the investigators. 

Those parts of the evidence obtained directly by the Com- 
mission were secured through personal observation and 
through open hearings held in Pittsburgh in November, sup- 
plemented by inspection trips in Western Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. More technical and detailed data 
were obtained by a staff of investigators working under a 
field director from the Bureau of Industrial Research, 
New York. jOther evidence was obtained directly by 
the Bureau of Industrial Research, by the Bureau of Ap- 
plied Economics in Washington, by a firm of consulting 
engineers, and by various other organizations and tech- 
nical experts working under the direction of the Com- 
mission. 

The results are presented in a Main Report with sub- 
sidiary supporting reports. Pertinent phases of other in- 
vestigations and surveys, including governmental studies, the 
recent findings of the Senate Committee on Labor, evidence 
on the limitation or abrogation of civil rights, before and 
during the strike, have been collected and analyzed. The 



INTRODUCTION 7 

relation of " welfare work " to the workers was determined, 
chiefly by the analysis of available statistics. 

A detailed analysis was made of the relation of the press 
and of the pulpit to the strike, fields hitherto neglected ; and 
a similar analytical study was made of companies' " under- 
cover men " and " labor detective agencies." A body of over 
Hve hundred affidavits and statements from striking and non- 
striking steel workers was collected and analyzed. 

The chief effort at intensive study was limited to the Pitts- 
burgh district, including Johnstown and Youngstown. The 
evidence may be said to center in the plants of the United 
States Steel Corporation and particularly its plants in the 
Pittsburgh district. 

'Difficulties in obtaining evidence were expected; — they 
exceeded expectations. In certain quarters the Commission 
of clergymen were charged with being " Bolshevists " and 
" anarchists " ; their investigators were rebuffed as " Reds " ; 
one was " arrested." Formal action was finally necessary 
to combat the circulation in written form of charges whose 
only basis, apparently, was that any persons had ventured to 
make any investigation In other quarters great courtesy was 
accorded, coupled with inability to furnish the desired 
statistics. Moreover the lack of up-to-date and available 
statistics which should have been possessed by union officials, 
the over-supply of unverified complaints from strikers and 
the reluctance to impart any information on the part of the 
companies combined to lengthen unduly the period of field 
investigation. The Commission's effort was in itself a reve- 
lation of the lack of authoritative means for acquainting the 
public with industrial information at a time of industrial 
crisis. 

At one period, investigation was delayed by an effort of 
the Commission to settle the strike. The Commission, hav- 
ing been urged to do so in a manner impossible to refuse. 



8 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

actually formulated a plan of mediation which was formally 
accepted by the leaders of the strike but was definitely re- 
jected by the Steel Corporation. 
Scope and Method: 

The scope of the inquiry was delimited by applying two 
simple questions: 

(a) What workers constituted the bulk of the strikers? 
The answer is not disputed: the backbone of the strike 

consisted of the mass of common labor and the semi-skilled, 
constituting roughly three-quarters of all employees, and 
mostly " foreigners." 

By " foreigners " the steel industry means not all im- 
migrants or sons of immigrants, but only the " new immigra- 
tion," consisting of the score of races from southeastern or 
eastern Europe. About half of these " foreigners " had 
citizenship papers. 

In many places all the skilled struck; in a few places the 
skilled went out and many unskilled stayed in the mills. 

The foreigners had never been organized before; hitherto 
they had been looked upon by the unions as potential strike 
breakers, " stealing Americans' jobs and lowering the Ameri- 
can standard of living." 

(b) What was the chief factor on the employers' side? 
The answer is not in dispute : the U. S. Steel Corporation 

was the admittedly decisive influence. 

Whatever the Steel Corporation does, the rest of the in- 
dustry will ultimately do; whatever modifications of policy 
fail to take place in the industry fail because of the opposition 
of the Steel Corporation. 

Throughout the report great emphasis is laid on Mr. Gary's 
testimony, partly because he was almost the sole spokesman 
for the industry during the strike and partly because officials, 
corporation and " independent," referred investigators to Mr. 



INTKODUCTION 9 

Gary and often limited their own testimony to reading ex- 
tracts from Mr. Gary's statements or approving his policies. 

The scope of the inquiry, therefore, included chiefly repre- 
sentative cross-sections of the mass of low-skilled " foreign- 
ers " in the Pittsburgh and Chicago district plants of the 
Steel Corporation. 

Of the Corporation's 268,000 employees, 80,000 are miners, 
railworkers and dockmen, ship crews and shipyard workers, 
who were untouched by the strike and are therefore excluded. 

The method was to carry the inquiry to the steel workers 
themselves, strikers and non-strikers. Effort was made to get 
beyond the debates of Mr. Gary and Mr. Gompers. The 
statements and affidavits of 500 steel workers carefully 
compared and tested, constitute the rock bottom of the 
findings, the testimony of the leaders on both sides being 
used chiefly to interpret these findings. 

Effort was made to keep in mind, that a strike is not 
merely a call to strike, it is a walk-out, frequently without a 
call. Everything, — Mr. Gary, Mr. Gompers, the Corpora- 
tion's labor policies, Mr. Poster's record, — was viewed in 
the light of whether or not it had or had not a relation to 
the separation of 300,000 men from their jobs. 

The Commission and its investigators went to the steel 
workers with two main questions: 

A. Why did you strike? (Or why refuse to strike?) 

B. What do you want? 

Answers to A. were found to deal with things that existed, 
— schedules of hours, wages, conditions, grievances, physical 
states and states of mind. 

Answers to B. were found to deal with a method (hitherto 
non-existent in the steel industry), for changing A.; the 
strike leaders called it collective bargaining and the right to 
organization; the steel employers called it the closed shop 
and labor autocracy. 



10 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

Therefore, the first half of the inquiry concerned, prima- 
rily, conditions of labor. 

The second half concerned, primarily, methods for chang- 
ing the conditions revealed by the first half. 

The second line of inquiry was found to stretch back with 
decisive effect over the first half; in short, the key to the 
steel industry, both before and during the strike and now 
was found in following to its furthest implications this 
question : What means of conference exist in the steel mills ? 
Both sides agreed that the occasion of the strike, leaving 
aside for the moment its relation to any fundamental cause, 
was the denial of a conference, requested by organized labor 
and refused by Mr. Gary. 

The inquiry into the means of conference was pursued 
through the three possible forms of conference : (a) through 
individuals ; (b) through shop committee or company unions ; 
(c) through labor unions. 

The complete scope of this phase of the inquiry might 
be restated as follows: 

(A) Investigation of a system of denial of organization and 
collective bargaining (the policy of the Steel Corpora- 
tion) . 

(B) Investigation of a system or systems of non-union collec- 
tive bargaining (existent in certain "independent" plants 
where strikes had once existed or were feared). 

(C) Investigation of a movement for collective bargaining and 

organization of the traditional trade union kind (ini- 
tiated by the American Federation of Labor and fought 
by the Steel Corporation). 

Inquiry B. was not sufficiently completed to be presented 
in this report, except as a sidelight on the main conditions. 
The plans in operation or attempted in the Pueblo plant of 
the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, the Midvale-Cambria 



INTRODUCTION 11 

Company, the Bethlehem, Inland and International Harvester 
plants, etc., did not suggest to the dominant factor, the Steel 
Corporation, any modification of its policy. 

Summarized Conclusions: 

Sufficient data were analyzed to warrant the following main 
conclusions concisely stated here and discussed at length in 
this report and the sub-reports. 

1. The conduct of the iron and steel industry was deter- 
mined by the conditions of labor accepted by the 191,000 
employees in the U. S. Steel Corporation's manufacturing 
plants. 

2. These conditions of labor were fixed by the Corporation, 
without collective bargaining or any functioning means of 
conference; also without above-board means of learning 
how the decreed conditions affected the workers. 

3. Ultimate control of the plants was vested in a small group 
of financiers whose relation to the producing force was 
remote. ('The financial group's machinery of control gave 
it full knowledge of output and dividends, but negligible 
information of working and living conditions. ) 

4. The jobs in the five chief departments of the plants were 
organized in a pyramid divided roughly into thirds; the 
top third of skilled men, chiefly Americans, resting on a 
larger third of semi-skilled, all based on a fluctuating mass 
of common labor. Promotion was at pleasure of company 
representatives. 

h/ Eates of pay and other principal conditions were based on 
what was accepted by common labor; the unskilled and 
K semi-unskilled force was largely immigrant labor. 

6. The causes of the strike lay in the hours, wages and con- 
trol of jobs and in the manner in which all these were 
fixed. 

7. Hours: Approximately one-half the employees were sub- 
: jected to the twelve-hour day. Approximately one-half 
\ of these in turn were subjected to the seven-day week. 



12 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

Much less than one-quarter had a working day of less 
than ten hours (sixty-hour week). 

The average week for all employees was 68.7 hours; these 
employees generally believed that a week of over sixty 
hours ceased to be a standard in other industries fifteen 
to twenty years ago. 

Schedules of hours for the chief classes of steel workers 
were from twelve to forty hours longer per week than in 
other basic industries near steel communities; the Ameri- 
can steel average was over twenty hours longer than the 
British, which ran between forty-seven to forty-eight hours 
in 1919. 

Steel jobs were largely classed as heavy labor and hazard- 
ous. 

The steel companies professed to have restored practically 
pre-war conditions ; 'the hours nevertheless were longer than 
in 1914 or 1910. Since 1910 the Steel Corporation has 
increased the percentage of its twelve-hour workers. 
The only reasons for the twelve-hour day, furnished by the 
companies, were found to be without adequate basis in fact. 
The increased hours were found to be a natural develop- 
ment of large scale production, which was not restricted 
by public sentiment or by organization among employees. 
The twelve-hour day made any attempt at " Americani- 
zation " or other civic or individual development for one- 
half of all immigrant steel workers arithmetically impos- 
sible. 
8. Wages: The annual earnings of over one-third of all pro- 
ductive iron and steel workers were, and had been for years, 
below the level set by government experts as the minimum 
of subsistence standard for families of five. 
The annual earnings of 72 per cent, of all workers were, 
; and had been for years, below the level set by government 
experts as the minimum of comfort level for families of 
five. 

This second standard being the lowest which scientists are 
willing to term an " American standard of living," it fol- 



INTRODUCTION 13 

lows that /nearly three-quarters of the steel workers could 
not earn enough for an American standard of living. J 
The bulk of unskilled steel labor earned less than enough 
for the average family's minimum subsistence; the bulk 
of semi-skilled labor earned less than enough for the aver- 
age family's minimum comfort. 

Skilled steel labor was paid wages disproportionate to the 
earnings of the other two-thirds, thus binding the skilled 
class to the companies and creating divisions between the 
V upper third and the rest of the force. 

Wage rates in the iron and steel industry as a whole are 
determined by the rates of the U. S. Steel Corporation. 
The Steel Corporation sets its wage rates, the same as its 
hour schedules, without conference (or collective bargain- 
ing), with its employees. 

Concerning the financial ability of the Corporation to pay 
higher wages the following must be noted (with the under- 
standing that the Commission's investigation did not in- 
clude analysis of the Corporation's financial organization) : 
the Corporation vastly increased its undistributed financial 
reserves during the Great War. [In 1914 the Corporation's 
total undivided surplus was $135,204,471.90. In 1919 this 
total undivided surplus had been increased to $493,048,- 
201.93.* Compared with the wage budgets, in 1918, the 
Corporation's final surplus after paying dividends of 
$96,382,027 and setting aside $274,277,835 for Federal 
taxes payable in 1919, was $466,888,421, — a sum large 
enough to have paid a second time the total wage and 
salary budget for 1918 ($452,^63,524), and to have left 
a surplus of over $14,000,000. t In 1919 the undivided sur- 
plus was $493,048,201.93, or $13,000,000 more than the 
total wage and salary expenditures. 1 ^ 

i Detailed figures on the Corporation's surpluses, accumulation of 
which was begun in 1901, are: 

1913— Total undivided surplus $151,798,428.89 

1914— Total undivided surplus 135,204,471.90 

1915— Total undivided surplus 180,025,328.74 

1916— Total undivided surplus 381,360,913.37 

1917— Total undivided surplus 431,660,803.63 

1918— Total undivided surplus 466,888,421.38 

1919— Total undivided surplus 493,048,201.93 



14 EEPOBT ON" THE STEEL STRIKE 

Increases in wages during the war in no ease were at a 
sacrifice of stockholders' dividends. 

Extreme congestion and unsanitary living conditions, prev- 
alent in most Pennsylvania steel communities, were largely 
due to underpayment of semi-skilled and common labor. 
9. Grievances: The Steel Corporation's arbitrary control of 
hours and wages extended to everything in individual steel 
jobs, resulting in daily grievances. 

The Corporation, committed to a non-union system, was 
as helpless as the workers to anticipate these grievances. 
The grievances, since there existed no working machinery 
of redress, weighed heavily in the industry, because they 
incessantly reminded the worker that he had no "say" 
whatever in steel. 

Discrimination against immigrant workers, based on ri- 
valry of economic interests, was furthered by the present 
system of control and resulted in race divisions within the 
community. 
10. Control: The arbitrary control of the Steel Corporation 
extended outside the plants, affecting the workers as citi- 
zens and the social institutions in the communities. 
The steel industry was under the domination of a policy 
whose aim was to keep out labor unions. In pursuit of 
this policy, blacklists were used, workmen were discharged 
for union affiliation, "under-cover men" and " labor de- 



This report does not go into the long dispute over the Corporation's 
financing, a controversy which blazed up during the strike but not as a 
part of the issue. A typical criticism printed about this time was the 
following from the Searchlight, commenting on Basil Manly's analysis 
of Senate Document 259, (a report from the Secretary of the Treasury) : 

" On the basis of the Steel Corporation's public reports, its net profits 
for the two years 1916 and 1917, ' after the payment of interest on bonds, 
and other allowances for all charges growing out of the installation of 
special war facilities,' amounted, according to Mr. Manly, to $888,931,511. 
The bonds of the corporation represent all the money actually invested 
in the concern, for the common stock is ' nothing but water.' 

" Of course out of the net income the Steel Corporation had to pay its 
taxes to the federal government, but the hundreds of millions that -re- 
mained represented earnings on ' shadow dollars.' " 



INTRODUCTION 15 

tectives" were employed and efforts were made to influ- 
ence the local press, pulpit and police authorities. 
In Western Pennsylvania the civil rights of free speech 
and assembly were abrogated without just cause, both for 
individuals and labor organizations. Personal rights of 
strikers were violated by the State Constabulary and sher- 
iffs deputies. 

Federal authorities, in some cases, acted against groups 
of workmen on the instigation of employees of steel 
companies. In many places in Western Pennsjdvania, 
community authorities and institutions were subservient 
to the maintenance of one corporation's anti-union 
policies. 

11. The organizing campaign of the workers and the strike 
were for the purpose of forcing a conference in an in- 
dustry where no means of conference existed; this specific 
conference to set up trade union collective bargaining, par- 
ticularly to abolish the twelve-hour day and arbitrary meth- 
ods of handling employees. 

12. No interpretation of the movement as a plot or conspiracy 
fits the facts; that is, it was a mass movement, in which 

. leadership became of secondary importance. 

13. Charges of Bolshevism or of industrial radicalism in the 
• conduct of the strike were without foundation. 

14. The chief cause of the defeat of the strike was the size of 
the Steel Corporation, together with the strength of its 
active opposition and the support accorded it by employers 
generally, by governmental agencies and by organs of pub- 
lic opinion. 

15. Causes of defeat, second in importance only to the fight 
waged by the Steel Corporation, lay in the organization 
and leadership, not so much of the strike itself, as of the 
American labor movement. 

16. The immigrant steel worker was led to expect more from 
the twenty-four International Unions of the A. F. of L. 
conducting the strike than they, through indifference, self- 
ishness or narrow habit, were willing to give. 



16 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

17. Racial differences among steel workers and an immigrant 
tendency toward industrial unionism, which was combated 
by the strike leadership, contributed to the disunity of the 
strikers. 

18. The end of the strike was marked by slowly increasing 
disruption of the new unions; by bitterness between 
the " Amterican " and " foreign " worker and by bit- 
terness against the employer, such as to diminish pro- 
duction. 



The following question was definitely placed before the 
Commission of Inquiry: Were the strikers justified? The 
investigation's data seem to make impossible any other than 
this conclusion: 

The causes of the strike lay in grievances which gave the 
workers just cause for complaint and for action. These un- 
redressed grievances still exist in the steel industry. 

Recommendations: 



I. Inasmuch as — 

(a) conditions in the iron and steel industry depend on the 
conditions holding good among the workers of the U. S. 
Steel Corporation, and — 

(b) past experience has proved that the industrial policies 
of large-scale producing concerns are basically influenced 
by (1) public opinion expressed in governmental action, 
(2) labor unions, which in this case have failed, or (3) 
by both, and — 

(c) permanent solutions for the industry can only be reached 
by the Steel Corporation in free cooperation with its 
employees, therefore — 



INTRODUCTION 17 

It is recommended — 

(a) that the Federal Government be requested to initiate 
the immediate undertaking of such settlement by bring- 
ing together both sides ; 

(b) that the Federal Government, by presidential order or 
by congressional resolution, set up a commission repre- 
senting both sides and the public, similar to the Com- 
mission resulting from the coal strike; such Commis- 
sion to — 

1. inaugurate immediate conferences between the Steel 
Corporation and its employees for the elimination of 
the 12-hour day and the 7-day week, and for the 
readjustment of wage rates ; 

2. devise with both sides and establish an adequate plan 
of permanent free conference to regulate the conduct 
of the industry in the future; 

3. continue and make nation-wide and exhaustive this 
inquiry into basic conditions in the industry. 

II. Inasmuch as — 

(a) the administration of civil law and police power in 
Western Pennsylvania has created many injustices 
which persist, and — 

(b) no local influence has succeeded in redressing this con- 
dition, therefore — 

It is recommended — 

(a) that the Federal Government inaugurate full inquiry 
into the past and present state of civil liberties in West- 
ern Pennsylvania and publish the same. 



18 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

III. Inasmuch as — 

(a) the conduct and activities of " labor-detective " agencies 
do not seem to serve the best interests of the country, 
and — 

(b) the Federal Department of Justice seems to have 
placed undue reliance on cooperation with corporations' 
secret services, therefore — 

It is recommended — 

(a) that the Federal Government institute investigation for 
the purpose of regulating labor detective agencies; and 
for the purpose of publishing what government depart- 
ments or public moneys are utilized to cooperate with 
company " under-cover men." 

IV. It is recommended that the proper Federal authorities 
be requested to make public two reports of recent in- 
vestigations of conditions in the steel industry, in mak- 
ing which public money was spent, and to explain why 
these and similar reports have not hitherto been made 
public, and why reports which were printed have been 
limited to extremely small editions. 

(Eeference is made specifically to Mr. Ethelbert Stewart's 
report on civil liberties in Western Pennsylvania, made to the 
Secretary of Labor ; to Mr. George P. West's report made to the 
War Labor Board; to the Testimony of the Senate Commit- 
tee's strike investigation, 2 vols., printed in an edition of 1,000 
only; and to Senate Document 259.) 

V. It is recommended that the Industrial Eelations De- 
partment of the Interchurch World Movement continue 
and supplement the present inquiry into the iron and 
steel industry with particular reference to — 



INTBODUCTION 19 

1. Company unions and shop committees; 

2. Social, political and industrial beliefs of the immi- 
grant worker; 

3. Present aims of production in the industry. 

4. Conduct of trade unions with reference to democracy 
and to responsibility. 

yi. It is recommended that immediate publication, in the 
most effective forms possible, be obtained for this report 
with its sub-reports. 



II. 

IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 

As a preliminary to the whole report, analysis of the data 
gathered in the inquiry warrants the following conclusions 
on two salient and inter-related phases of the strike: 

The steel companies had no adequate means of information 
on the usual conditions of employment, previous to the 
strike, nor on the motives of employees in joining the 
unions during the organizing campaign; they therefore 
placed undue reliance on information obtained from 
secret and mercenary sources. 

The public purveyors of information on normal steel condi- 
tions and on the causes of the strike failed to ascertain 
and publish the facts. Ignorance of the facts was so 
general that it was possible for one interpretation of the 
strike to obtain wide acceptance, viz. the companies' 
explanation that the strike was a plot of Bolshevists, sup- 
ported mainly by " radicals " who were largely aliens. 

Evidence on this interpretation of the strike as a Bolshevist 
plot failed entirely to substantiate it. On the contrary, 
it tended to show that this conception was without foun- 
dation in fact. 

Concerning the basic facts of normal steel employment 
conditions, not only were the public and the companies un- 
informed but the strikers' leaders were also uninformed. It 
is not unusual for strikes, like presidential elections and wars, 
to be fought out on extraneous issues, with little elucidation 
of fundamental facts. In most such cases, however, some of 
the basic facts finally do come to the surface. In this strike, 

20 



IGNOKANCE : BOLSHEVISM 21 

so far as the public was concerned, lack of information re- 
mained so general that it was possible to set up straw-man 
explanations and keep public attention diverted to knocking 
them down. 

It was necessary for this Commission to consider such 
questions as the following: Was there any substantial 
general knowledge of the customary organization of the steel 
industry, its hours, its wages, its workers and their modes 
of living? Did the government have the basic facts regard- 
ing employment in the industry, and did it make use of the 
facts it had ? Did the United States Steel Corporation, in 
normal times, possess adequate means of ascertaining the 
truth about living conditions and the desires of its workers ? 
Was the Corporation subject to misinformation? Were the 
press and the pulpit in possession of the facts ? Within steel 
communities, are the facts about steel workers' lives obvious 
and immediately accessible to the rest of the community? 

As to the allegation that the strike was plotted and led by 
" Reds " or syndicalists or Bolshevists, that it was supported 
mainly or entirely by alien " radicals," and that its real 
objects were the overthrow of established leaders and es- 
tablished institutions of organized labor and perhaps the 
overthrow of the established government of the country, it 
was necessary to consider such questions as: What sort 
of facts were essential to determine the problem? Who 
offered this allegation and with what proof ? Why was this 
allegation made? Did the allegation seriously affect the 
strike ? What were its effects on the public ? 

Analysis of the data collected proved that neither the 
United States Steel Corporation, nor organized labor, nor 
governmental agencies have considered it their normal busi- 
ness to ascertain the current facts regarding conditions of 
employment, etc., in the steel industry and to take the public 
constantly into their confidence on such facts. The Corpora- 



22 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

tion's annual report is made public, but the facts therein 
which deal with labor are confined to a few lines and are not 
illuminating. Organized labor has never understood the 
business of gathering facts about any industry nor the advisa- 
bility of presenting such facts to the public. The govern- 
ment's bureaus for collecting such statistics as hours, wages, 
working conditions, costs and profits, are ridiculously in- 
adequate, are almost invariably undercut by Congress in 
appropriations, and are not primarily concerned with pop- 
ularizing such facts as they possess. What might be con- 
sidered as a prime business of any government, i.e. the 
discovery and current publication of fundamental facts of 
the country's basic industries was not considered the national 
government's business in relation to the steel industry. N 

In normal times, the Steel Corporation had no adequate 
means of learning the conditions of life and work and the 
desires of its employees. ^Company officers admitted that 
they had no real way of reaching, or of keeping in touch 
with, the mass of workers who became involved in the strike, 
that is the foreign-speaking unskilled workers and the lower 
half of the semi-skilled, constituting up to 80 per cent, of 
the force in representative plants. Even such machinery of 
contact as is provided in " modern employment management " 
systems had not been installed very long in the steel plants 
and was not developed beyond the point of keeping in con- 
tact at the moment of hiring and firing. With the employ- 
ment managers were usually joined one to four welfare 
workers of limited training who were little concerned with 
interpreting the difficulties and desires of the " foreign " 
steel worker because they were powerless to effect changes. 
J The President of the Carnegie Steel Company declared to 
the Commission that there was " no real way of getting 
hold of the foreigner." The head of the Corporation's Sani- 
tation, Safety and Welfare Department, Mr. C. L. Close 



IGNOKANCE: BOLSHEVISM 23 

agreed with this statement.) Neither seemed to think that this 
inability was due to a lack of machinery and it was apparent 
that steel officials generally relied on some other method for 
information than an openly organized system of studying 
the minds and needs of the workers. A suggestion that 
companies might foster and enlist the aid of organizations 
of the workers themselves for the purpose of insuring such 
information was commented on by company officers with 
surprise not to say suspicion. Mr. Gary gave the clearest 
testimony in confirmation of his subordinates, though that 
was not his immediate purpose. He told the Senate Com- 
mittee that his men were " contented." He said he knew 
this to be the case and that he had adequate means for know- 
ing it ; that there was " no cause " for the strike and that 
" the men were not complaining ; the workmen had found 
no fault; we are on the best of terms with our men and 
have always been, with some very slight exceptions, very in- 
consequential exceptions." Then he volunteered the follow- 
ing, (quoted in full from the Senate Testimony, Volume I, 
pages 161 and 162) : 

Senator Walsh. "How did you personally know that hun- 
dreds and thousands of your men were content and satisfied?" 

Mr. Gary. " Senator, I know it because I make it my par- 
ticular business all the time to know the frame of mind of our 
people. Not that I visit every man ; I do not do that ; of course, 
I could not do that; not that there could be something done or 
something said in the mills that I would not know; but, in 
the first place, my instructions regarding the treatment of the 
men are absolutely positive, given to the presidents at the presi- 
dents' meetings regularly — plenty of my remarks to the presi- 
dents have been printed and can be exhibited if necessary — 
and because I am inquiring into that; and we have a man at 
the head of our welfare department, Mr. Close, who is here, 
who is around among the works frequently, and all the time, 



24 KEPOKT ON THE STEEL STKIKE 

more or less, trying to ascertain conditions; because public 
writers, unbeknown to us, have been among our works mak- 
ing inquiry and reporting and writing articles on the subject; 
and because we come in contact with the foremen and often 
with the men, going through the mills, Mr. Farrell and myself, 
and others from time to time; because we have a standing rule, 
and have had, that if any of our men in any department are 
dissatisfied in any respect they may come singly or they may 
come in groups, as they may choose, to the foremen and ask 
for adjustments, make complaints, and if necessary they may 
come before the president of the company, or they may come 
to the chairman of the Corporation. Now then, sometimes there 
have been complaints made. For instance, to mention a some- 
what trivial circumstance, some three or four years ago — not 
to be exactly specific as to date — one of our presidents tele- 
phoned to the president of our Corporation, who is in general 
charge of operations, that a certain number of men — it may 
have been a thousand or it may have been two thousand men — 
in a certain mill had all gone out, and his report was that 
there was no reason for their going out " 

Senator Sterling. " When you speak of ' one of our presi- 
dents/ you mean the president of a subsidiary company?" 

Mr. Gary. "Yes; the president of a subsidiary company. 
And he said, ' It is very easy for me to fill this mill, and I 
will proceed to do it.' The president of the Corporation came 
to me immediately and reported this. I said, e Tell him to wait 
and to come to New York.' He came the next morning and he 
made substantially that same statement to me. I said, 'Have 
you taken pains to find out ; has anybody spoken to you ? ' c No,' 
he said, C I have not received any complaint whatever.' I said, 
6 Are you sure no complaint has been made to anyone ? ' He 
said, 'I will find out.' I said, ' You had better do so before 
you decide what you are going to do or what you propose to 
do.' He went back; got hold of the foreman. A committee 
of men had come to the foreman and said that they thought 
three things, if I remember, were wrong — not very important, 
but they claimed they were wrong. And the president came 



IGNOKANCE: BOLSHEVISM 25 

back the second time and reported that ; and I said, ' Well, 
now, if they state the facts there, isn't the company wrong?' 
( Well/ he said, ' I don't consider it very important.' I said, 
1 That is not the question. Are you wrong in any respect ? It 
seems to me yon are wrong with respect to two of those things, 
and the other not. Now, you go right back to your factory 
and just put up a sign that, with reference to those two par- 
ticular things, the practice will be changed.'" 

The foregoing revelation of Corporation practice must be 
analyzed from the standpoint of Mr. Gary's machinery for 
getting information about his workmen. Mr. Gary's sys- 
tem is: 1) To give instructions to the subsidiary com- 
pany presidents ; as to whether the presidents carry out those 
instructions, he " is inquiring into that." 2.) He has one 
man, head of a busy and complex department, who is " more 
or less trying to ascertain conditions." 3.) Public writers 
write articles on his steel works. 4.) Mr. Gary and Mr. 
Farrell sometimes go through the mills and " come in con- 
tact with the foremen and often with the men." 5.) /Mr. 
Gary knows his system is adequate because of " a standing 
rule " that anybody in the plant is privileged to come to him 
with complaints. He did not cite, nor, so far as the Com- 
mission has been able to ascertain has anybody in his office 
cited, any example of any workman or committees of work- 
men coming to him. In short, it would appear that he gets no 
information under " the standing rule." Finally, he gives 
in full the circumstances of how he learned of the desires 
of one thousand, " it may have been two thousand," whose 
grievance was so vital to themselves that they went on 
strike. 

That is, these one thousand, or two thousand, workmen 
whose complaint was just, or two-thirds just, according to 
Mr. Gary himself, after weeks or months of effort to obtain 
redress, took the desperate venture of quitting their jobs. 



26 EEPOET ON" THE STEEL STEIKE 

That they might never get the jobs back again was likely, as 
the president of the subsidiary company told Mr. Gary that 
he could easily fill their places. The livelihood of more 
than five thousand men, women and children (if the strikers 
numbered one thousand) of over ten thousand men, women 
and children (if the strikers numbered two thousand) was 
vitally involved. Without redress, and without jobs, this 
population would have had to move from their community, 
perhaps, and would certainly have had to seek new ways 
of earning a living except for Mr. Gary's casual intervention 
in deciding to ask them what they wanted. 

Why it is normally impossible for steel workers to get 
their lesser grievances considered by officers in power is con- 
sidered in another section of this report. The greater griev- 
ances, concerning hours and wages, are admittedly outside 
the province of the Corporation's theoretical committee sys-' 
tern. In practice, grievances which drive workers out of the 
steel industry are effectually stopped from getting higher 
than the first representative of the company reachable by 
the workers, — the foreman. Is it not clear, therefore, that 
the Steel Corporation disposes of the work and livelihood of 
its 260,000 employees without learning how such disposal 
really affects them? 

The Corporation relies upon other means of information 
than a system of open and cooperative machinery operating 
within the mills. Mr. Gary's testimony on this subject is 
brief: (Senate Testimony, Volume I, Page 177:) 



Senator Walsh. "Have you a secret service organization 
among your employees at any of the subsidiary plants of the 
Steel Corporation ? " 

Mr. Gary. " Well, Senator, I cannot be very specific about 
that, but I am quite sure that at times some of our people have 
used secret service men to ascertain facts and conditions." 



IGNOKANCE: BOLSHEVISM 27 

It was not the original intention of the Interchurch Com- 
mission to gather evidence on the widespread charges of 
" company spy systems/' " industrial espionage/' etc. Steel 
workers and their spokesmen asserted that such spy systems 
were the ever-present instruments resulting in an ever-present 
fear, — some workers called it " terrorization," — evident 
among the rank and file of steel workers. For one thing, it 
would have seemed impossible to get such secret evidence. 
For another thing, the Commission doubted its importance. 
But it became apparent that some officials of some steel com- 
panies were so accustomed to look upon their secret service 
reports as the basis on which their, or any company's, labor 
policy would have to be formed that they showed no hesitancy 
in producing information about them from their secret files. 

The Commission's investigators, asking the officers of a 
company in the Pittsburgh district for information concern- 
ing their machinery for ascertaining their workers' needs, 
•encountered this : " Bring in the labor file." The labor 
file, this company's basis for a labor policy, consisted of the 
secret service reports of various detectives and of " labor 
agencies." Here were hundreds of misspelled reports of 
" under-cover men," " operatives ' X/ i Y/ and * Z," con- 
tracts for their services, official letters exchanged between 
companies giving lists of strikers, commonly known as 
" black lists." In' some instances original pencilled scraps 
of paper contained secret denunciations of workers, which 
denunciations, raised to the dignity of typed documents, 
were then circulated to other companies and even to the 
Federal Department of Justice. The names of independent 
concerns and of subsidiary companies of the Steel Corpora- 
tion appear on letterheads showing how this information or 
misinformation was passed along. 

A detailed study of this file and of the spy system is 
given in another section of this report. It is sufficient to 



28 BEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

note here that no small part of the labor policy of this com- 
pany was founded on the inaccurate, prejudiced and usually 
misspelled reports of professional spies. 

In Chicago one labor detective agency had operatives at 
work during the strike in the South Chicago district, where 
a subsidiary of the Steel Corporation and independents have 
plants. This concern was investigated by agents of the War 
Department, its offices were raided by the State's Attorney 
and one of its responsible heads was indicted for intent to 
" kill and murder divers large numbers of persons " and to 
create riots. A published statement that these operatives had 
been employed in behalf of the Steel Corporation among 
others was put before the President of the Illinois Steel Com- 
pany, the Corporation's big Chicago-Gary subsidiary, who 
declared it untrue. The statement was put before the head 
of the raided concern who declared that his operatives were 
working for the Illinois Steel Co. 

The Commission of Inquiry had not expected to ask 
Mr. Gary whether the head of the United States Steel Cor- 
poration made use of such detectives' reports. However, 
one such report, received by Mr. Gary, was produced by him. 
This document dealt with the present investigation of the 
steel strike, the activities of the Interchurch World Move- 
ment and its Commission of Inquiry. The same curious il- 
literacy, characteristic of the labors of these " under-cover 
men," characterized the " report " on the Commission of 
Inquiry. Mr. Gary made this document the primary sub- 
ject of discussion when conferring with a committee of Com- 
missioners whose business with him was nothing less than a 
plan of mediation designed to end the whole strike. 1 

» That is the committee men representing the Interchurch Commis- 
sion visiting Mr. Gary by appointment were first asked by Mr Gary's 
secretary ^they had seen the secret document which he handed them. 

^^B^^^re^ed surprise and he wondered "where it 
ha l cS^issToner noted that "The report is anonymous." The sec- 



IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 29 

It is undeniable that labor policies in the steel industry 
rest in considerable part on the reports of " under-cover 
men " paid directly by the steel companies or hired from 
concerns popularly known as " strike busters." The " opera- 
tives " make money by detecting " unionism " one day and 
" Bolshevism " the next.;;' The importance of the espionage 
system as revealed by this evidence lies in the light it sheds 
on the atmosphere of war normal to the steel industry, and 
this atmosphere is due to the dominant policy of preventing 
organization among the workers, even organization for above- 
board study of the men's conditions of labor and thought. 
This state of latent warfare is now so customary that the 
highest company officers can consider it a matter of routine, 
consonant with their practice and dignity, to examine with 
judicial solemnity the reports of anonymous spies. 

For the country at large, the source of information about 
conditions in the steel industry and the progress of the strike, 
was, of course, principally the press. The wide discrepan- 
cies between the facts now disclosed and most of the press 
reports at the time are the subject of exhaustive analysis 
elsewhere. The findings are that most newspapers, tradition- 
ally hesitant in reporting industrial matters, failed notably 
to acquaint the public with the facts, failed to take steps 
necessary to ascertain the facts, failed finally to publish 
adequately what was brought out by the brief investigation of 
the U. S. Senate committee. 1 

Within the steel communities themselves the facts about 
the organization of the steel industry are not known. Even 
in the case of the American workers, the conditions of their 

retary agreed that "the copy which they had was also anonymous and 
they had no idea where it came from." 

Then the whole matter of the weighty business in hand had to wait 
while Mr. Gary read excerpts of the " anonymous " report and cross- 
examined the Commissioners as to whether the persons named in the 
report were Bolshevists or I.W.W.'s or some other kind of radical. 
(The secret report is analyzed elsewhere.) 

i A notable exception to the general rule was shown by a series of 
articles during the strike carried by the New York World. 



30 REPORT ON* THE STEEL STRIKE 

jobs, their hours, rates of pay, methods of promotion and 
attitude to the companies are not common knowledge. Even 
in normal times it is difficult to get American skilled steel 
workers to discuss their jobs. These men say when pinned 
down, " How do I know who you are ? Even in the mill 
I can't talk about conditions. If I talk, I may find myself 
transferred to a worse job or laid off. I can't afford to talk." 

In the case of the " foreigner," the facts lie behind the 
further screen of physical and mental segregation. The 
unskilled foreign-language steel workers congregate in com- 
munities of their own. In the narrow valleys of the great 
Pittsburgh and Mahoning Valley districts, they are for the 
most part crammed into old houses and tenements fringing 
the great plants. The worker's life is to hurry from his 
segregated home to the plant and then hurry back and 
sleep. "Not even on street cars is there much communication 
between the " foreigner " and the ordinary American citizen. 

Within these bounds of physical segregation there are 
twenty or thirty distinct mental worlds, belonging to as many 
different races. What influences move those worlds is an un- 
answered question to most good Americans and for the 
most part an unasked question. To this lack of understand- 
ing and sympathy much of our popular distrust of the 
" foreigners " can be traced. Physically powerful men, 
with dark or dirty faces, with heavy brows or long mus- 
taches, in whose former home lands strange political events 
are going on, these men are feared because nothing is known 
about them. A few years ago East Youngstown, the dis- 
trict's " hunkie " town, was a scene of riot and wholesale 
burning during a strike. But what caused that strike and 
what moved those " foreigners " to violent outbreak are still 
unknown to the good Americans who live on the hill tops. 

The employment managers, welfare workers and other 
mill officials who try to make it their business to know at 



IGNORANCE : BOLSHEVISM 31 

least a little something of what is going on in the " foreign- 
er's " head, say frankly that they cannot follow him, they 
cannot speak his twenty or thirty languages nor break down 
his suspicion of " bosses." 

The situation, then, during the strike, and existent now, 
is that the fundamental facts about the steel industry and 
especially about the masses of unskilled foreign workmen 
are not known and that this ignorance breeds a public fear 
akin to panic. 

" Bolshevism " : 

The second preliminary phase of the report concerns the 
charge, widely current, that the strike was a product of 
Bolshevism. The evidence, from steel company officials, 
strike committee records, local and national governmental 
officers and from observations by the Commission and its in- 
vestigators is completely adequate for forming a judgment. 

A stranger in America reading the newspapers during the 
strike and talking with steel masters both in and out of 
steel communities must have concluded that the strike repre- 
sented a serious outbreak of Bolshevism red hot from Rus- 
sia. The chief memory that American citizens themselves 
may have a few years from now may well be that the strike 
was largely the work of Reds. " * Reds ' hade of the Steel 
Strike " was a frequent headline in September. As late as 
January 4, 1920, an article in The New York Times con- 
tained the following: 

" Radical leaders planned to develop the recent steel and coal 
strike into a general strike and ultimately into a revolution to 
overthrow the government, according to information gathered 
by federal agents in Friday night's wholesale round-up of mem- 
bers of the Communist parties. These data, officials said, tended 
to prove that the nation-wide raids had blasted the most men- 
acing revolutionary plot yet unearthed." 



32 REPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

Data on the strike as a Bolshevist manifestation were 
analyzed with the following questions in mind: 

1. Who started this explanation? 

2. Why was it offered? 

3. Was there Bolshevism in the strike? Was there radi- 
calism ? 

The allegation was not offered by the strikers nor by the 
government. It was traced chiefly to two sources: first, the 
newspapers ; and these led to the second and main source, the 
steel companies. 

The following efforts, among others, were made to obtain 
from officials of the steel companies their evidenca 

Eirst, the commission addressed to Mr. Gary, after long 
discussions with him personally and after considering particu- 
larly his statements that men still out were " Bolsheviki," a 
letter which formally asked him to furnish the evidence on 
which he based that judgment. The Commission at the time 
felt confident that Mr. Gary could furnish considerable evi- 
dence and that any discussion would turn on whether or not 
the evidence he produced proved the case. But Mr. Gary 
produced nothing. 

Second, Mr. H. D. Williams, President of the Carnegie 
Steel Company, the largest subsidiary corporation, when asked 
for the evidence referred the Commission to " Margolis' testi- 
mony before the Senate Committee." When told that the 
Margolis testimony established no connection between Bol- 
shevism and the leaders of the strike, Mr. Williams expressed 
surprise. He admitted that he had not read the transcript 
of the testimony but was sure, however, that the newspapers 
had said so. Anyway, he said, there were many other things 
that could be produced to prove the point. Eleven subse- 
quent calls for this evidence were made on Mr. Williams' 
office but without result. 



IGNOKANCE : BOLSHEVISM 33 

Third, the Commission's desire for evidence on this point 
was explained to Mr. E. J. Buffington, President of the Illi- 
nois Steel Company, and he was asked for the facts on which 
he endorsed Mr. Gary's Bolshevist theory of the strike. He 
expressed wonder at the Commission's inability to find such 
proofs. He did produce a photograph of a poster, saying, 
" Look at that." The poster consisted of photographs of 
strike scenes, showing among other things the dead body of a 
union organizer, Mrs. Fanny Sellins. This poster was signed 
by A. E. of L. officials and was headed " Abolish Garyism." 
When doubt was expressed as to the conclusiveness of this 
exhibit as proving the Bolshevist origin of the strike, Mr. 
Buffington was certain that he had seen other " evidence," 
but he produced none. 

Of the many interviewed, no steel company official pre- 
sented to the Commission any evidence of Bolshevism. In 
declaring on December 5 that the workmen who " followed 
the leadership of Eitzpatrick and Eoster were Bolsheviki," 
Mr. Gary insisted to the Commission that the strike aims were 
" the closed shop, Soviets and the forcible distribution of 
property." Mr. Gary warned the Commissioners to remem- 
ber that any statement that they might make about the U. S. 
Steel Corporation and the strike should be " gravely con- 
sidered " inasmuch as " the foundations of the United States 
Government were involved." 

Mr. Buffington, in supporting Mr. Gary's position, said: 
" The organizers were all subversive. They said things to 
make the labor forces want more than fair wages ; made 'em 
want to share the profits." 

Mr. Gary was finally asked in the course of one of these 
discussions if he did not really mean that " labor was 
getting too strong." To this he gave general assent. 

In addition to the efforts above cited, the Commission care- 
fully examined the organization of the strike, and the union 



34 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

literature, listened to speakers, consulted Federal and State 
officials, and in every way sought to get at the bottom of the 
Bolshevist theory. The line of inquiry included such ques- 
tions as: What induced the newspapers in many states in 
the first week after September 22 to print on their front 
pages extensive extracts of a pamphlet called " Syndicalism " 
by Wm. Z. Foster ? Why was " radicalism " charged % Were 
ideas of political radicalism as inextricably mixed with ideas 
of industrial radicalism in the actual situation as they were 
in the published charges? Was there industrial radicalism, 
that is, ulterior strike aims for something beyond orthodox 
trade union demands on hours, wages, conditions and organi- 
zation ? 

The first facts persistently brought up were : Mr. William 
Z. Foster, Secretary-Treasurer of the National Committee for 
Organizing Iron and Steel Workers, and his " Red Book," 
the above mentioned tract on " Syndicalism." The two must 
be separated. The " Bed Book's " actual relation to the 
strike is undisputed. No copy of the original book, out of 
print for several years, was found in possession of any striker 
or strike leader. A reprint, which was a fac-simile in every- 
thing except the price mark and the union label, was widely 
circulated from the middle of September on by officials of the 
steel companies. The absence of the union label indicated 
that the reprint was not in behalf of any labor organization. 
What organization bore this expense of reproducing the book 
was not investigated. There was no need to investigate who 
distributed it. Steel company officials openly supplied it to 
newspapers, to preachers and investigators. In McKeesport, 
for example, it was mailed to all the pastors in the city who 
were then summoned to a meeting with the Mayor, attended 
also by representatives of the Sheriff, the State Constabulary 
and the Steel Corporation. The representative of the Steel 
Corporation, who was the Superintendent of the local Cor- 



IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 35 

poration plant, came well supplied with " Red Books " and 
read extracts. In cities like ISTew York and Boston, far 
from the strike areas, newspapers carried extracts from the 
hook as the principal news of the beginning of the strike. 
The book's relation to the strike, therefore, was in no sense 
causative; it was injected as a means of breaking the strike. 
Mr. Foster, however, was a causative factor in the strike. 
'Attempts to raise the question, " Was Mr. Foster really 
sincere in recanting Syndicalism," inevitably raised the other 
question, " Was Mr. Gary really sincere in charging Bolshe- 
vism." It seemed best to leave such analysis to speculative 
psychologists. Instead the test of Mr. Foster's acts was 
applied to Mr. Foster's mind. In two other sections of the 
report this analysis is made, based on full examination of 
the private official records involved and on reports of first 
hand observers both of the strike and of the organizing cam- 
paign. Only the conclusions need be set down here and 
these are — 

That the control of the movement to organize the steel in- 
dustry, vested in twenty-four A. F. of L. trade unions, 
was such that Mr. Foster's acts were perforce in har- 
mony with old line unionism. 

That Mr. Foster " harmoniously " combated the natural 
tendency of sections of the rank and file toward in- 
dustrial unionism. 

That a mass movement involving 300,000 workers and twenty- 
four national unions cannot be controlled to secret, 
opposite ends. 

The organizing plan was the same and was directed by 
the same two men as that of the stock yards employees in 
1918. That campaign was carried through to recognition 
of the unions without anyone calling it Bolshevism. The 



36 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

plan rejected the opportunity to organize along the line com- 
monly called the One Big Union. From the standpoint of 
the Industrial Workers of the World and the other One 
Big Unionists, no group ever had such an opportunity to 
establish the new kind of organization as did the National 
Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers. I. W. 
W.s throughout the campaign spoke with contempt of the 
Committee's plan of splitting up each batch of union re- 
cruits into twenty-four separate craft unions. Despite the 
fact that most professed industrial revolutionaries " favor " 
all strikes there is evidence as to their indifference or active 
opposition to this one. When Mr. Foster's organization was 
having hard sledding in organizing Youngstown, Ohio, 
Eugene V. Debs visited the district and began severely criticis- 
ing the whole plan in public speeches. It was necessary to 
send a committee to Debs before he could be indued to drop 
the subject. In the Pittsburgh District, I. W. W.s tried to 
break the strike a few days after it had been started by 
circularizing the mills with leaflets declaring that the old 
'A. F. of L. plan would fail and that the A. F. of L. would 
not support the strike. 

As to literature: the .official strike pronouncements and 
leaflets were confined to orthodox texts. Investigators saw 
one bunch of Communist leaflets but these had been con- 
fiscated by strike leaders who had thrown the distributor out 
of a hall into which he had wormed his way. Mr. Foster 
refused to allow in an official strike bulletin even the mild 
advice that laboring men should join a labor party, until the 
chairman of the National Committee, John Fitzpatrick him- 
self, ordered it put in. One of the leaflets ended with the 
supposedly poetical quotation : " Forward to bleed and die ! " 
The Committee's translator rendered this into Polish to 
read, " Forward to wade through blood ! " The Polish 
leaflets were returned by local Polish organizers with this 



IGNOKANCE: BOLSHEVISM 37 

objection, — " My people are all good Catholics. They won't 
stand for advice like that." 

As to national organizers: there were socialists among 
them but the most were old organization standard bearers of 
the A. F. of L. Moreover in the Pennsylvania district the 
meetings were few, police were on the platform and the 
power of the organizers was greatly lessened. Most organizers 
were overworked and preoccupied with details. These A. F. 
of L. veterans could not get over their surprise at being de- 
nounced as Bolshevists. 

As to local leaders : these generally followed the ideas and 
methods of the National Committee but were less considerate 
of A. F. of L. doctrine and more influenced by the feeling of 
the rank and file. Finding that organization by shops, de- 
partments and plants was often the most natural to their 
inexperienced fellow-workers, they followed that plan even 
though the result was industrial unionism in miniature. 
They had no labor reputations to preserve against charges of 
Bolshevism. They used as assistants the boldest and most 
energetic spirits and these were frequently readers of the 
only sort of labor papers customarily circulating among un- 
organized workers, that is, socialist and I. W. W. papers. 
The local leaders' talk ran more freely to downright terms and 
to soaring speculation about " sharing in industrial control." 
Their sole object was to win the strike. They expected to 
have " public opinion " against them anyway and so they 
cared less about exhibiting to the public a conventionally 
conservative front. They looked to their followers, men 
speaking thirty different dialects, and did not mind if some of 
the followers imbibed ambitious ideas about " ending the 
rule of the bosses." But it took very few repetitions of these 
ambitions, in broken English, to the mill bosses to spread the 
fear that the " foreigners " had revolutionary intentions. 

The investigators searching for political revolutionaries 



38 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

among the leaders or even the great rank and file became 
convinced, from the attitude taken by local, state, federal 
and army officials, that if such revolutionaries existed the 
authorities would surely find them. 

No leaders of the strike were convicted of " radicalism " 
in court. Hundreds of strikers were rounded up in " radical 
raids," but none tried and convicted. In McKeesport in one 
raid 79 workmen were taken, three were detained and one on 
final examination was held by the Federal authorities. 
Federal officers testified that the denunciations which had 
led to these arrests were made by plant detectives or " under- 
cover men " of the steel companies, many of them sworn in 
as sheriff's deputies during the strike. In the Pittsburgh 
District raids and arrests for Bolshevism were made on the 
sole complaint of company " under-cover men." Meetings 
were broken up but most of those arrested were released. 
The testimony of Federal authorities in two districts in 
December was that after the raiding and arresting at the 
instigation of company " under-cover men," no striker had 
been held by the Federal authorities on any charge of radical 
agitation in the strike. 

In the Gary district in October out of 16,000 strikers, 
seven immigrants were turned over for deportation by the 
military officers whose agents had been working in Gary 
since May, 1919. In February, 1920, these seven had still 
not been ordered deported. None of these was arrested on 
charges of radical agitation during the strike but for being 
members of organizations, such as the I. W. W. and various 
Russian societies or for professing Communist beliefs. That 
is, the arrests might have been made, so far as the charges 
were concerned, at any time irrespective of the strike. In 
view of the undoubted efforts by various organizations to 
spread political or industrial revolutionary teachings in 
America, it seemed probable that some of the workers, if not 



IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 39 

the leaders, among 300,000 strikers would utilize the strike 
as a platform for organizing agitation of their views. De- 
spite this, no records of conviction through legal process on 
charges of such agitation were discovered by investigators. 
(The charges on which many hundreds of arrests were made 
are considered elsewhere.) 

Were there any radicals in the sense of rebels against their 
present way of life? The steel industry was full of them. 
They wanted big changes. But the changes were all related 
definitely to the right to organize, the twelve-hour day, the 
seven day week, the foremen's ways, the company's methods, 
or some other definite thing which they were sick of. It is 
possible that the workers throughout the whole steel industry 
might much more easily have been organized on a radical 
appeal. But the Strike Committee were opposed in prin- 
ciple to any such appeal. After the first three months of the 
strike when the nerves of strikers and leaders were worn by 
the struggle, Mr. Foster was constantly complaining of fight- 
ing the " radicals," meaning those who wanted to have a 
general strike called or the whole strike called of! in order to 
be called on again and again and again. But that kind of 
"radical" still was concerned only with steel matters, not 
with social or political programs. 

The upshot of the matter is this: the methods of organi- 
zation used in the steel strike were old fashioned and became 
ostentatiously so as the organizers recognized the radical 
possibilities of the strike and conscientiously believed that 
anything other than tried trade unionism would be bad for 
the steel workers in their newly organized state. The cry 
of Bolshevism was not only a fraud on the public ; it was a 
dangerous thing because it advertised to the mass of immi- 
grant steel workers, who went down to defeat under old flags 
and old slogans, an idea and untried methods under which 
they might be tempted to make another battle. It roused in 



40 KEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

the minds of hundreds of thousands who know host that they 
are not Bolsheviki a distrust, which abides, and a suspicion of 
government agencies and of American public opinion which 
seemed to lend themselves to a campaign of misrepresentation. 
The evidence justifies the following observation of general 
significance: Not one new development of major importance 
was discovered in this strike. That is, in the light of indus- 
trial history there was nothing in the strike which deserves 
to be called industrially new, or revolutionary. 

It was an old-fashioned strike, preceded by a slightly new 
mechanical quirk in organizing. It ran on rather unusually 
old-fashioned lines, especially in comparison with such up- 
heavals as the coal strike, the printers' strike, the clothing 
strikes of recent years and the recent aims of railroad labor 
organizations. The steel strike had old style methods and 
aims, it was attended by the usual futile governmental at- 
tempt to avert and futile Senatorial effort to investigate. By 
the end of the year it was evident that the strikers were 
getting an old-fashioned licking. There was the usual crip- 
pling of industry, threatening to hang over into the months 
after the strike was called off. 

As the strike ended there was in steel master circles the 
usual after-strike feeling " that something would have to be 
done." The word was " the Corporation is going to do some- 
thing." The Corporation in January raised wages 10 per 
cent. " Independent " small concerns began trying to put in 
the eight-hour day. The feeling was general that the eight- 
hour day and collective bargaining could not be staved oft 
forever Corporation subsidiaries announced more extensive 
welfare work, company stores, etc. The latter weeks of the 
strike saw Mr. Gary expressing to public-spirited inquirers his 
open-minded desire "to consider any well thought out plan 
which anyone can suggest" for bettering conditions in the 
steel mills. (Another section of this report considers what 



IGNORANCE: BOLSHEVISM 41 

soundness there may be in any attitude of looking outside the 
industry for " any well thought out plan.") 

That the whole strike seemed extraordinarily old-fashioned 
to observers in England is evident from even a hasty examina- 
tion of such conservative papers as the London Times 
(October 28, 1919) : 

"The steel workers' strike, which is the rock upon which 
the Industrial Conference split, turns on the question of recog- 
nizing unions, an issue which has gone into the limbo of almost 
forgotten things here, as between employers and employed. . . . 
The employers in America have evidently something to learn 
in these matters. They have been apt to compare with some 
complacency their own relations with labor to those existing 
in this country and to attribute their comparative immunity 
from labor troubles to the superior atmosphere of the United 
States or to their own superior management. It is really due 
to the simple fact that the Labor Movement in the United 
States is historically a good many years behind our own. But 
it will infallibly tread the same broad course with certain dif- 
ferences determined by local conditions, and to resist the in- 
evitable is a great mistake. There are many different elements 
present in the States, and a far greater tendency to violence 
is one of them." 

Not only the issues but the attendant circumstances of the 
steel strike seem antique. A hundred cases could be cited. 
The famous " Dorchester Laborers' case " which happened in 
1833, was also a first attempt at organizing common labor, 
that time on the farm. Earm hands at Tolpuddle, a tiny 
English village, faced with a cut in wages from 8 shillings 
to 6 shillings a week went to the magistrate who interpreted 
to them the noted " law of supply and demand." " We were 
told," writes their leader, the Methodist lay preacher, Love- 
less, " that we must work for what our employers saw fit to 
give as there was no law to compel masters to give a fixed 



43 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

Slim » Then the farm hands heard of trade societies in the 
near'hy towns and they were visited by two delegates or out- 
side agitators," who formed a Friendly Society among them 
and "Instructed them how to proceed." Among the instruc- 
tions were the directions for a secret oath. The union s con- 
stitution read: « That the ohject of this society can never be 
promoted by any act of violence, but on the contrary, all such 
proceedings must tend to injure and destroy the society it- 
self " Within four months, six of Jhe leading members were 
arrested as " evil disposed persons " and thrown into ]ail. _ 

Since the law against unionization had been repealed in 
1824 it was necessary to discover some other under which 
these men could be tried. An old statute intended for the 
suppression of seditious societies was specially invoked and 
the six persons, after a brief trial, were sentenced to seven 
years' transportation to Botany Bay, for the crime of having 
administered an oath. 

This law, Daniel O'Connell said, " has only been raked up 
to inflict an enormous punishment on unfortunate men who 
were wholly ignorant of its existence and innocent of any 
moral offence." But the London Times of that age declared 
that " The real gravamen of their guilt was their forming a 
dangerous union to force up, hy various modes of intimida- 
tion and restraint, the rate of laborers' wages. Other 
spokesmen of public opinion agreed on the need for rigorous 
action against « that criminal and fearful spirit of combina- 
tion " A wave of panic swept the country; Lord Uowick 
tried to prove in Parliament that these laborers, who worked 
all day knew they were doing wrong for "did they not hold 
their meetings at night? " The first great procession of in- 
dustrial protest ever formed in England marched through 
London to present a petition which the government refused 



to receive 



receive. . j 

In western Pennsylvania in 1919 steel workers were tned 



IGNORANCE : BOLSHEVISM 43 

and fined in cases where the major allegation was " smiling 
at the State police." 

In his testimony before the Senate Mr. Gary, discussing 
the cause of the strike, specifies " intimidation " on pp. 151, 
153, 164, 174, 201, et al. 

In the course of the strike deputations of t?orkers sought 
the government with petitions. Attorney General Palmer, 
they considered, gave them the government's only answer in 
his letter, published on November 26, commending a patriotic 
society's efforts to run labor " agitators " out of Pennsyl- 
vania. " It is a pity," the Attorney General wrote, " that 
more patriotic organizations do not take action similar to 
that of your order." 

Altogether, analysis of all data seems to make it more 
profitable to consider the steel strike of 1919 in the light of 
one hundred years' industrial history than in the glare of 
baseless excitement over Bolshevism. 



Ill 

THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY IN A NO-CONFERENCE 
INDUSTRY 

Analysis of the data gathered in this inquiry proves that 
a prime fact in the organization of the steel industry and 
a prime fact in explaining the strike may be formulated as 
follows : 

Approximately half of the employees in iron and steel manu- 
facturing plants are subjected to the schedule known as 
the twelve-hour day (that is a working day from 11 to 
14 hours long). 

Less than one-quarter of the industry's employees can work 
under 60 hours a week " although in most industries 
60 hours was regarded as the maximum working 
week " x ten years ago. 

In the past decade the U. S. Steel Corporation has increased 
the percentage of its employees subject to the twelve- 
hour day. 

The mass of unskilled and semi-skilled workmen, mostly 
" foreigners," in the twelve-hour day class were the backbone 
of the strike. 

The relation of a prevailing schedule of excessive hours 
to the facts that no means of conference affecting hours and 
wages, or collective bargaining exist in the plants of the Steel 
Corporation, and that the Corporation's workmen hitherto 

1 " Conditions of Employment in Iron and Steel Industry," Senate 
Document 110, Vol. I, p. xlii (1910) . At that time 14.39 per cent, of all 
steel employees worked less than 60 hours. 

44 



THE TWELVE-HOUK DAY 45 

were unorganized, is analyzed in Section V of this Report, 
on " Control in a No-Conference Industry." 

What is true of the Corporation's hours and wages is 
mainly true of the industry of which it constitutes the domi- 
nating half. 

Consideration of hours is inseparable from wages ; the next 
section determines what proportion of the twelve-hour day 
men fall in the following class: 

The high percentage of steel workers whose earnings, despite 
their long hours, fall from 5 to 25 per cent, below the 
lowest level which Government experts have been will- 
ing to call an " American standard of living " for an 
average family. 

It must be clearly noted that the twelve-hour day schedules 
are compulsory. The Steel Corporation's " basic eight-hour 
day " is a method of paying wages and in no way concerns 
hours. The twelve-hour day workman cannot knock off at the 
end of eight hours, if he wants to retain his employment. 
Neither can he escape the eighteen-hour or twenty-four hour 
" turn," usually every fortnight, which goes with most of 
the twelve-hour day schedules. He can " take it or leave it " 
but he cannot bargain over his job's hours. 

The present analysis deals with the length of hours in 
the industry and the nature of the long-day jobs ; whether the 
hours are necessary; what excuses for such schedules are 
made by the Corporation; what validity attaches to these 
excuses ; what amount of seven-day work persists ; and what 
the twelve-hour day means to the worker and to the com- 
munity. 

Data considered were drawn from the U. S. Steel Cor- 
poration, " independent " concerns, Federal bureau reports, 
diaries by steel workers before the strike, records of indepen- 
dent investigators, the testimony before the Senate strike in- 



46 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

vestigating committee, hearings before this Commission and 
interviews with hundreds of strikers and non-strikers. 

Literature on the subject of the steel industry's hours, 
especially on the twelve-hour day enforced by the U. S. Steel 
Corporation, has accumulated since 1907 ; each year of these 
records is punctuated with plans, promises or expectations 
that the Corporation was about to abolish such hours. Ten 
years ago the practice was referred to as " notorious " ; the 
literature includes sardonic references even by steel masters. 
For example, W. B. Dickson, Chairman and Vice President 
of the Cambria-Midvale Co., and former director of the U. S. 
Steel Corporation, in an address in 1919 to a scientific body, 
spoke of the spectacle of Mr. Gary as chairman of a com- 
mittee to relieve unemployment (in 1916 in New York), 
when the " large proportion of his men were working twelve 
hours a day and are still doing so." 

General conclusions to be drawn from this literature are, — 

that the development of large-scale production enter- 
prises under absentee financial control tends inevitably 
to sacrifice the labor force in favor of utilizing, to the 
maximum, the costly machines; that is, trust manage- 
ment lengthens hours, unless combated by — 

(a) public opinion (generally, in legislation), or 

(b) organization of the workmen (generally, in 
unions) : — 

that in the steel industry the Corporation, by resisting 
public opinion and by preventing organization among 
its workmen, tends persistently to lengthen the hours 
of labor. 

Examination of government statistics assembled in this 
Inquiry proves that hours in the steel industry have actually 
lengthened since 1910 and that now over 400,000 steel 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 47 

workers, or a population of about two million men, women 
and children are more or less directly affected by this un- 
restricted tendency toward lengthened hours. 

In the following discussion, therefore, the frequent quo- 
tation of Mr. Gary — necessary because he was almost the sole 
spokesman of the industry during the strike and is the only 
authorized source of statistics for the Steel Corporation — 
must not be misinterpreted to imply that Mr. Gary could be 
personally and solely responsible for the labor hours- of which 
he testifies. Industrial history would seem to indicate that 
despite the " good deal of authority and power " which Mr. 
Gary * says he possesses, the effectiveness of personal wills, 
once they have committed an industry to a labor policy such 
as the Corporations, greatly diminishes, as regards hours 
and several other matters. 

However, the Corporation ended the strike without mak- 
ing any promises on the twelve-hour day and the Corpora- 
tion's statements on " eliminating " the seven-day week were 
found to be inaccurate. 

The term " twelve-hour day " is precise only where the 
day's work at the blast furnace, open hearth and other more 
or less continuous processes, is actually divided into two shifts 
of twelve hours each. But in many plants it is divided into 
an 11-hour day shift and a 13-hour night shift, or a 10-hour 
day and 14-hour night. Usually the shifts alternate weekly 
and men must work the " long turn " of 18 hours or 24 hours, 
— a solid day at " heavy " labor. In some plants the 36-hour 
turn is still not unknown. (The 7-day week of 12-hour 
turns will be considered later.) 

Consideration of the number on the 12-hour day may begin 
with Mr. Gary's figure of 69,000 ; and might stop there since 
this means that the daily hours and lives of over 350,000 
men, women and children are directly dominated and " arbi- 

1 Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 216. 



48 BEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

trarily " 1 ordered by the Corporation's 12-hour day. The 
total, however, assignable to this class seems to be larger. 
Mr. Gary testified (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 157) : 

"Twenty-six and a half per cent, of all employees work the 
twelve-hour turn and the number is 69,284." 

" All employees," however, includes nearly 80,000 of the 
Corporation's metal miners, coal miners, railroaders, ship 
crews, dockers, etc., not concerned in the strike or in the 
12-hour day. Mr. Gary furnished data to the Commission, 
however, enabling correction of the misleading " twenty-six 
and a half per cent" ; the total of all Corporation employees 
in " the manufacturing plants," that is, in the strike areas, 
is 191,000. Mr. Gary's "69,284 " is 36 per cent, of 191,000. 
The 36 per cent, of men working 12 hours or over fails to 
account for a large number working 11 hours or even 10 
hours, and, on alternate weeks, 13- and 14-hour turns; 
that is, a large number properly to be classed as 12-hour men. 
The only attempt at exact analysis of hours furnished by a 
Corporation plant to the Senate Investigating Committee was 
the following given by Superintendent Oursler of the typical 
Homestead works (Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 482) : 

"21.2 per cent, working eight hours; 25.9 per cent, work- 
ing ten hours; 16.4 per cent, working eleven hours; 36 per 
cent, working twelve hours." 

The " 16.4 per cent, working 11 hours " is made up of day 
shift " 12-hour men " whose hours on night turn will be 
13; 2 that is, a proper classification is 36 per cent plus 16.4 
per cent, or 52.4 per cent, on the 12-hour turn at Homestead. 

1 " Arbitrarily " controlled is Mr. Gary's term in relation to fixing 
wages. Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 226; it also applies to hours. 

2 Mr. Gary's explanation, letter of Feb. 13: " 16 per cent, of the total 
employees at Homestead work 11 -hour and 13-hour turns alternately 
weekly." See next footnote, quoting letters. 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 49 

This does not equal the verbal estimate of the President of 
the Carnegie Co. (of which the Homestead works is a part), 
made to the Commission of Inquiry in November, 1919, 
whose estimate was 60 per cent, of his 55,000 employees on 
the 12-hour turn. 

Moreover the Homestead figures seem to be compiled on the 
same method of classification as Mr. Gary's for the total of 
the Corporation's manufacturing plants: the Homestead 36 
per cent, agrees exactly with Mr. Gary's 36 per cent.; the 
Homestead 21.2 per cent, on " the 8-hour day " agrees with 
Mr. Gary's 22 per cent, on " the 8-hour day," as furnished to 
the Commission. The proper classification, indicated for the 
Corporation's manufacturing plants, is thus 52.4 per cent 
on " the 12-hour " turns. 

Hours in the " independent " plants comprising the other 
half of the industry are approximately the same as the Cor- 
poration's (with a few notable exceptions such as the Pueblo 
works of the Colorado Puel and Iron Co., which are on a 
three-shift 8-hour basis, and Pacific Coast plants which are 
on an 8-hour basis). The only exact figures obtained for 
an " independent " plant were for a department in the 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube as follows : 

On 8 hours. 10 per cent. 

On 10 hours.., 35 per cent. 

On 12 hours.................... 55 per cent. 

The Corporation's figures which were submitted by Mr. 
Gary as estimates, not as exact tabulations 1 (admittedly diffi- 

1 The Steel Corporation's lack of knowledge of now its decrees affect 
its workmen extends to its statistics of hours. Mr. Gary's letters to this 
Commission, again and again replying that "we have no compiled 
statistics" showing the exact data requested, indicate that the task of 
determining precisely the trend of steel hours is left to outside agencies, 
such as the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Even the apparently abso- 
lutely precise figures supplied by the Homestead Superintendent, cited 
above, fail to total up precisely 100 per cent. Mr. Gary's explanation of 
Mr. Oursler's testimony, in a letter to this Commission dated Feb. 13, 



50 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

cult to compile owing to the widely differing methods of 
time-keeping in the Corporation's 300 plants) are borne out 
by more comprehensive statistics from more impartial sources. 
The chief of these sources is the U. S. Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics whose figures are taken from the company pay rolls 
of representative plants all over the country. 

Government statistics are reckoned on the basis of hours 
per week ; roughly interpreted these mean that hours avera- 
ging 70 to 72 weekly mean 6 days of 12 hours each; hours 
averaging 80 to 84 weekly mean 7 days of 12 hours each; 
this is irrespective of how the shifts are actually divided in 
various plants, of 12, 11, 10% or 10 hours, alternating, 
weekly with 12, 13, 13% or 14 hours. Taking the statistics 
for the center of the industry, the Pittsburgh District, by 
departments of plants, for the last quarter of 1918 and the 
first quarter of 1919, as compiled by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (October, 1919, Monthly Review), we have for the 
largest department in the industry : 

1920 contains the following interesting comment: "The percentage Mr. 
Oursler quoted of 16 per cent, for employees working 11 hours is cor- 
rect although his statement, to he exactly right, should have read 16 
per cent, of the total employees at Homestead work H-hour and 13-hour 
turns alternating weekly.'" So far so good, hut Mr. Gary went on: 
" The percentage given of 36 per cent, is not correct if the percentage 
was intended to indicate those who work straight 12-hour turns I he 
number of these straight 12-hour turn men is 26 per cent, of the total. 
Thus at Homestead 26 per cent, of the total men work straight 12-hour 
turns, 16 per cent. 11 and 13-hour turns, alternating as explained and 
the balance of the men work 10 hours or less." 

Now, statistically analyzed, Mr. Gary's letter comes to this: Supply- 
ing his "26 per cent." of "straight 12-hour men" (whatever that may 
mean) for Mr. Oursler's 36 per cent, and totaling all up gives only 
89.5 per cent, and fails to account for the remaining 10.5 per cent, at 
Homestead. His letter indicates plainly that the two classifications 
should be lumped, that is, 16 per cent, plus "26 per cent.," or 42 per 
cent. ; the remaining 10 per cent., of course, is in Mr. Oursler s figures, 
making 52.4 per cent, as the true total of 12-hour men. 

Mr Gary's letter of Jan. 30 to the Commission contains estimates 
even harder to reconcile with his other estimates. This letter gives the 
"standard daily service or turn" as "for about 70,000—10 hours; for 
about 68,000—11, 12, 13 hours." This attempts to lump the 13-hour 
men under the 68,000 but Mr. Gary gave the Senate Committee (Vol. 
II p 157 ) " 69,284 " on " the 12-hour turn," with no mention of the 



THE TWELVE-HOUR BAY 51 

Stockers, 83.6; larrymen, 82.6; larrymen's helpers, 82.3; skip 
operators, 81.6; blowers, 81.7; blowing engineers, 81.7; keep- 
ers, 81.9; keepers' helpers, 81.8; pig machine men, 83; cinder- 
men, 81.8; laborers, 82. Average, 82.1. 

That is, the whole department, the largest in the industry is 
on the 12-hour basis, 7 days a week, a mathematical average 
for all workers in the department being 11.7 hours daily. 

Open hearth furnaces, the next largest producing depart- 
ment, hours per week by occupations are : 

Stockers, 78.8 ; stock cranemen, 76.6 ; charging machine men, 
76.8 ; melters' helpers, first, 78.9 ; melters' helpers, second, 76.1 ; 
melters' helpers, third, 76; stopper setters, 75.8; steel pourers, 
75.7; mold cappers, 77; ladle cranemen, 76.1; ingot strippers, 
70.5; laborers, 78.5. Average, 76.4. 

That is, with one exception, all occupations are above 72 
hours, or the 12-hour day, on a 6-day week basis, and the 

thousands of 12-hour men whose hours on alternate weeks are 14; that 
is, 10 hours by day for one week, and 14 hours by night for the next 
week. It would be a highly misleading classification to lump under 
the 10-hour class, for example, 15,000 men actually working 10 hours 
one week but subject to 14 hours the next. 

At the same time that Mr. Gary was writing to the Commission, he 
made the following admission, as quoted in the statement made by Dr. 
Devine of the Federal Council of Churches to the presidents of the 
Corporation's plants: "the proportion (of 12-hour men) would be 50 
or 60 per cent. Judge Gary said that this might be correct." 

The Corporation's entire statistical reckonings, as furnished to the 
public, are on the wrong basis. The hundreds of different kinds of steel 
jobs vary so in hours-requirements that, for its own benefit, the Cor- 
poration can get accurate estimates only by dropping the vague " alter- 
nating turns " classification and by adopting the long-established gov- 
ernment bureau classification of " hours per week." The government's 
" 72 hours per week," for example, plainly indicates 6 daily 12-hour 
" turns" whether the turns are actually divided into 12 and 12, 11 and 
13, 10 and 14, or any other shifts; likewise "82 or 84 hours weekly" 
indicates the 7-day week of 12-hour turns, no matter how divided. As 
against this system the total " 69,284 " on " the 12-hour turn " sounds 
very exact but means little without additional information as to (a) 
the length of the period for which the figure is given; (b) the number 
outside this 69,284 working 10 or 11 hours but subject bi-weekly to 
13 and 14. 



52 



EEPORT ON" THE STEEL STRIKE 



78.5 weekly hour average of laborers (who constitute 46 
per cent, of the whole) is nearer the 12-hour day, 7-day week 
average. 

Take the same departments, from the latest .figures for 
1919 in the Bureau of Labor Statistics, giving the numbers 
employed instead of percentages and affording comparison 
of other districts with the Pittsburgh District. 



HOURS 



Blast Furnaces 



45 fl 

O 02 




Average 

full time 

hours 




Schedule of 12-hour day 


56 


60 


60-66 


66-72 


72 


72-78 


78 


78-84 


84 


24 


6315 


78.8 


456 


178 


29 


364 


483 


38 


702 


16 


4049 



All under 72 hours per week are from Great Lakes and Mid- 
dle West and Southern Districts (except one laborer at 60 
hours, and 41 laborers at 66-72 hours, in Pittsburgh District). 
With this exception, Pittsburgh blast furnace workers are all 
twelve-hour day and three-quarters are seven-day week. 



Open Hearth Furnaces 





o t>> 


Average 

full time 

hour3 




Schedule of 12-hour day 


56 
751 


60 


60-66 


66 


66-72 


72 


73-78 


78 


84 


19 


4702 


73.8 


80 


10 


38 


39 


1010 


24 


1913 


337 



In this table the only men 60 hours or under, in the Pitts- 
burgh District, are five ingot strippers at 56 and one laborer at 
60. Practically everything 60 and under is Great Lakes and 
Middle West and Pacific Coast Districts (which include a num- 
ber of three-shift, eight-hour day plants). 



THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY 



53 



The only available late figures for a rolling mill depart- 
ment exhibit 78 per cent, of the employees on the 12-hour 
day, almost altogether with the 6-day week. 



Rail Mills 



No. estab- 


No. of 

employees 


Hours 


lishments 


48 


50-60 


60 


72 


84 


5 


1170 


237 


3 


18 


900 


12 



None under 60 in the Pittsburgh District. All 60-hour and 
84-hour men were laborers in this district. The 48-hour men 
were from one mill in the Great Lakes and Middle West Dis- 
trict. 

What do these figures for principal departments mean in 
relation to the Corporation's statistics (keeping in mind that 
half the industry is in the Pittsburgh District and that the 
influence of Corporation practice is less hampered in this 
District) ? They mean altogether — 

that the large continuous-process producing depart- 
ments, — the pace setters of the industry — were being 
run largely on a 12-hour day basis and largely 7 days 
a week; 



that the resultant hours approximated 12 hours daily 
for about half the employees ; 

that to these must be added about a quarter more, mak- 
ing three-quarters of all employees whose hours per week 
were 60 or over, that is, beyond the generally accepted 
maximum for most other industries. 



54 KEPOKT ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

These long hours appeared, in the course of the Commis- 
sion's inquiry, to have a more causative bearing on the strike 
than " Bolshevism." Of the hundreds of strikers and non* 
strikers interviewed in this inquiry, few could put together 
two sentences on " Soviets " but almost all discoursed or, 
more accurately, cursed " long hours." 

Comparisons of wider-sweeping government statistics, also 
based on company pay-rolls, only confirm conclusions. The 
average of hours for the entire industry, including great 
numbers of foundries and fabricating plants whose hours 
average less than those of the plants against which the strike 
was aimed, was 68.7 hours per week or over 11% hours per 
day on a 6-day mathematical average. (U. S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Monthly Review, Sept., 1919.) 

Ten years ago the Labor Commissioner, at the order of 
Congress, made the exhaustive survey of the industry (Senate 
Document 110, four vols.) which formed the standard on 
which to make comparisons. In May, 1910, the percentage 
of employees working 72 hours and over per week, i.e. at 
least 12 hours a day, was 42.58 per cent, {ibid., Vol. I, p. 
xlii). How much the 1919 percentages of 12-hour men may 
have increased over that 42 per cent, cannot be exactly de- 
termined. The average of weekly hours for the industry in 
1910 was 67.6; for 1919 it was 1.1 hours higher. The 
average weekly hours for the Pittsburgh District in 1910 
and 1919 for three departments for which 1919 statistics 
were available were: 

Year Blast Furnaces Open Hearth Plate Mills 

1910 78.7 75.3 67.3 

1919 82.1 76.4 71.1 

These increases were from 1 to nearly 4 hours weekly. 
They are insufficient to prove, but they do suggest, that if 
the government had ordered another exhaustive survey of the 



THE TWELVE-HOUK DAY 55 

iron and steel industry in the months immediately preceding 
the strike, it would have found conditions materially worse 
than they were in 1910 when strikes due to lengthening hours 
started the government survey. 

The requirements of the war, which permitted the steel 
companies free rein as regards hours, ceased with the armi- 
stice and according to steel company officials war conditions 
were largely eliminated 1 in the spring of 1919. By the sum- 
mer of 1919 then there could be no legitimate excuse for war 
conditions; yet it was in the months of July, August and 
early September, 1919, that the steel industry was speeded 
up in every direction ; and for these critical months the gov- 
ernment statistical bureaus have published no figures. 

These, then, were the steel hours constituting one of the 
" relics of barbarism " referred to by an official of a steel 
company, who told an independent investigator 2 that his 
sympathies in the strike were " entirely with Judge Gary " 
but whose stand on hours was set forth in a letter as follows : 

<e At the greatest personal sacrifice,, both in friendship and in 
money, for the past twenty-five years I have waged unceasing 
warfare against the Steel Corporation on the question of the 
seven-day week, the twelve-hour day and the autocratic methods 
of dealing with workmen/' 

These were the hours which must be compared with hours 
in other industries of the country. The steel workers' 68.7 
hours a week must be compared with the street railwaymen's 
56.4 in another " continuous industry " and the nearest com- 
petitor to steel hours in the list of principal industries com- 
piled by the Bureau of Applied Economics, Washington, 

D. C. ; 3 with the anthracite coal miners' 52-hour weekly 

1 " With the close of the war . . . the 7-day service has been largely- 
eliminated. At the present time there is comparatively little of it." 
Letter of Mr. Gary to Commission, Jan. 30, 1920. 

2 K. S. Baker in N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 31, 1919. 
8 See Sub-Report for charts and details. 



56 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

schedule and the bituminous coal miners' 52.9-hour weekly 
schedule; with the standard 48 hours weekly of the United 
States Arsenals, the United States ISTavy Yards, the railroad 
shop men, railroad freight firemen, the ship yards ; compari- 
son is impossible with iiie 44 hours weekly of the building 
trades, the 30 hours average for passenger firemen on the 
railroads. 

These were the hours which must be compared with steel 
hours in England 1 where the twelve-hour day had largely dis- 
appeared before 1914 and where the elimination of the 
twelve-hour day was directly retarded by the competition of 
the American plants' longer schedules. 

These were the hours which must be compared with what 
government sanction and public opinion had for manys years 
considered a standard work week, — 48 hours ; the steel week 
averaged more than 20 hours longer. For thousands of steel 
workers the " normal " work week was nearly twice as long 
as the 44-hour standard customary in many industries. 

These were the hours for 1919 which must be compared 
with the industry's own hours for 1914 and 1910. Five 
years ago the steel week was 2.4 hours shorter ; 10 years ago 
1.1 hours shorter. Steel hours have lengthened in a decade 
when other industries were shortening hours. This in spite 
of Mr. Gary's statement before the Senate Committee : " The 
Chairman of the Committee will bear in mind that we have 
been reducing these hours from year to year, going back many 
years, as rapidly as we could " (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, 
p. 202). The emphasis of the analyst must be laid on the 
" as we could." Industrial history, as noted before, indicates 
that hours inevitably tend to lengthen under absentee cor- 
poration control, unless restricted by public opinion or by 
labor organization. Competition, foreign markets, " the 

i General average of steel hours in England, July, 1919, 47-48 hours 
weekly. 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 57 

war," each in turn, is an actual cause for lengthening hours, 
or an excuse for it long after the cause is gone. Persona], 
will alone, — or " as we could," — simply has not worked re- 
form. Whoever ought to do the reforming, it is a matter of 
record that in England the abolition of the twelve-hour sched- 
ule was initiated and pressed by trade unions. So far as 
the twelve-hour day can be laid to choice, the responsibility 
is flatly put by " independent " steel companies on the Steel 
Corporation. 

The twelve-hour day is not a metallurgical necessity ; steel 
masters are not caught in the grip of their gigantic machin- 
ery. Thirty years ago train wrecks burned up a lot of pas- 
sengers because of the " deadly car stove " ; and the solidest, 
most responsible railroad presidents assured the legislatures 
that coal stoves were an unescapable necessity, that cars could 
not be heated by steam from the engine. Do steel masters 
fail to end the twelve-hour day because they cannot? The 
fact that the eight-hour day has replaced the twelve-hour day 
in England, on the Pacific Coast, in the Pueblo plant of the 
Colorado Fuel and Iron Co., and in some " independent " 
plants near Chicago and Pittsburgh, proves that it is not a 
matter of necessity. Metallurgists agree that production is 
better, — by a small percentage, but better, — on the three-shift 
eight-hour day. Steel engineers do not dispute that three 
shifts mean more steel and better steel. Only one process is 
absolutely " continuous," requiring, on the eight-hour basis, 
three shifts. The final findings of the 1910 survey of the 
industry, which are true today, read (Senate Document 110, 
Vol. I, p. Ixii) : 

" The blast-furnace department is the only one of the four- 
teen departments where there is any metallurgical necessity for 
continuous operation day and night throughout seven days per 
week. . . . Throughout the iron and steel industry ... the 
employees were expected to work seven days wherever the de- 



58 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

partment in which they were working was running seven days 
and the occupation in which they were engaged required con- 
tinuous work. ... 

" The large proportion of Bessemer converters, open hearth 
furnaces and rolling mills working seven days or turns was due 
to the fact that these departments were in continuous operation 
in some plants, although no real necessity for this condition ex- 
isted, only a desire to increase the output of the plant." ' 

Only two excuses were offered to the Commission for the 
twelve-hour day: labor shortage and workmen's preference. 
On analysis we shall see that both are baseless and that the 
true causes concern much more the helplessness of disorgan- 
ized immigrant labor. First, it is advisable to analyze steel 
production sufficiently to understand the kinds of jobs these 
are which must be followed twelve hours a day. 

It is an epigram of the industry that " steel is a man 
killer." Steel workers are chiefly attendants of gigantic 
machines. The steel business tends to become, in the owners' 
eyes, mainly the machines. Steel jobs are not easily char- 
acterized by chilly scientific terms. Blast furnaces over a 
hundred feet high, blast " stoves " a hundred feet high, coke 
ovens miles long, volcanic bessemer converters, furnaces with 
hundreds of tons of molten steel in their bellies, trains of hot 
blooms, miles of rolls end to end hurtling white hot rails 
along, — these masters are attended by sweating servants 
whose job is to get close enough to work but to keep clear 
enough to save limb and life. It is concededly not an ideal 
industry for men fatigued by long hours. 

To comprehend precisely what the twelve-hour day meant, 
the Inquiry gathered data from steel mill officials and from 
the workers themselves. Mr. Gary's testimony was : 

"It is not an admitted fact that more than eight hours is 
too much for a man to labor per day. ... I had my own ex- 



THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY 59 

perience in that regard (on a farm) ; and all our officers worked 
up from the ranks. They came up from day laborers. They 
were all perfectly satisfied with their time of service; they all 
desired to work longer hours ... the employees generally do 
riot want eight hours. ... I do not want you to think that 
for a moment." (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 180.) 

Mr. H. D. Williams, president of the Carnegie Steel Com- 
pany, said that he had worked fourteen hours a day and did 
not feel he was any the worse for it. 

Mr. W. B. Schiller, president of the National Tube Com- 
pany, said that he had worked the twelve-hour day when 
young and that it never did him any harm. 

Mr. E. J. Buffington, president of the Illinois Steel Com- 
pany, said that he had worked the twelve-hour day when a 
young man and he rather thought it did him good. 

This official attitude is important despite the fact that it is 
the testimony of experience undergone twenty-five to forty 
years before, the severity of early work being tempered 
and mellowed in recollection by decades in comfortable office 
chairs. Corporation officials do regard the twelve-hour day as 
a young man's " experience," to be left early. For the 
workers who do not rise to be a steel corporation's subsidiary 
president but who are held for years to the twelve-hour day 
a phrase has been coined which is well understood by them : 
" Old age at forty." Especially they understood it when a 
corporation plant made the rule of hiring no man over forty 
years of age. 

Eirst, what exactly is the schedule of the twelve-hour 
worker ? Here is the transcript of the diary of an American 
worker, the observations of a keen man on how his fellows 
regard the job, the exact record of his own job and hours 
made in the spring of 1919, before the strike or this Inquiry, 
and selected here because no charge of exaggeration could be 
made concerning it. It begins : 



60 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

" Calendar of one day from the life of a Carnegie steel work- 
man at Homestead on the open hearth, common labor: 

"5:30 to 12 (midnight) — Six and one-half hours of shovel- 
ing, throwing and carrying bricks and cinder out of bottom of 
old furnace. Very hot. 

" 12 :30 — Back to the shovel and cinder, within few feet of 
pneumatic shovel drilling slag, for three and one-half hours. 

" 4 o'clock — Sleeping is pretty general, including boss. 

" 5 o'clock — Everybody quits, sleeps, sings, swears, sighs for 
6 o'clock. 

" 6 o'clock — Start home. 

" 6 :45 o'clock — Bathed, breakfast. 

" 7 :45 o'clock — Asleep. 

"4 P. M. — Wake up, put on dirty clothes, go to boarding 
house, eat supper, get pack of lunch. 

" 5 :30 P. M.— Eeport for work." 

This is the record of the night shift ; a record of inevitable 
waste, inefficiency and protest against " arbitrary " hours. 
Next week this laborer will work the day shift. What is his 
schedule per week ? Quoting again from the diary : 

" Hours on night shift begin at 5 :30 ; work for twelve hours 
through the night except Saturday, when it is seventeen hours, 
until 12 Sunday noon, with one hour out for breakfast; the fol- 
lowing Monday ten hours; total from 5:30 Monday to 5:30 
Monday 87 liours, the normal week. 

" The Carnegie Steel worker works 87 hours out of the 168 
hours in the week. Of the remaining 81 he sleeps seven hours 
per day; total of 49 hours. He eats in another fourteen; walks 
or travels in the street car four hours; dresses, shaves, tends 
furnace, undresses, etc., seven hours. His one reaction is ' What 
the Hell ! ' — the universal text accompanying the twelve-hour 
day." 

What kinds of job are these twelve-hour turns ? Here are 
the observations of his own successive jobs by a second 
worker, also an American, also written before the strike 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 61 

began, in the summer of 1919 in an " independent " plant in 
the Pittsburgh district. (Both these workers were distinctly 
critical of labor organizers.) 

"Job of labor in the clean-up gang in pit of open hearth, 
furnaces: 

"The pit is the half -open space where furnaces are tapped 
into ladles (pocket shaped, ten feet high, swung by overhead 
cranes) and ' poured ' into ingot molds. As the hot metal comes 
from the tap-hole much spills and when partially cool must 
be broken with picks and cleaned out, and <( slag' and ' scrap ' 
separated into different cars. 

"The job is: clean up cinder when ladle is dumped; break 
clay covers from valve pipes, pile pipes at side of pit, repile 
pipes on flat car. After pipes have been moved to blacksmith, 
affix chains for swinging them to blacksmith's door, repile in 
6hop. Get straightened pipes back to pit by same series of 
steps; same going and returning for broken chains. Affix hooks 
to ladles when crane shoves ladle in your face. Clean out all 
hot cinder and scrap under all furnaces, take cinder by hand 
or barrel to cinder boxes. Clean hot overflow metal or slag 
from tracks. Very hot work. Tools used, pick, shovel, fork, 
crowbar, sledge-hammer, chains, barrel. Heavy work, but con- 
sidered here as one of the ' easier jobs.' Hours : 14 hours on 
night turn, 10 hours on day turn; long turn of 24 hours every 
two weeks. 

"Job of third-helper, open hearth furnace: 

"With other helpers he makes 'back wall/ which means 
throwing heavy dolomite with a shovel across blazing furnaces 
to the back wall, to protect it for the next bath of hot steel. 
Every third-helper makes the back wall on his own furnace 
and on his neighbor's, sometimes making three or four a shift. 
You march past the door of the furnace, which is opened in your 
face for a moment. Heat about 180° at the distance from which 
the shovelful is thrown in; each shoveler wears smoked gog- 
gles and protects his face with his arm as he throws. After a 
back wall it is necessary to rest at least 15 minutes. 



62 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

" Second and first helpers work i hook and spoon ' to spread 
dolomite for the front wall. Very easy for a new man to get 
badly burned in approaching furnace to fill his spoon. 

" When front wall and back wall are both made there is 
usually a long ' spell ? unless the adjoining furnace needs atten- 
tion. A man may have four or five hours to himself out of 
the fourteen-hour shift or he may work hard the whole turn. 
He may have two or three such easy days or he may have a 
week of the most continuous and exhausting Tcvnd. 

"After making the front and back walls the third-helper 
wheels mud to the tap-hole for lining on the spout; it takes 
40 minutes to one hour ; temperature around spout about 
110°. 

" Scrap, in chunks from small bits to thousand-pound blocks, 
fall from charging boxes when furnace is being charged and 
must be cleaned up by second and third-helpers. 

" The third-helper fills large bags with coal to throw into 
the ladle at tap time; easy to burn your face off. 

"Helps drill a 'bad' hole at tap time, work of the most 
exhausting kind ; also must shovel dolomite into ladle of molten 
steel. This is the hottest job and certainly the most exposed 
to minor burns. Temperatures around 180°, but it takes only 
four or five minutes. Nearly every tap time leaves three or 
four small burns on neck, face, hands or legs. It is usually 
necessary to extinguish little fires in your clothing. Altogether 
not so bad as heavier lifting parts of the furnace job which are 
most hateful, together with the monotonous exposures. 

"On the blast furnaces. Job of the stove gang: 

" Six to ten men in a gang keep the blast furnace stoves 
cleaned (a stove is an oven for heating the blast and is as big 
as the blast furnace itself, full of a gigantic brick checker work) ; 
as stove cools, gang cleans out hardened cinder in combustion 
chamber with pick and shovel. Men go inside the stove. Ten 
minutes to one hour is the length of time inside, according to 
degree to which the stove has been allowed to cool. Before 
going in the man puts on wooden sandals, a jacket which fits 
the neck closely and heavy cap with ear flaps; also goggles. 



THE TWELVE-HOUK DAY 63 

Cleaning out the flue dust not so hot, but men breathe dust- 
saturated air. 

" Hardest job is c poking her out/ ramming out the flue dust 
in checker work at top of stove. Large pieces of canvas tied 
over feet and legs to keep heat from coming up the legs; two 
pairs of gloves needed; handkerchiefs cover all head except the 
eyes. Three minutes to ten minutes at a turn are the limit for 
work in the chamber at top of stove ; very hard to breathe. Aver- 
age man can do four holes each trip. 

"Easy days with couple of hours' sleep are sandwiched in 
between hard ones, after which the men leave the mill exhausted. 
Hours: 12 hours a day. 

"Job of stove-tender helper: 

"Learners' job following stove tender; manipulates large, 
clumsy valves; operations, if performed in wrong order, stove 
tender will break his stove and kill himself. Unless tremen- 
dous pressure is first ' blown off' the opening of another valve 
will blow the opener into bits. Hours: day shift, 10 hours ; 
night, 13 hours." 

These workers' records were made before the strike began 
and are open to no possible charge of bias. They record in 
exact form what many " hunkies " tried to tell investigators. 
As actual experience — as opposed to theory — they may be 
contrasted with this excerpt from Mr. Gary's testimony be- 
fore the Senators (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 160) : 

Mr. Gary. " Nowadays none of these men, with very few 
exceptions, perform manual labor as I used to perform it, on 
the farm, neither in hours, nor in actual physical exertion. It 
is practically all done everywhere by machinery and the boy 
who opens the door I think touches a button and opens the door. 
And this work of adjusting the heavy iron ingots is done by 
the pulling of a lever. It is largely machinery, almost alto- 
gether machinery. That is not saying there is no work in that, 
because of course there is, and I would not belittle it. of course. 



64 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

It is hard work to work hard whatever one does, and to the 
extent one does work hard he, of course, is doing hard work." 

Mr. Gary submitted to the Senate Committee " photo- 
graphs of open hearth laborers at leisure " and asserted that 
they worked but half the time. This hardly accords with 
the open hearth laborer himself who worked that twelve-hour 
day every day in the week and whose daily job includes such 
as the following, and this is described as " not the worst of 
his daily grind " (from Carnegie Steel worker's diary) : 

" You lift a large sack of coal to your shoulders, run towards 
the white hot steel in a 100-ton ladle, must get close enough 
without burning your face off to hurl the sack, using every 
ounce of strength, into the ladle and run, as flames leap to 
roof and the heat blasts everything to the roof. Then you 
rush out to the ladle and madly shovel manganese into it, as 
hot a job as can be imagined." 

'Nov are the above at all the extreme hours of the plant. 
In the millwright department of the Carnegie Steel Company 
everyone in the department works fourteen working days out 
of every fourteen calendar days, on the thirteen-hour night 
turn, including the twenty-four-hour turn within the four- 
teen days. Here is the actual schedule of the above quoted 
worker when employed in the millwright department of the 
Carnegie Steel Company last spring : 

"Five nights at 13 hours, regularly . ... . 65 hours 

Saturday night, regular 15 hours 

Sunday double turn, regular every other week. ... 24 hours 

Total 104 hours 

" Add to this half an hour each night for dinner means three 
hours more, or 107 hours under the plant roof in the 168 hours 
in the week." 



THE TWELVE^HOUR DAY 65 

That conditions in Corporation plants are not worse than 
in " independents " is shown by this from the records of an 
investigator for the Commission (Youngstown, Oct. 27, 
1919) : 

" Timekeeper in the sheet mill department of a large c inde- 
pendent ' stated : that among the men whose time he kept there 
were about 45 rollers who worked eight hours, 110 laborers who 
worked ten hours and 190 who were on the twelve-hour basis, 
seven days a week. They changed every week from day to night 
turn, making a 24-hour shift. These latter included electricians, 
mill hands, engineers, pipefitters, cranemen, loaders, loader- 
helpers, and gasmen. In the sheet galvanizing department the 
men worked a twelve-hour day with no rest spells and no lunch 
hour. Their rates were 42, 42%, and 44 cents. So many 
men gave out under the strain and had to be fired for not being 
able to do the work that checks for these men gave out in the 
time department, and the timekeeper begged the foreman not 
to discharge so many. There were about 100 men in the de- 
partment, and from 35 to 50 were hired and fired each month." 

ISTone can dispute the demoralizing effects on family life 
and community life of the inhuman twelve-hour day. As a 
matter of arithmetic twelve-hour day workers, even if the 
jobs were as leisurely as Mr. Gary says they are, have abso- 
lutely no time for family, for town, for church or for self- 
schooling, for any of the activities that begin to make full 
citizenship ; they have not the time, let alone the energy, even 
for recreation. 

• At Johnstown a member of the Commission was ap- 
proached by a man of middle age who said that he was 
determined never to go back to work until the question of 
hours was settled. He gave as his reason the fact that his 
little daughter had died within the last few months ; he said 
he had never known the child because he was at work when- 



66 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

ever she was awake, or else he was asleep, during the day 
time. He was determined that he would know the other 
children and for that reason felt that it was imperative that 
he should have the eight-hour day. 

This man was an American, getting good wages and embit- 
tered, not by " outside agitators " but by the facts of his life 
as he found them. 

When the Commissioners spoke to President Williams of 
the Carnegie Company about this, he smiled and said that it 
was very evident that the man's case was an exceptional one 
and not to be taken as typical. He did not go on to explain 
how such a man who worked from eleven to thirteen or four- 
teen hours a day or a night could secure time in which to be 
a normal father to a family of children. 

Insufficient evidence was gathered by the Commission to 
pass any judgment on one phase of the twelve-hour day — the 
resultant rate of accidents. The accident rate in the steel 
industry is, of course, still high. After the various criticisms 
of its policies thirteen years ago, and after engineers had 
proved to the companies the loss entailed by accidents and 
especially after compensation laws threatened to make acci- 
dents pretty costly to the companies, the steel companies 
began installing safety devices; the Steel Corporation set up 
a Safety Department which has been the recipient of many 
medals. Only statistics can determine to what extent the 
safety campaign is adequate. Statistically steel still ranks 
with mining for fatal accidents. The 1918 report of compen- 
sable accidents for the state of Pennsylvania gives the four 
largest hazardous industries as follows: 

Number Percent of Total 

Mines and quarries ., 23,161 33.12 

Metals and metal products. . . 22,222 31.78 

Public service . . ... . 4,985 7.13 

Building and contracting. ... 4,184 5.98 



THE TWELVES-HOUR DAY 67 

It was surprising, in view of the reputation which the Steel 
Corporation had been accorded for safety, to find so large 
a number of strikers complaining about hazards. They de- 
scribed with specincness menaces to limb or life, concerning 
which they had complained to foremen and superintendents 
month in and month out without avail. Without adequate 
statistics it was impossible to weigh the value of these com- 
plaints just as it was inadvisable to pay great heed to the 
number of crooked-legged men always seen in the streets of 
a steel mill town. 

Here is a specimen of such complaints, this from a 
worker's testimony before the Senate Committee (Vol. II, 
pp. 728-9) : 

Mr. Colson — I worked in the mill in 1913, in the nail mill. 
I drew 17% cents an hour. I enlisted in the army during 
the trouble in Mexico and from there I was sent to West Point 
Military Academy with a detachment of Engineers, and from 
there to Washington, D. C, with the First Battalion of Engi- 
neers. From there I went to France and I was one of the 
first fifty men that got off the boat — one of the first men in 
France. 

The Chairman — What mill are you in? 

Mr. Colson — The bloom mill at the steel works at Donora, 
Pa.; and, so far as safety conditions up there are concerned, 
a man has no chance, because if he ever slips, his hands are 
greasy and the steps are greasy, and there is no rail, and there 
is no chance for your life, unless you jump out of the window 
and kill yourself. 

Senator Sterling — Did you ever know of anybody slipping 
there ? 

Mr. Colson — Yes, sir; there was one man who slipped and 
fell 'off and I got his job. I took his place as millwright 
helper. 

Chairman — Why did you go on strike? 

Mr. Colson — I went out with them, because I did not get 



68 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

satisfaction from the company in no way. I had to get down 
on my hands and knees and ask for a job. 

Senator McKellar — What job did you have before you en- 
listed in the Eegular Army? 

Mr. Colson — I was in the tool room ; and they said, ' When 
you come back we will give you a good job.' 

Senator McKellar — And when you came back you got 44 
cents an hour? 

Mr. Colson — And longer hours, sir. 

The Chairman — How long did you work? 

Mr. Colson — Thirteen hours during the night and 11 hours 
during the day. 

Ten years ago the Steel Corporation and all steel com- 
panies were under fire because of Sunday work, the seven- 
day week, the possible 365-day year, chiefly the work on the 
largest single department of a steel plant, the blast furnace. 
During the strike the Steel Corporation flatly asserted that 
that condition had been reformed before the war and that 
although the seven-day week was resumed during the war, it 
was quite done away with by 1919. The president of the 
Carnegie Steel Company and of the Illinois Steel Company, 
Corporation subsidiaries, 1 assured this Commission that 
" seven-day work is all done away with," or where it persists, 
as it must in the blast furnace department, that " the seven- 
day week work is a thing of the past"; that is, that blast 
furnace employees got one day off in seven. 

Mr. Gary testified before the Senate Committee (Vol. I, 
p. 179) : " We decided to eliminate the seven-day week if we 
possibly could and we practically eliminated it. At times 
and places there were strikes, because the compensation was 
decreased." 

1 President Schiller of the National Tube Co. said that the 7-day week 
was " indefensible," that his company had none of it but that " most 
other companies' blast furnaces were still on a 7-day basis." 



THE TWELVE-HOUB DAY 69 

On January 30, 1920, in a letter to the Commission, Mr. 
Gary said : 

"We have no compiled statistics in respect of employment 
at blast furnaces which you ask for. 

"As to the seven-day week, however, beg to state that prior 
to the war it had been eliminated entirely except as to main- 
tenance and repair crews on infrequent occasions. During 
the war, at the urgent request by government officials for larger 
production, there was considerable continuous seven-day serv- 
ice in some of the departments. With the close of the war 
this attitude was changed and the seven-day service has been 
very largely eliminated. At the present time there is com- 
paratively little of it. We expect to entirely avoid it very 
shortly." 

Concerning the eighteen-, twenty-four- or thirty-six-hour 
shifts customary with the twelve-hour day, especially at blast 
furnaces, Mr. Gary could find for the Senate Committee only 
" 82 employees working a continuous twenty-four hours once 
each month," and " 344 working continuous eighteen hours 
twice each month." (Vol. I, p. 202.) 

Analysis of all data before the Commission proved that 
conditions regarding the seven-day week work are radically 
different from the impression conveyed by Mr. Gary. 

Moreover the evidence showed this fact : that the conditions 
concerning seven-day week work complained of and proved in 
19 10 -still exist in the steel industry. The thing in the situa- 
tion which needs explaining is not so much whether these evil 
and unnecessary conditions exist today as why they exist, 
especially in the face of the Steel Corporation's asserted de- 
sire to better them. 

The Commission of Inquiry composed as it was of church- 
men, liable to a biased interest in the observance of Sunday, 
for that very reason attempted to confine its studies to in- 



70 KEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

dustrially important facts. Sunday violation by seven-day 
work is a minor consideration compared to the violation of 
American life worked by the twelve-hour day even for only 
six days a week throughout an industry. The seven-day week 
on blast furnaces and the avoidable Sunday work will go 
when the twelve-hour day is eliminated as the industry's 
basis. The Commission tried not to be unduly swayed by 
the testimony of local preachers and priests over the havoc 
wrought in their congregations by the seven-day week worked 
by members of their congregations. For example, part of the 
interrogation of the Kev. Charles V. Molnar, pastor, Slovak 
Lutheran Church at Braddock, Pa. ? by the Commission 
reads : 

u My people are on strike. They work mostly in the Edgar 
Thompson Works. Some are working in Rankin, and have 
some members in Homestead and Duquesne, but most of the 
congregation are in Braddock." 

Question — " Are practically all of your members on the 
twelve-hour day?" 

Answer — " Yes, some of our men have been working longer 
than twelve hours." 

Question — " Is there much Sunday work ? " 

Answer — "Very much; that is what we suffer from. The 
men would be very glad to be excused from Sunday work, but 
it seems impossible to accomplish anything." 

i 

The testimony of a Roman Catholic priest before the 
Senate Committee was even more emphatic. When asked 
about " the number of times that persons have omitted to go 
to church" (Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 544) : 

Father Kazinci — Well, these are from the furnaces in the 
Braddock mills. There are nine furnaces there, and furnaces 
H and A allow the men to go to church every second Sunday. 
The balance of the nine furnaces do not allow their men at 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 71 

all to go to church. Some get a Sunday off, perhaps, once in 
six months; but it is not taking care of their souls. 

The Chairman — Do many members of your church congre- 
gation work on Sunday? 

Father Kazinci — Most of them work on Sunday; and they 
do not see the inside of a church more than once in six months, 
because they are forced to work on Sunday. 

What are the simple statistical facts concerning the 
" elimination " of seven-day work and the " reduction " of 
hours which according to Mr. Gary have been the object of 
such earnest effort by the Corporation ? 

Beginning by re-stating the comparison of hours in 1910 
when private institutions and governmental agencies began 
the " great drive " against such hours, with hours in 1919, 
we have (Figures from Senate Document 110 and October 
Monthly Beview, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) : 






Average steel week, 1910 67.6 hours 

Average steel week, 1919. . . . 68.7 hours 



That is, ten years of " reduction " has increased the num- 
ber of hours. In this time several " independent " concerns, 
such as the Pueblo plant and all the Pacific Coast plants have 
adopted the eight-hour day; the Corporation's hours have 
helped overbalance this " deficit " for the total increase. 

Take the figures for 1914 and 1919 : 

1914 1919 
Common labor — hours per week. . . . 70.3 74. 

Skilled and semi-skilled — hours per 

week , 57. 66. 

All employees — hours per week 66.3 68.7 

In each classification the length of the week has increased. 
Take the seventy-nine separate occupations in the steel in- 
dustry for which statistics are given by the U. S. Bureau 



72 BEPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

of Labor Statistics and compare 1914 and 1919. In eighteen 
classes hours have decreased; in four remained stationary; 
in fifty-seven of the seventy-nine classes hours per week have 
increased, from a few minutes up to fourteen hours per week. 
Blast furnace and open hearth laborers constitute the 
great bulk of the seven-day week workers. Eor all districts 
the figures are : 

1914 1919 

Blast furnace, common labor 70.8 78.9 

Open hearth, common labor 69.5 72.7 

In one case an increase of eight hours per week or more 
than an hour per day since 1914; in the other an increase 
of three hours. 

In the Pittsburgh District, thus eliminating the principal 
eight-hour independents and confining the comparison more 
to Steel Corporation conditions, the figures are: 

1914 1919 

Blast furnace, common labor 73.1 82. 

Open hearth, common labor 71.3 78.5 

Increases of nearly nine hours in one class and over seven 
in the other. Statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Bulletin 218 (Oct., 1917) reveal what actual successes were 
accomplished by the Corporation in " eliminating " seven- 
day work. Seven-day workers in blast furnaces were: (p. 
17) 1911, 89 per cent.; 1912, 82 per cent.; 1913, 80 per 
cent. ; 1914, 58 per cent. ; 1915, 59 per cent. Open hearths, 
during the same period, " about equally divided among the 
seven-day, the seven-day and six-day alternately and the six- 
day groups." Even before the war seven-day " eliminating " 
waited on what " steel demand " decided. The best year's 
figures show that the Corporation never achieved even a half- 
reform. 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 73 

For 1919, after the war, the latest figures for blast fur- 
naces, referred to earlier in this report, mean not even a real 
attempt to reform. The figures were drawn from the twenty- 
four representative establishments' pay-rolls and of the 
employees in the blast furnace department, totalling 6,315, 
exactly 4,049 were on the flat eighty-four-hour week, i.e. 
seven-day week. An additional 756 were on twelve hours, six 
days a week, plus Sunday work ranging up to eleven hours. 
The Pittsburgh section of the twenty-four plants had on 
schedules helow seventy-two hours only the following: 1 
laborer at 60 hours and 41 laborers at 66 to 72 hours. All 
the rest of these Pittsburgh blast furnace workers in twenty- 
four representative plants were on the twelve-hour day and 
all but 485 of the 5,290 were on this twelve-hour-day seven 
days a week. 

f In the open hearth, where there was no metallurgical 
excuse for seven-day work, conditions were similar.} In nine- 
teen representative establishments whose open hearth em- 
ployes total 4,702, 2,750 were on the six and one-half or the 
flat seven-day week, all on the twelve-hour schedule. 

It is in the face of such facts, buried in statistics usually 
unread by the public, that Steel Corporation officials from 
Mr. Gary down assured the Commission that " seven-day 
work was a thing of the past." 

Such statements were maddening to the strikers. A Home- 
stead worker whose evidence happened to be in the shape of 
the notebook in which he had recorded all his hours and 
" turns " for eight months and twenty days previous to the 
strike, went to the Senate Committee hearing in Pittsburgh 
to read what the notebook showed. It showed : 

Hours worked , ., 2,930 

Number of 24-hour turns , 18 

Number of days off 17 



74 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

That is, lie worked the twelve-hour day in ten and one-half- 
hour shifts by day and thirteen hours by night for thirty- 
seven weeks, with the twenty-four-hour shift every fortnight 
and one day off every fortnight. These were the hours of his 
department in a Corporation mill; the schedule of that de- 
partment allowed its employees seventeen days off out of 244. 

He did not testify. He explained to an investigator that he 
saw what he feared were Corporation " spotters " in the room. 
He owned his home in Homestead and he said he could not 
afford to testify and run the risk of being blacklisted. 

Mr. Gary began his account of " elimination " to the 
Senate Committee with the telegram sent by him to the presi- 
dents of all constituent companies on March 18, 1910, read- 
ing as follows : 

"Mr. Corey, Mr. Dickson and I have lately given much 
serious thought to the subject matter of resolution passed by 
the Finance Committee April 23, 1907, concerning Sunday or 
seventh-day labor. . . . The object of this telegram is to say 
that all of us expect and insist that hereafter the spirit of the 
resolution will be observed and carried into effect. There 
should and must be no unnecessary deviation without first tak- 
ing up the question with our Finance Committee. ... I em- 
phasize the fact that there should be at least twenty-four con- 
tinuous hours interval during each week in the production of 
ingots. E. H. Gary." 

This "peremptory order," putting into effect a resolution 
passed three years before, was sent the day after the Federal 
Labor Commission began an investigation of seven-day work 
in the Bethlehem plant on an order from Congress; which 
investigation was later extended to Corporation plants and 
the whole industry. 

Following this telegram, Mr. Gary told the Senate Com- 
mittee, " We practically eliminated it," and he asserted that 



THE TWELVE-HOUE DAY 75 

the Corporation had now sufficiently recovered from the emer- 
gencies of war practically to re-eliminate seven-day work. To 
what extent the Steel Corporation lived up to this peremptory 
order even in peace time can be estimated. In 1916 the Lacka- 
wanna Steel Company in its petition for exemption from the 
one day rest law of New York State showed plainly what 
Professor Commons (who quotes it in the American Labor 
Legislation Eeview, March, 1917) calls "the futility of de- 
pending on even the most prosperous of the tariff's bene- 
ficiaries " : 

"We are advised that the chairman of the United States 
Steel Corporation several years ago, while labor conditions were 
entirely different from those obtaining at the present time, 
gave instructions quite peremptory in character to all the sub- 
sidiaries of that company requiring them to follow out the 
one day of rest principle and warning them that any devia- 
tion from the published instructions would result in dismissal 
from office. We have, therefore, directed our investigations to 
these subsidiaries and state, without fear of successful con- 
tradiction, that the corporation is now disregarding the one 
day of rest in seven principle which it so strongly advocated 
several years ago and which it in the past, in good faith, earn- 
estly strove to put into practice. It, too, has felt the shortage 
of men, and owing to the great and pressing demand for its 
product no longer observes the practice which its chairman 
promulgated. Having taken so firm a position, it is not strange 
that it is difficult to get heads of subsidiaries to admit that the 
published rule has become a dead letter. When labor condi- 
tions become normal the corporation will doubtless return to 
an observance of the rule. So far as we can ascertain, the rule 
was only observed by the corporation during the years when 
the employees of this company had far more time off than the 
one day of rest statute requires." 

There is then some basis for estimating the probable effi- 
cacy of what Mr. Gary told the Senate Committee (Vol. I, 



76 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

p. 180) when he assured the Senators that he believed in the 
eight-hour day and that he believed, " there are a good many 
employees, I do not say the majority or anything like the 
majority, but there are a good many employees who believe 
the same thing." Mr. Gary asserted that the Corporation 
was " very carefully considering that question." He added : 
" If we can make it practicable to develop the eight-hour shift 
throughout our works universally and the men are willing to 
accept that basis we would be very glad to adopt it for the 
reason, if for no other, that we think there is a strong public 
sentiment in favor of it and I would not want to be put on 
record here or any other place as against the eight-hour day 
if the men themselves want it." 

The Steel Corporation offered but two excuses for the 
twelve-hour day to the Commission. 

The first was the shortage of labor. President Williams of 
the Carnegie Steel Company said it would take 50 per cent, or 
26,000 more workers to put in three shifts on the eight-hour 
day in the Carnegie Steel Company (which employs 55,000 
men). He asked: " And if we could get the labor, where 
could we house it? It would take 20,000 more houses." 
Steel masters in general agreed with this viewpoint except 
that Mr. Gary wrote the Commission that only 16% per cent, 
more men would be required, 

On the other hand it was admitted, even by the steel 
masters themselves, that one of the reasons why the industry 
faced a shortage of labor was " because you can't get Ameri- 
cans to work the twelve-hour day." } The labor shortage in the 
industry is a problem, according to the opinion of the steel 
masters or of their employment managers, of getting Slavic, 
Greek, Italian and Turk labor which will work the twelve- 
hour day, or even of admitting Chinese coolie labor into the 
country. It was admitted that Americans dislike the slavish 
character of common labor steel jobs as being " hunkie jobs." 



THE TWELVE-HOUK DAY 77 

Despite this, inasmuch as the steel mills were once entirely 
manned by Americans, it was admitted that a great many 
men would come back to the industry if the twelve-hour day 
were eliminated. 

But the decisive factor, setting aside all consideration of 
the moral questions involved in the twelve-hour day and in 
suggestions of flooding the steel industry with Balkan immi- 
grants or coolie labor, lies in this consideration which, ac- 
cording to engineers, disposes of the labor shortage argu- 
ment against the eight-hour day ; the steel requirements of the 
country could be met by utilizing all the first-class machinery, 
scrapping the rest and distributing the work throughout the 
available labor supply and throughout the year on a three- 
shift eight-hour day basis. 

Engineers' findings are : that the steel industry being run \ 
for the making of profit and not primarily for the making of 
steel as the country needs it, favors (a) spells of idleness 
during which the country and the steel workers pay for the i 
maintenance of idle machinery, and later (b) spurts of long 
hour, high speed labor. 

Here is an analysis of steel production, made in 1919 by 
W. !N". Polakov, who compiled coal production studies for 
the Council of National Defense during the war : 

"It is a well-known fact that during 1914 the mills were 
running considerably below their capacity because of an in- 
dustrial crisis manifested in a general business depression. Pro- 
duction of pig-iron during the two preceding years averaged 
thirty million tons, even at that time, however, utilizing less 
than 75 per cent, of the productive capacity of equipment; 
full productive capacity of blast furnaces in 1914 was 44,405,000 
tons per year. The fact that only 23,300,000 tons were pro- 
duced in 1914 left nearly half of the equipment idle. A con- 
sumer of iron should not be asked to pay for the use of fur- 
naces in which his iron was not made any more than the tenant 



78 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

to pay rent of the vacant apartments of his landlord. Yet 
exactly the same thing was being done when the overhead 
charges, rent, etc., amounting to $104,052,085, were distributed 
on only 23,000,000 tons, while they should have been spread 
over 44,000,000 tons. The consumer was asked to pay rent 
at a rate of $4.47 per ton instead of only $2.17. The country, 
therefore, had to pay $2.30 more for each ton of pig-iron than 
it was worth and than it would have cost if production had not 
been curtailed by the companies. Total over-charges, therefore, 
appear to be about $53,552,084. 

" Similarly, the capacity of steel mills was sufficient to pro- 
duce 45,000,000 tons while only about 23,500,000 tons were 
made. Were the overhead expenses, rent, etc., of only that 
portion of plant and equipment that was actually used in the 
production of steel charged to consumer, the overhead per ton 
would have been not $9.95, but only $5.17, and the country 
would not have had to pay $112,350,000 to the steel makers 
for the equipment the country and the people received no 
benefit from. In other words,|the expense of idle plant equip- 
ment was charged to consumers of both iron and steel, and 
this item alone cost the country $175,009,084.'^ 

The second excuse offered for the twelve-hour day was 
this : that the workers prefer the twelve-hour day. 

This was urged by the Corporation's subsidiary presidents 
before this Commission just as solemnly as Mr. Gary urged 
it before the United States Senate. 

Mr. Gary said " Let me tell you, the question of hours 
has been largely a question of wishes, of desire on the part 
of the employees themselves." 

Steel presidents assured this Commission that in a few 
plants where the three-shift day was inaugurated the plants 
lost their men " because the foreigner wants to work the 
twelve-hour day, he wants to make as much money as he 
possibly can." They united in telling the Commission that 
" if the Corporation put in the eight-hour day, the ' inde- 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 79 

pendents ' would steal all our men, because they want to work 
the twelve-hour day." 

They stated, what there is little reason to doubt, that some- 
times when they tried to put in a rule of one day's rest in 
seven, blast furnace laborers would desert to a seven-day job 
or go to a neighboring plant and work for that extra day when 
they were supposed to be " off." 

This whole argument is based on what Mr. Gary called 
" compensation." Mr. Gary himself said, " Of course if we 
should immediately limit hours to eight and pay for the 
eight hours the same the men are now getting for ten or 
twelve hours every employee would favor it." (Senate Testi- 
mony, Vol. I, p. 180.) o 

There seems to be not the slightest disposition on the part 
of the Corporation in tackling the twelve-hour day evil to go 
at their problem from this standpoint: " What is a wage 
necessary for an American standard of living? Let us pay 
at least that minimum for an eight-hour day." Many pages 
of the Steel Corporation's testimony and hours of discussion 
by presidents and plant superintendents would vanish if the 
Steel Corporation would consent to such a basis of considera- 
tion of its problems. | Of course there are " hunkies " who 
will work just as long as possible for all the money they can 
get ; these are chiefly the immigrants who want to hurry back 
to Europe to live in comparative leisure for the rest of their 
days. Are these men to be favored at the expense of the 
immigrant who has become an American, who wants to stay 
here with his family, who is growing up to American speech 
and ways and who wants to keep himself and his money here 
forever? This latter is the immigrant who struck by the 
tens of thousands against the twelve-hour day; but he looks, 
to Mr. Gary, the same as the un-American worker J Mr. 
Gary told the Senate Committee (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, 
p. 183) : " Some of the men prefer to secure their own places 



80 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

of residence and save their money and take it home — take it 
abroad. Of course this is not objectionable from our stand- 
point at all." But is it not emphatically objectionable from 
the standpoint of American citizenship? 

Mr. Gary propounded his question of pay, what he called 
twelve hours wages for eight hours work, as if it could not 
be taken seriously by practical men. It is taken seriously 
by his entire common labor force. Witnesses before the 
Senate Committee and scores interviewed in this Inquiry 
took the stands set forth in the following paragraph from 
the diary of the Carnegie Steel worker at Homestead in the 
spring of 1919 : 

" A rumor of the coming eight-hour day is commented on 
as follows: Negro laborer says he doesn't see how he can 
get along with only eight hours as long as family groceries stay 
up so high. One of the best first-helpers, pay check $175 to 
$200 every fifteen days, mainly tonnage, says it would be fine; 
it would cost money, but it would give him a chance to get 

the good of being alive." 

o 

There in a nutshell are the answers given by the two main 
parts of the labor force. The upper third, consisting of the 
skilled workers and upper half of the semi-skilled, would 
willingly accept a compromise cut in wages for the sake of 
the eight-hour day. The other and greater half, especially 
the common labor section, feel they must have their present 
pay when they get the eight-hour day. That the Corporation 
recognized some reasonableness in this stand was evidenced 
when Mr. Gary announced a 10 per cent, raise for all com- 
mon labor three weeks after the strike was called off. 

This Inquiry hesitated to raise the issue as to whether 
or not the rates of pay for the Steel Corporation's common 
labor are purposely kept low in order to force men to submit 
to the inhuman twelve-hour day. 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 81 

Progressive steel masters have fought the Corporation's 
twelve-hour day for years. They instance what is well 
known, that the actual work delivered toward the end of the 
twelve-hour shift, much less the eighteen, twenty-four, or 
thirty-six hour shift, is nothing compared to the wear and 
tear on the workman delivering the labor. The following 
quotation from the diary of the Carnegie steel worker is 
pertinent : 

" The twelve-hour day for common labor is impossible. To 
deliver heavy muscular effort for twelve hours cannot be done. 
The last six hours is done with a 35 per cent. load. After 
midnight it is a contest to see who keeps out of the boss's way 
and does the least work." 

In sum, the twelve-hour day is the most iniquitous of the 
by-products of the Corporation's labor policy; which is to 
get cheap labor and keep it cheap. The Corporation baits 
floating labor with the wage possibilities of excessive hours, 
does nothing to combat the drainage of money out of the 
country by the smaller fraction of the incorrigibly un-Ameri- 
can immigrant ; and for the greater bulk of immigrants who 
want to be Americans it imposes un-American hours. In the 
light of thirteen years' history of " eliminating " the seven- 
day week, the conclusion seems unescapable: that the Steel 
Corporation moves to reform only when it has to. It must 
be added that if the twelve-hour day is bad for the country, 
the government is to blame and as long as it fails to tackle 
the twelve-hour day it imposes upon the trade unions alone 
the humane task of moving the Steel Corporation in the 
direction of reform. 

Moreover, the conclusion is unescapable that a real cause 
of the persistence of the twelve-hour day and the seven-hour 
week is the defenselessness of the unorganized immigrant 
worker. Again the government, as much as the Steel Cor- 
poration, is to blame and again the Corporation and the 



82 EXPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

government have seen fit to leave the field of reform to the 
trade unions. 

In the twenty-eight pages of the Senate Committee's Ee- 
port on the steel strike much space is devoted to the need 
for Americanization. Only a few lines were devoted to the 
twelve-hour day. \But Americanization is a farce, night 
schools are worthless, Carnegie libraries on the hilltops are 
a jest, churches and welfare institutions are ironic while the 
steel worker is held to the twelve-hour day or the fourteen- 
hour night. Not only has he no energy left, he has literally 
no time left after working such schedules. He has not even 
time for his own family.'] 

The facts have long been known. The National Associa- 
tion of Corporation Schools, the chief employers' organization 
for furthering workers' education, at its 1919 session heard 
A. H. Wyman of the Carnegie Steel Company of Pittsburgh 
cite the reasons given by immigrant workers for dropping 
out of the nightly English classes for foreigners in the South 
Chicago public schools : 

Fatigue from long hours.. , 27 

Change of jobs, unable to get to school by 7 P. <M....... 36 

Change from day to night work . . 37 

Overtime work ,., ........ 69 

Total 169 

That is, nearly fifty per cent, of the startlingly small group 
of 341 enrolled out of the tens of thousands in the district 
dropped out for reasons connected with hours. Mr. Wyman 
did not mention the relation of steel workers' hours to the 
defeat of the South Chicago Americanization educational 
campaign ; neither did anybody else in the audience mention 
it. 1 

The Committee of Senators investigating the strike heard 
1 Report National Association of Corporation Schools, 1919, p. 492. 



THE TWELVE-HOUR DAY 83 

testimony directly related to this matter of Americanization 
of which the following is typical (Vol. II, p. .602) : 

A. Pido — Twenty-three years old, an immigrant striker, on 
the stand. 

The Chairman — What is the reason yon struck this time? 

Mr. Pido — I strike on eight hours a day and better condi- 
tions. 

Senator McKellar — What sort of conditions do you want 
better ? 

Mr. Pido — This better; I think that a man ought to work 
eight hours today and have eight hours sleep and eight hours 
that he can go to school and learn something; and I think that 
an education is much better than any money. I have been 
going to night school in Clairton for a while. 

The Chairman — Did a good many of the men go to night 
school ? 

Mr. Pido — They don't have any chance. They work 12 hours 
a day, and they do not have any chance. 

The Chairman — How long did you go to night school? 

Mr. Pido — I went about twenty nights altogether. 

The Chairman — Is that all of the schooling that you have 
ever had? 

Mr. Pido — I did not have any chance. 

The Chairman — How many men went to the night school? 

Mr. Pido — Not very much. There were about twenty-three 
altogether. 

The Chairman — Do you think they would go to night school 
if they had an opportunity? 

Mr. Pido — I think they would if they had a chance to go, 
but the way they are now they have no chance to go to school. 

Another witness, a Slovak priest in Braddock, testified as 
follows : 

Father Kazinci: "We have an Americanization course in 
project taking place, and they have been instructed to go and 
attend those night schools. They are not a very great success, 



84 .REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

for the simple reason that the men are overworked, working 
from 10 to 13 hours a day; and they do not feel like going 
to the schools and depriving their families of their own com- 
pany and society even after those hours, those long hours. 
Sundays, they have none, for most of them go off to work. 

" The men are worked from 10 to 13 hours a day. The 
conditions under which they are living are bad for America. 
The housing conditions are terrible. The work conditions, the 
hours of work, are absolutely impossible, and I think that it 
tends to make the men become disgusted with the country, 
and they will say, ' Well, let us go back to the old country ; 
perhaps it is going to be better than it is for us here.' There 
is no hope for them bettering their condition, for they work 
from the time the whistle begins to blow in the morning until 
they are whistled out at 6 o'clock in the evening." (Vol. II, 
p. 544-6.) 

Americanization of the steel workers cannot take place 
while the 12-hour day persists. Human beings un-Ameri- 
canized by the 12-hour day in such scores of thousands are 
a stiff price paid by America for the profits of steel com- 
panies. 

Recommendations along the following lines seem unescap- 
able: 
That the 12-hour day is a barbarism without valid ex- 
cuse, penalizing the workers and the country. 
That the church and every other American institution has 
a duty to perform to the immigrant worker and that 
this duty cannot be fulfilled until the 12-hour day is 
abolished. 
That effective elimination of the 12-hour day must and 
can be initiated and worked out only by (a) the U. S. 
Steel Corporation in free cooperation with its workers, 
and (b) by the Federal Government. 



IV 

WAGES m A JSTO-CONFEKENCE INDUSTKY 

Analysis of the wages paid in the iron and steel industry, 
together with comparisons with wages in other industries and 
with two recognized standards of living, results in the fol- 
lowing conclusions directly bearing on the causes of the 
strike : 

The annual earnings of over one-third of all productive 
iron and steel workers were, and had been for years, below 
the level set by government experts as the minimum of subsis- 
tence standard for families of five. 

.The annual earnings of 72% of all workers were, and 
had been for years below the level set by government ex- 
perts as the minimum of comfort level for families of five. 

This second standard being the lowest which scientists 
are willing to term an " American standard of living," it 
follows that\nearly three-quarters of the steel workers could 
not earn enough for an American standard of living. 

The bulk of unskilled steel labor, with exceptions here- 
after noted, earned less than enough for the average family's 
minimum subsistence. 

The bulk of semi-skilled steel workers earned less than 
enough for the average family's minimum comfort. 

Skilled steel labor is paid wages disproportionate to the 
earnings of the other two-thirds, thus binding the skilled 
class to the companies and creating divisions between it and 
the rest of the force. 

41.6 per cent, of the payroll goes to the skilled, who number 
but 30.4 per cent, of the whole. 

85 



86 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

30.6 per cent, of the payroll goes to the semi-skilled, who 
number 31.5 per cent, of the whole. 

27.8 per cent, of the payroll goes to the unskilled, who, how- 
ever, are 38.1 per cent, of the whole. 1 

One-half of the three-quarters earning less than an Ameri- 
can living wage reached even their wage levels only because 
of the twelve-hour day with its " 14-hour earnings." 

Wage rates in the iron and steel industry are determined 
by the rates of the IT. S. Steel Corporation. The Steel Cor- 
poration sets its wage rates, the same as its hour schedules, 
without conference (or collective bargaining) .with its em- 
ployees; it decrees them arbitrarily. 

Mr. Gary testified before the Senate Committee : 

"I have forgotten how many times we increased wages dur- 
ing the war, but repeatedly, voluntarily — arbitrarily, but arbi- 
trarily in favor of the workmen." (Senate Testimony, Vol I, 
p. 226.) 

The Commission's data on wages were furnished primarily 
by the U. S. Steel Corporation. The Corporation's Annual 
Reports, together with more recent statistics supplied by Mr. 
Grary are here analyzed through the media of the standard 
government survey of the industry, (Senate Document 110, 
4 vols.), the analyses of the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics; and are checked by data accumulated by the Commis- 
sion's investigators. Comparison is made with budgets of 
expenditures supplied by workers' families in the Pitts- 
burgh District and with wage rates paid in similar industries. 

In relation to the strike these wage analyses warrant the 
following conclusion: 

i Figures derived from analysis of the wage tables in Senate Docu- 
ment 110. The proportion between the different classes of workers 
and other general conditions have not changed vitally since then (1910). 
The percentages have been carried out to the decimal point, although, 
of course, they represent no such precise division in fact. 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 87 

Besides the skilled workers who struck principally against 
arbitrary (or autocratic) control and besides the mass 
which, struck mainly against the 12-hour day, a large 
proportion of the unskilled and semi-skilled struck also 
against wages which, statistics indicate, were actually 
inadequate to maintain an American standard of liv- 
ing. 

In regard to the Steel Corporation's financial ability to pay 
higher wages than it does the following facts were noted : 

The Corporation increased its total undivided surplus from 
$135,204,471.90 in 1914 to $493,048,201.93 in 1919, 
that is, to a figure larger than its total wages and salary 
budget for 1919. ) 

Increases in wages during the war in no case were at a sacri- 
fice of stockholders' dividends. 

•Net earnings per ton of steel in 1918 were $14.39, that is, 
higher than the average since 1910, ($13.03). Net 
earnings per ton of steel in 1917 were $19.76. 

These conclusions being true, some explanation should be 
made of what would then seem to be a popular illusion, — 
that steel is a highly paid industry. The most recent cause 
of this illusion is, perhaps, Mr. Gary's testimony on wages 
before the Senate Committee. Mr. Gary began his wage 
list with " rollers, $32.56 per day " (Senate Testimony, Vol. 
I p. 156). Although it became quickly apparent (ibid. p. 
159) 1 that there was only one roller in the steel business 
making that $32.56 per day, nevertheless, the public at large 
seems to have accepted Mr. Gary's flat statement that " the 
Corporation has been in the van all the time " 2 and his 
•applications of this to wages, such as the following : 

1 Mr. Gary: "Senator, I believe there is only one who gets as high 
as $32.56.'* 

2 P. 178. 



88 EEPORT ON" THE STEEL STEIKE 

Mr. Gary : " I wish to state that there is no basic industry 
in this country, nor in the world, in my opinion, which has 
paid larger wages to its employees than the United States Steel 
Corporation, and perhaps not as large. . . . 

" For the year 1914 in manufacturing the wages were $2.93 ; 
July, 1919, $6.27, an increase of 114 per cent. ... all com- 
panies, 1914, $2.88; July, 1919, $5.99, an increase of 108 
per cent.; unskilled labor, 10 hours, 1914, $2 per day; July, 
1919, $4.62, an increase of 131 per cent. Twelve hours, in 
1914, $2.40; in July, 1919, $5.88, an increase of 145 per cent. 
(p. 158). 

" We have stood for the highest wages, iinvariably. We 
have been the first to increase wages and the last to decrease 
them." (Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 175.) 

Altogether, Mr. Gary's figure of $6.27 per day as the 
average for the whole industry, his figures on wage increases 
in hundred percentages and exhibits of photographs of beauti- 
ful homes owned by steel workers, combined to leave with 
the public the impression that " steel may be mighty hard 
labor but its wages are mighty big," and that " whatever else 
the steel trust may be, it pays well." It might not be unfair 
to say that the impression is general that the Steel Corpora- 
tion's reason for hiring 24 different races of foreigners was 
that they could stand the hours, not that the kind of wages 
these foreigners would take had anything to do with it. 

Another means of misleading public opinion undoubtedly 
was the appearance in the press and in magazines during the 
strike of many articles such as the one entitled " Think of 
the ' Poor Steel Workers ' Who Get Prom Four Dollars to 
Seventy Dollars a Day" in the Current Opinion of Janu- 
ary, 1920. The article is taken from the N. Y. Sun and goes 
on to say: 

" According to a writer who has been investigating condi- 
tions in the Pittsburgh steel mill district for the New York 



WAGES m BTOvCONFEKENCE INDUSTRY 89 

Bun, the worker on an ice wagon or on a moving van in any 
large city does more real hard work in a day than the aver- 
age mill laborer does in two or three days. . . . .Wages of from 
$8.26 to $9 a day have been made right along by semi-skilled 
workers, a large number of whom are foreign born. For 
what are known as skilled workers in the steel mills, to which 
positions all workers may aspire and many of which are held 
by aliens, the average daily wages are, at this writing: 

Steel rollers $28.16 

Sheet heaters 21.12 

Roughers 11.92 

Steel pourers 12.84 

Vessel men 14.65 

Engineers, manipulators, etc 12.63 

Blooming mill heaters ,. 17.92 

Skelp mill heaters . . 18.18 

Skelp mill rollers 21.73 

Lap welders 16.08 

Blowers ,. . 13.76 

Bottom makers 12.91 

Regulators , 13.52 

"It is stated authoritatively that employees of the United 
States Steel (Corporation now are the highest paid body of men 
in the steel industry in the world." 

The list of employees given above, " rollers," etc., consti- 
tutes a fraction of 1 per cent, of all employees. Of these in 
turn, the " aliens," or immigrants who " may aspire " to 
such jobs, constitute a fraction of 1 per cent. It was " stated 
authoritatively " — on behalf of steel companies, — many times 
during the strike that steel workers were highly paid, on the 
basis of such citations as the above. 

The result was that most persons had the impression that 
"wages were not an issue in the strike." Even public 
spirited citizens who conferred with Mr. Gary on the strike 



90 KEPOKT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

remained under this misapprehension. Persons who took 
the trouble to mingle with strikers, however, found every 
other man complaining of wages. Half the strikers inter- 
viewed by the Senate investigating committee talked of " low 
wages." 

It is entirely possible that the Steel Corporation heads 
sincerely believe their workers are well off, financially. ~No 
such analyses as the following were obtainable from the Cor- 
poration's statisticians. 

Analysis shows that the misconception of steel as a high 
wage industry arises from: 

(a) The existence of a very small highly skilled and highly 
paid body of American workers prominently visible at 
the top of the industry. 

(b) Failure to realize that the amounts earned by the low- 
skilled, (the bulk of the labor) are determined chiefly 
by the extraordinary long hours rather than by a high 
rate per hour. 

That is : steel rates are the same or lower than in similar 
industries if earnings are compared on a basis of equal hours. 
As regards common labor steel is a low wage industry. Com- 
parison of common labor earnings in steel with common 
labor earnings in five other major industries in the Pitts- 
burgh district for the latter part of 1919 on the basis of a 
common standard week shows steel labor the lowest paid of 
the six. 

" This class (common labor) is of the greatest importance 
in the industry, not only because of the very large propor- 
tion employed, but even more because their wage forms the 
base rate of the entire industry, above which the wages of 
the other employees are graded." (Senate Document, 110, 
Vol. I p. xxxix.) This finding of the Labor Department's 
famous study of the steel industry in 1910 is admittedly true 
today. The steel wage, as well as the organization of the 



WAGES m NO-CONFEKENCE INDUSTRY. 91 

steel business, (see next section of this report) is pyramided 
on a broad and tremendous base of common labor, restlessly 
drifting and with a high turnover while the industry is held 
together by the tight and almost unbreakable skilled organi- 
zation at the apex. Yet the high pay rates at the top depend 
largely on the rates which the mass at the bottom are will- 
ing to take. 

True understanding of the wage complaints of thousands of 
steel workers depends on analyzing the huge wages budget 
of the Corporation to show how the earnings are divided. It 
is no comfort to the underpaid worker to learn that the 
Corporation paid in wages and salaries for 1918, $452,663,- 
524. ; and for the first eight months of 1919, to manufacturing 
employees, $255,861,264. The following figures make the 
matter plainer than gigantic totals, though the figures are 
based on the totals, which include many salaries in the 
administrative force, admittedly larger than the run of pro- 
ducing employees' wages. (Reference is made to tables in 
sub-reports.) These figures are maxima, too high to be rep- 
resentative. The figures cover approximately the union or- 
ganizing period of a year before the beginning of the strike, 
September 22, 1919. 

In 1918 the the Corporation's wage and salary budget " for 
the manufacturing properties," $344,907,626 went to the 
198,968 employees as follows: 

60,486 skilled (30.4 per cent, of all) got 41.6 per 

cent, or , $143,581,571 

62,675 semi-skilled (31.5 per cent, of all) got 30.6 

per cent, or 105,531,733 

75,807 unskilled (38.1 per cent, of all) got 27.8 
per cent, or , 95,884,320 

In 1919 the Corporation's wage and salary budget ($255,- 
861,264 for eight months) went to 191,000 employees as fol- 



92 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

lows : (eight months budget multiplied by 50 per cent, for an 
annual basis) : 

58,064 skilled (30.4 per cent, of all) got 41.6 
per cent, or $159,657,328 

60,165 semi-skilled (31.5 per cent, of all) got 30.6 

per cent., or 117,440,320 

72,771 unskilled (38.1 per cent, of all) got 27.8 
per cent., or 106,694,145 

That is, individual average earnings were not higher than 
as follows, since the above totals contain administrative 
salaries : 

In 1918: 

Skilled annual earnings averaged under , $2,373 

Semi-skilled annual earnings averaged under. . 1,683 

Unskilled annual earnings averaged under. .... 1,265 
In 1919: 

Skilled annual earnings averaged under $2,749 

Semi-skilled annual earnings averaged under. . 1,952 

Unskilled annual earnings averaged under 1,466 

With this must be compared what the workingman is 
always comparing with his wage — his cost of living. Before 
taking up detailed discussion of standards of living, it will 
be convenient to set down here brief definitions of two stand- 
ards, (disregarding a third commonly called the pauper line, 
because the latter has not been defined with scientific exacti- 
tude comparable to) — (1) the minimum subsistence level, and 
(2) the minimum comfort level) both for families of iive. 

These standards, derived from the most exhaustive extant 
analysis of cost of living statistics, incorporated in govern- 
ment reports and used in government wage awards, are defined 
as follows: 



WAGES IN" NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 93 

1. The minimuni of subsistence level. This is based essen- 
tially on animal well-being, with little or no attention to the 
comforts or social demands of human beings. 

2. The minimum comfort level. This is somewhat above 
that of mere animal subsistence, providing in some measure 
for comfortable clothing, insurance, a modest amount of rec- 
reation, etc.^) This level provides for health and decency, but 
very few comforts, and is 'probably much below the idea had 
in mind in the frequent but indefinite expression, f< the Ameri- 
can standard of living/' 

In other words, these standards applied to families, mean 
first, the level at which a wage-earner can keep himself and 
his dependents healthfully alive; second, the lowest level at 
which scientists would be willing to put " the American 
standard of living." (The detailed calculations of these stand- 
ards, chiefly on the basis of the work done for the govern- 
ment by Prof. W. F. Ogburn, the best known American 
authority on costs of living statistics, will be set forth later 
in an appendix.) 

It must be noted that as standards for wages, these levels 
are bitterly protested by organized labor. The whole princi- 
ple of limiting wage rates to their relation to bare standards 
of subsistence or of minimum comfort has been denounced 
again and again by Mr. Gompers. The following figures 
therefore may be considered simply at the rock bottom of 
calculation for those who wish to grasp the meaning of exist- 
ing wage rates, not as representing rates which organized 
labor considers just. 

For 1918, Family of Five (June)' 

Minimum of subsistence level , $1,386 

Minimum of comfort level 1,760 

For 1919, Family of Five (August) 

Minimum of subsistence level $1,575 

Minimum of comfort level 2,024 



94 KEPORT ON THE STEEL STKIKE 

These figures, — which are hammered down to the most 
conservative possible levels — may be compared with the 
(highest possible) individual averages based on the Corpora- 
tion's payrolls above ; as follows: — 

1918 1919 

Minimum of comfort level $1,760 $2,024 

Minimum of subsistence level , 1,386 1,575 

Unskilled labor's annual average 1,265 1,466 

That is, in 1918, the unskilled worker's annual earnings 
were more than $121 below the minimum of subsistence 
level and more than $495 below the " American standard of 
living " for families. 

In 1919 the unskilled worker's annual earnings were more 
than $109 below the minimum of subsistence level and more 
than $558 below the " American standard of living." 

Comparing the semi-skilled earnings and the minimum of 
comfort level: 

1918 " 1919 

Minimum of comfort level $1,760 $2,024 

Semi-skilled labor's annual average 1,683 1,952 

That is, in both years the semi-skilled's annual earnings 
Were below the lowest " American standard of living " for 
families. 

These two groups, unskilled and semi-skilled, comprise 72 
per cent, of all manufacturing iron and steel workers. 

If, leaving average annual earnings for a moment, com- 
parison is made between (a) the two standards of living cited 
and (b) the wages of those groups of workers whose highest 
earnings just fail to reach these standards, the following 
curious and significant revelation results. That is, the labor 
force of 191,000 men for 1919 can be classified by grada- 
tions upward, beginning with the group earning $3.36 a day 
or approximately $1,000 a year, then the group earning 



.WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 95 

$1,200, then $1,300, etc. The level at which $1,575 (the 
minimum of subsistence standard) appears in this classifi- 
cation leaves just 38 per cent, of the workers below it. If 
the classification is continued on upward, through $1,600 
annually, $1,700, $1,800, etc., the level at which $2,024 
(the minimum of comfort standard) appears leaves just 72 
per cent, of the workers below it. But 38 per cent, marks 
the limit of unskilled labor and 72 per cent, the limit of 
semi-skilled. 

That is, as if by the workings of a law, all in the unskilled 
class fall just short of the level of living to which common 
labor ordinarily feels it is entitled and should attain, — the 
level of a healthful animal existence. And all in the semi- 
skilled class (workers in steel jobs usually from 1 year to 5 
years or more) fall just short of the level of living to which 
more steady workers feel they ought to attain — the level of 
decency and at least a few comforts. 

Such a " law " might be put thus : that the " labor market," 
if left only to " supply and demand," uninfluenced by trade 
union or other forces, tends to leave the top level of possible 
earnings for each class of worker just out of reach. Each 
class of worker must always be striving for the level of 
livelihood which seems " due" him and always be just short 
of it. He must, therefore, always be working his hardest. 

The worker is, therefore, by the workings of such unre- 
stricted industrialism, " speeded " to the limit by the hope 
of attaining the standard which seems surely attainable. 
Employers capitalize the situation, partly consciously, — " if 
you pay 'em too much, they won't work " — and partly un- 
consciously, by making each wage raise just enough to meet 
" increased costs of living." Consciously, employers have 
utilized this " law " to speed workmen by skilfully adjust- 
ing reductions in piece-rates of payment to increases in out- 
put. This is the practice of " increasing output by c shaving ? 



96 BEPOKT ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

rates, a method raised to perfection by the steel trust," * as 
observed by Prof. Carleton Parker in 1914. 

The wage averages given above, it should be noted again ? 
were based on the money actually paid out. The true aver- 
ages for each class of work, therefore, could not be over 
the figures given. How much lower than the given averages 
the true averages should be is hard to determine. It depends 
mainly on the extent to which the Steel Corporation has 
lumped into its totals for wages for the labor force, the sums 
spent for salaries for the great office and administrative or- 
ganizations. That these have been lumped in is obvious ; 2 
but to what extent can only be estimated. Besides the adminis- 
trative salaries which must be paid out of the industry's 
productiveness, there are such items as the thousands of 
" plant police " and other adjuncts of anti-union policies, 
whose pay must also be earned by the productive steel workers. 
This percentage of deduction for administrative overhead, 
etc., should be, judging by the only statistics available, about 
9 per cent. In 1910 the indicated average for all Steel 
Corporation employees, obtained by dividing the given total 
payroll of $174,995,130 by the 218,435 employees, was $801 
per man annually. But the actual average annual earnings, 
as determined by the government's exhaustive survey of that 
year, were about $726 per man, or 9 per cent, below the 
Steel Corporation's indicated average. In 1919 the Cor- 
poration's indicated average, obtained by dividing the given 
manufacturing plant payroll by the number of manufacturing 
employees, was $2,009 per man. If this " manufacturing 

1 " The Technique of American Industry," Atlantic Monthly, Jan., 1920. 

2 The fact is plainly indicated by analysis of the figures cited by Mr. 
Gary to the Commission in the letter of Jan. 30. This gives $344,907,- 
626, as the " total payroll " for " the employees of the manufacturing 
plants." If this excluded administrative salaries, etc., these salaries 
should raise unduly the average annual wage for the rest of the Cor- 
poration's 70,000 employees. Instead the average for the remaining 
70,000 is $200 lower than the average given as for "the employees of 
the manufacturing plants" alone. 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 97 

payroll " contains the same proportion of overhead as the 
Corporation's customary " total payroll/' as seems to be true, 
this average of $2,009 should be 9 per cent, too high as a 
true average. But the $726 true average of 1910, increased 
by 150 per cent., (the actual increase in iron and steel wages 
according to government reports 1 ) would be $1,815 and this 
is also just 9 per cent, below the Corporation's indicated 
average. This would mean that the true average annual earn- 
ings of iron and steel workers for 1918 and 1919 would be as 

o 

follows : 

1918 1919 

Unskilled $1,152 $1,335 

Semi-skilled , 1,534 1,777 

Skilled , 2,178 2,502 

That is, if a survey were made of company payrolls, it 
would probably indicate the above as the actual average 
earnings of steel workers. 2 

These facts, then, should be borne in mind in consider- 
ing the following recapitulating table. The above averages 
are probably much truer estimates of actual annual earn- 
ings than the averages given below which, on the com- 
panies' own statistics, are maxima. The true averages for 
semi-skilled and unskilled are farther below the standards 
of living than this table indicates: 

1918 1919 

Skilled . ., $2,373 $2,749 

Minimum of comfort 1,760 2,024 

Semi-skilled 1,683 1,952 

Minimum of subsistence 1,386 1,575 

Unskilled 1,265 1,466 

1 Increase in average hourly earnings 1910 to 1919 is 150 per cent. 
Bulletins U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 218 and Monthly Labor 
Review, November, 1919, p. 192. 

2 An increase of 10 per cent, for common labor with proportionate 
adjustments for skilled was gTanted by the U. S. Steel Corporation 
at the close of the strike. This was immediately met by increases 
from the independent companies. 



98 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

In each of two classes, in each year, the average earnings 
were below the standard of living which each class normally 
feels to be the least " due " him. How far one class, common 
labor, was below the minimum comfort or lowest " American 
standard of living" was striking. 

For many years this was so in the industry; decency, or 
comfort, just out of reach, for two-thirds of the workers. 
Therefore many strikers, who looked blank at mention of 
" Bolshevism " and who knew little even of the A. F. of L., 
insisted on talking a great deal about wages to this Com- 
mission's investigators and to the Senate Committee. 

Such were the hard facts of which all but skilled steel 
workers were more or less conscious year in, year out. They 
realized that by the long day, and its overtime they could 
earn considerable sums, but, what with exhaustion due to 
overwork and what with lay-offs due to shut-downs, the an- 
nual income was disappointing. Though they were laid off, 
they must eat and their families be kept alive. Iron men, 
with plants running full time, could earn much more than 
the $24.32 (1918) or the $28.19 (1919) maximum weekly 
averages actually paid to common labor in those years. For 
example, the following is an Open Hearth gang actual sched- 
ule for a Pittsburgh District plant, July, 1919 : 

Hours: ten-hour day, fourteen-hour night 
(Alternate 6-day and 7-day week) 

Weekly Bate 

Common labor . . .unskilled $35.28 $ .42 

Pit unskilled 36.12 43 

Third-Helper .... semi-skilled . . . 45.00 ( 6 wks. to learn ) .45 

Second-Helper . . .skilled 45.00 (8 mo.-2% yrs.) . 7.00 a day 

First-Helper skilled 69.00 10.07 plus 

tonnage 
($lor$2) 
17 (hours) X 45 (cents) X 6 (days) =: night week 
11 " X 45 " X 6 " + ( 32 X 45) = day week 

The mathematics of overtime for the semi-skilled man at the end 
illustrates the story. This Third-Helper makes his total on his " night 
week," 14 hours for 6 nights, by multiplying his hourly 45 cents by 
17 hours by 6. He makes his "day week" total by multiplying 45 
cents by 11 hours by 6 plus one 24 hour turn, or (overtime pay, 32 hours 
in all), $14.40. 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 99 

If this semi-skilled man kept this up for 52 weeks he 
would, being allowed only 26 days rest in all that year of 
12-hour days, earn $2,340 or $216 over the minimum of 
comfort level for 1919. And (if the common laborers who 
make up 49 per cent, of Open Hearth employees, worked 
this 12-hour schedule for all but 26 of the 365 days in the 
year, they would still be nearly $200 below the lowest 
"American standard") But few men can stand it and few 
plants run without a lay-off, — many are " down " from 8 
to 20 weeks a year, and the years' earnings are never " full 
time." Thus common labor's income is annually below 
healthful existence for families. 

It is these possibilities of overtime on 12 to 24-hour shifts 
which give to steel jobs the reputation of " high pay " which 
they actually enjoy among a considerable class of husky 
unmarried immigrant workers. This touches one of the 
real reasons why the 12-hour day has persisted in the steel 
industry: 30 per cent, of steel workers are unmarried, with 
no responsibilities and with the strength and desire to pile 
up as much as they can for a few weeks or months, then 
" lay off " to enjoy life or take an " easy job " until " broke." 
From this 30 per cent, the steel companies recruit their 12- 
hour gang in considerable part, irrespective of whether the 
development of such intermittent working is good for the 
industry or the community. The long overtime constitutes 
the bait to this class and to many a simple foreign laborer 
who sees what one day can bring in but not what the years 
do bring in, to him and his class. (Moreover 68 per cent, of 
the " foreigners " are married, with an average of 6.63 mem- 
bers to each household, and 81 per cent, of the " foreigners " 
in the industry are paid the unskilled or semi-skilled wage 
rates. These married and familied " foreigners " are the 
ones who desire to keep their money and themselves here, to 
be " Americans ;"' and these are the immigrants most worth 



100 REPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

while and yet most penalized by steel's long hours and un- 
American wage rates. 

It must be noted too that 15 per cent, of immigrant steel 
workers have families of ten members or over; of the Croa- 
tians 37 per cent, have families of 10 or over; of the Mag- 
yars, 21 per cent. With large families, with the unskilled 
jobs where the " lay offs " strike first in slack times, with 
the communities such that none other than steel jobs are 
near, with the work such that " old age at forty " is its watch- 
word, the average immigrant steel worker, after a dozen 
years at it, often finds himself contemplating not the " long 
overtime " which first tempted him but actual conditions 
nearer the following: 

This is the official family budget and verbal report made 
by the Home Service Division of the Pittsburgh Red Cross 
for the only case of relief growing out of the strike that had 
come to it by November 26, 1919. (The question of helping 
a striker was the subject of very serious debate by the Pitts- 
burgh Red Cross.) 

Polish worker living in Braddock, employed by American 
Steel and Wire Company. Father, mother, and nine children. 
Oldest boy, 21, was making about $60 a month, went into army 
service. 

Father, 42, common laborer, was making $80 to $90 a month 
on the average. His employment was irregular, although his 
foreman reported that he was a good, steady workman and 
worked every day there was a job. Last summer his monthly 
earnings went up, being $129 in July, and $118 in August. 
There is no record of the family ever having been a charity 
case. 

Another boy makes about $15 per month, and some of the 
girls occasionally pick up some money. 

The father went on strike; since the strike he has applied 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 101 

for other jobs and was refused them because he belongs to the 
union. At length he got a job on a government dam. 

Minimum Budget for the above family of father, mother 
and eight children, worked out specially with reference to the 
special needs of the family for milk, medicine, etc.: 

Rent $ 20.00 

Food ,.., 101.65 

Clothing , 42.00 

Fuel ..., 3.00 

Spending money 5.00 

Medicine 4.00 

Education .60 

Polish tuition 1.50 

Insurance 2.00 

Recreation 1.00 



$180.75 
Family income in normal times. . . . 143.00 



Actual relief needed before the 

strike $ 37.75 

Comment : Almost any ordinary workman's family has a hard 
time to get along at present prices. The worst problem is hous- 
ing. Not only are rents high, but there is an absolute shortage 
of fit housing. 

In this case the " decency budget " set by local authorities 
was $2,168 a year, or over $700 more than the average 
actual earnings of common labor for that period; and over 
$1,000 more than the average earnings of the father himself. 

Before making detailed comparisons with costs of living, 
reference should be made to the other of the two comparisons 
which the steel worker is always making in regard to his 
wages — the comparison with the wages of his neighbor miner, 
builder, railroader, etc. Detailed comparisons of hours and 



102 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

wages in nine industries are given in Appendix B, based on 
the " earnings per full week/' not on the actual annual earn- 
ings. With this is a comparison of weekly earnings in six 
principal industries, besides steel, in the Pittsburgh District, 
on the basis of a common standard-length week. The earn- 
ings of (1) steel workers, (2) bituminous coal miners, (3.) 
metal trades, (4) railroad employees, (5) building trades, 
(6) street railwaymen, (7) printers, are compared on the basis 
of the same week for all, in this case a 44-hour week. 1 In the 
comparison steel earnings due to overtime for the customary 
excessive hours are averaged in, but even so the following 
facts are brought out: 

Comparative earnings for 4Arliour week at prevailing hourly 
rates (Pittsburgh District, 1919) : 
Common labor — 

Iron and steel $21.12 

Bituminous coal . . . . 25.30 

Building trades 

Building laborers $22.00 

Hod carriers 30.80 

Plasterers' laborers 30.80 

Average for laborers 27.85 

The comparison makes it plain that steel common lahor has 
the lowest rate of pay of the trades for which there are 
separate statistics for laborers. The two principal factors to 
be considered in the comparison are, of course, (a) seasonal 
influences; (b) unionism. 

Excluding laborers the main comparisons run as follows: 
(still on 44-hour week basis) : 

Iron and steel — 

Skilled and semi-skilled $38.32 

1 It could be any week for the purposes of comparison, 44-hour week, 
90-hour week, 120-hour week; the comparison would result the same. 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 103 

Bituminous coal miners — 

Hand miners 34.50 

Machine miners 41.67 

Metal trades — 

Blacksmiths 30.80 

Iron molders 33.00 

Railroad employees — 

Machinists 31.68 

Boilermakers 31.68 

Building trades — 

Bricklayers 49.50 

Carpenters . 39.60 

Painters 38.50 

Structural iron workers 44.00 

Street railwaymen 23.76 

Printers — 

Newspaper linotypers 38.50 

Newspaper compositors 33.88 

Book and job 26.58 

With this should be noted the average for all steel workers 
■ — $32.02 ; the whole comparison makes plain why steel work- 
ers found that steel rates of pay were not " high " when com- 
pared with similar industries ; that " high " earnings in 
steel plants were due principally to long hours. Steel work- 
ers often carried the comparisons on to the causes of differ- 
ences : e.g. to comparisons of the amounts of time lost by un- 
employment in steel, building, mining, etc.; and to the fact 
that the building trades, street railways, railroads and mines 
were more or less completely unionized and steel not at all. 

A first and foremost item in living costs, conditioned by 
wages, is housing. This Inquiry for adequate reasons did 
not go extensively into two phases of housing: (a) the Steel 
Corporation's housing provisions; (b) comparison of present 
conditions with findings of investigations of a dozen years 
ago. 

(a) The Steel Corporation testimony on the houses, includ- 



104 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

ing whole towns, built for workmen and leased at low rentals, 
takes up over ten pages in the Senate Investigating Com- 
mittee's record. It includes the millions expended for this 
purpose and this item as a total (Yol. I, p. 192) : 

Dwellings and boarding houses constructed and leased 
to employees at low rental rates. , , 25,965 

But most of these houses, it was well known, were for the 
Corporation's miners, erected in hitherto uninhabited regions 
where towns had to be built before mining could go on. 
Inquiry of the Corporation determined the fact that less than 
10,000 of these houses were available for steel workers. The 
facts were simple : 

Total employees at manufacturing plants. ., 191,000 

Total Corporation houses near plants ,. ., 10,000 

Employees not company-housed i. 181,000 

That is, 181,000 steel workers had just as much chance to 
get a Corporation-built, low-rental house as they had to get 
Mr. Gary's New York mansion. Moreover most of the 
10,000 houses were occupied by " American " workers. 

(b) A dozen years ago the Pittsburgh Survey revealed 
conditions of housing of steel workers which shocked public 
opinion and which, Pittsburgh authorities state, have been 
improved practically not at all since then. It was impossible 
to conduct another such exhaustive housing survey in this 
investigation but sufficient observation was made to bear out 
the local statement, that housing was as bad as ever. The 
U. S. census, taken in January, 1920, should reveal com- 
plete statistics of conditions. The census takers found in 
Braddock, for example, that in this steel suburb of Pitts- 
burgh 200 families were living in 61 houses; 35 boarders 
were in one house where three different persons occupied each 
bed in the 24 hours of each day, sleeping in eight-hour shifts. 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 105 

It was of Braddock that Senator Kenyon, chairman of the 
Senate Investigating Committee, was quoted as saying: 
" This is the worst place I have ever seen and I have 
watched the living conditions of many immigrants." 

A sub-report x contains the detailed findings of an investi- 
gator for this Inquiry who spent three weeks in November, 
1919, in the Pittsburgh District collecting data on the actual 
living conditions of steel workers' families. The investi- 
gator obtained, as far as the workers could supply them, data 
on the family budgets of expenditures for rent, food, clothes, 
children's education, benefit societies, etc. and observed the 
housing conditions. Questions were also asked, principally 
of the wives, dealing with the strike, what were their ideas 
of its causes, whether they approved the strike. Strikers 
and non-strikers, " foreigners " and " Americans," were in- 
terviewed. The visits were haphazard, including neighbor- 
hoods in Pittsburgh, Braddock, Homestead and Monessen, 
sometimes with an interpreter, sometimes with a member of 
the strike relief committee or with a settlement worker, fre- 
quently alone. The neighborhoods were principally those of 
the immigrant semi-skilled and unskilled workers who con- 
stitute the bulk of steel communities. At the end of the 
investigation, tabulation of the results proved that this hap- 
hazard inquiry had achieved a representative survey inas- 
much as the average of income for the families visited ap- 
proximated the average income for the semi-skilled and un- 
skilled workers for the whole industry. The semi-skilled and 
unskilled actual average for the eight months of 1919 before 
the strike was not over $128 monthly. The average income 
of the forty-one immigrant strikers' families visited was 
$132 a month. The excerpts from the investigators' family 
reports, given herewith, are representative of the forty-one 
immigrant households. 

i Family Budgets and Living Conditions," by Marian D. Savage. 



106 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

These families ran from four to eight members. The 
tabulation of the forty-one immigrant families brought out 
the first characteristic of steel communities, — overcrowding: 

Living in 1 room . ... .,. ... ... .,. . 2 families 

Living in 2 rooms ,. ., 22 families 

Living in 3 rooms. ... ., 14 families 

Living in 4 rooms. 2 families 

Living in 5 rooms. ....... 1 family (with two 

boarders) 

Over half of these four to eight-member families lived in 
, " apartments " of two rooms; over one-third in three rooms. 
The resultant physical and moral conditions are not suffi- 
ciently portrayed by the bare figures. An excerpt from the 
report reads : 

The first thing which strikes the attention of one who visits 
the homes of the strikers is the shocking overcrowding. The 
majority of families which I have seen live in only two rooms, 
and only four of them have more than three rooms. As the 
families are composed of from four to eight people, this means 
that the air space necessary for hygienic living is wholly lacking, 
and the right kind of home life is made impossible. It means 
that frequently a bed must stand in the kitchen all the time, 
taking up space greatly needed for other things. In a few 
cases the crowding is due to the presence of lodgers, but usually 
it is not. In one case I was told that the family had tried to 
find an apartment with three rooms instead of two, but had been 
unable to, as many landlords objected to having such a large 
family of children in their houses. Such a policy, of course, 
means that the largest families may be forced into the smallest 
accommodations. In general, however, the burden of paying 
rent for an additional room seemed too great for the family 
to undertake. In many cases the apartments have no water in 
them and several families are forced to use a single pump in the 
court yard. In still a larger number of cases there are no toilet 
arrangements except dilapidated water closet sheds in the yard. 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 107 

In a few places there are open unsanitary drains in the court 
yard, around which the wooden houses are built. Many of the 
strikers live in alleys which are very dirty and cluttered with 
rubbish collected by the authorities at infrequent intervals. In 
one place in Homestead I found what appeared to be drainage 
water flowing down the middle of the alley. In a good many 
cases families live in rear houses which can only be reached by 
narrow dark passageways or ramshackle wooden staircases lead- 
ing in from the street. 

Although the wages in many departments of the industry have 
more than doubled in the last five or six years, the women are 
quite convinced that the cost of living has risen very much 
higher in proportion, so that they are worse off than they used 
to be. According to the Associated Charities of Pittsburgh, a 
food order which in 1914 cost $5.88 in New York City (where 
prices are not very different from those here), in 1919 cost 
$11.10 in Pittsburgh. This food order, though intended as a 
minimum standard for a family of five for one week, is not con- 
sidered adequate by the Pittsburgh A. C, which substitutes a 
food budget of $17.04 that makes it possible to have meat twice 
a week instead of once. Compared with this minimum standard, 
the amount spent for food by the women visited seems to be 
enough to sustain life, but in most cases, especially in the larger 
families, to do little more than that. Considering how hard and 
long-continued the work of a man in the steel industry is, a 
food budget which does not allow him meat more than twice a 
week is hardly sufficient, so even in the cases where somewhat 
more than $17.04 is spent for food for a family of five every 
week the amount seems far from exorbitant. 

( Out of forty-eight families from which data could be 
obtained for estimating each family's budget of expenditures, 
twenty-eight of the budgets fell below the minimum of sub- 
sistence level for 1919 and ten below the minimum of com- 
fort level. 

Following are the tables of hours, wages and budgets for 
the immigrant strikers and for native-born strikers : 






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110 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

Following are typical excerpts from the investigator's note- 
books, giving a little better idea, than do the tables, as to 
what such budgets means to strikers: 

Place — Braddock 
Nationality — Slavish 

G is a laborer in a blast furnace. Earned $34.00 a week. 

Worked 11 hours on day shift, 13 hours on night shift. Has 
6 children. Before prices were so high he could save, but can- 
not now. Groceries cost from $48.00 to $60.00 a month, and 
meat just about as much. The rent for the two rooms in which 
the family lives is $10.00 a month, and the landlord is soon to 
raise it to $11.00. A " tax " of $5.09 also has to be paid. The 
wife, when asked in the presence of her husband if she wanted 
him out till the strike was won, replied that she did. 

Place — Braddock 
Nationality — Slavish 

L earned $4.62 a day and worked 13 days in two weeks. 

Has two children. The mother-in-law lives with them and pays 
half the rent, which is $10.00 a month for the two rooms. Food 
costs from $76.00 to $88.00 a month. They were unable to 
save anything. The man, who seemed more intelligent than 
most, declared vehemently that the union was the principal thing 
he cared about — more even than wages and hours. His wife said 
little, but agreed that she wanted him to stay out on strike. 

Place — Braddock 
Nationality — Slavish 

E. is a laborer in rail mill. Earned 42 cents an hour ($80 
in two weeks when working 14 turns) . Worked 12 hours, some- 
times on day shift, sometimes on night. Worked 7 days a week 
about twice in two months. Has four children. Eent for their 
two rooms costs $10 a month. Food costs about $80 a month; 
$5 a month was paid to the lodge to insure man and his wife. 
He had bought a $100 Liberty Bond, but has only paid $50 on 
it; $10 a month was deducted from his pay for it. He cared 
more for shorter hours than anything else, though he needed 
higher wages, too. 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 111 

Place — Braddock 

Nationality — Slavish 

S. worked in engine house of Carnegie Steel Co. Earned 
48 cents an hour; $77 for 15 turns was the most he ever earned. 
Worked 10 hours a day, 7 days a week. Has one child. Eent 
for one room in which family lives is $6 a month. Food costs 
from $60 to $65 a month; $1.85 a month is paid to the lodge. 
Shoes cost on an average $5 a month. The wife wants the man 
to stay out on strike till it is won. She cares most about reduc- 
tion of hours, provided the weekly pay is not reduced. 

Place — Homestead, Pa. 
Nationality — Eussian 

K. worked as an open hearth laborer in one of the Carnegie 
Steel Mills, 11 hours during the day, 13 hours at night. Every 
second Sunday he worked also. His wife said that when he 
came home at night he was so tired that he just lay down and 
slept. As one of the neighbors explained, when a man works 
as long as that "he can't see his babies, he can't see the day- 
light — all he can do is just to come home and lie and sleep." 
Shorter hours seemed more important to him than anything 
else, provided the weekly wages were not reduced. He could 
get along after a fashion with his present wages, but could not 
stand the long day. His wage was 45 cents an hour, and $60 
or $70 in two weeks, according to whether there were 12 or 14 
turns. This amount did not permit any permanent saving, how- 
ever. He had one Victory Bond of $100 which he was forced 
to sell after the strike began in order to live. A Liberty Bond 
which he had bought last year he had been obliged to sell again 
last fall in order to live. He had nothing in the bank and he 
had not been able to afford membership in any lodge. Eent 
for the three rooms in which he and his wife and three children 
lived was $15 a month. The rooms were well lighted and the 
kitchen had running water. He was obliged to pay for paper- 
ing and painting them, however. 



112 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

Place — Homestead, Pa. 
Nationality — Austrian 

C. worked as a laborer in one of the Carnegie Mills, 10 hours 
on the day shift, 12 hours at night, 6 turns a week, and earned 
from $53 to $58 in two weeks. He has two children. The fam- 
ily lives in three rooms, which are light, pleasant and well cared 
for. Eent is $15 a month. The wife said she wanted to move 
somewhere where rent was cheaper, but could find no other 
rooms. I was unable to discover how much food and clothes 
cost, as she kept no record of them. From $3.25 to $4 a month 
was paid to the lodge, according to the number of members who 
were ill. If a member is obliged to omit three monthly pay- 
ments he is dropped from the lodge. The man was ill with in- 
fluenza for 12 weeks last year and was obliged to sell the $200 
Liberty Bond which he had in order to pay expenses. The bond 
was sold to the storekeeper, who only gave $180 for it, much 
to the indignation of Mrs. C. Since the strike began C. has had 
to sell the only other bond which he had — a $50 one, on which 
he had only paid $30. The family have no other savings, and the 
money from the bond is almost gone. 

Last spring the family bought a load of coal for $13, but 
that is all gone and they have nothing but wood to burn. They 
cannot afford any more coal. 

I asked Mrs. C. if she wanted her husband to go on strike, 
and if she now wanted him to stay out. She said she did not 
know anything about the strike before the men went out and 
knows little about it now. She does not want her husband to 
return to work while the strike is going on for fear he might 
be hurt She does want better conditions, however. Shorter 
hours seem to her more important than anything else, provided 
there is no reduction in pay, as her husband is very tired when 
he comes home — too tired to do anything but eat and sleep. She 
also feels that more money is needed. 

I asked if she liked living in Homestead. She replied that 
she had lived there ever since she came to America thirteen years 
ago and could not compare it with other places. She was too 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 113 

young when she left Austria to know much about conditions 
there. 

Place — Pittsburgh 
Nationality — Polish 

S. is 45 years old. Six children in the family, the oldest 15 
years old. The father was the only supporter. He was a laborer 
in the J. & L. mill, but did not have steady work. Worked 12 
hours a day about four days a week frequently. Earned on the 
average about $25 a week. Was able to save nothing. Paid 
$1 a month to the lodge. He owns the house — a ramshackle 
wooden building — lives in three rooms. According to the wife, 
all that is earned goes into food. Though wages were quite in- 
adequate, the long hours seemed most serious to the woman. 
When asked if she wanted him to stay out till the strike is won 
replied, " Yes — what a question ! " 

Place — Pittsburgh 
Nationality — Polish 

P. is 56 years old. Has three children, one of them is a boy 
who is now earning $10 a week. Has worked as a laborer, putting 
screws on bolts at the Oliver Iron & Steel Co. for 10% hours a 
day, 5% days a week. He earned 30 cents an hour. Before 
the strike, he was sick for ten weeks and hence had no savings. 
He paid $1.05 a month to the lodge, however. Pent for the two 
rooms in which the family lives is $8.50 a month. The man 
wants a permanent union most of all, but better wages and hours 
are both very important. 

Place — Pittsburgh 
Nationality — Lithuanian 

J. has six children, one of whom, a girl, is earning $7.50 a 
week. The man worked as a laborer at the J. & L. mill, 12 hours 
a day, 7 days a week. (Since the strike was declared the week 
has been shortened to 6 days for that job.) He earned $5.80 a 
day. Pent for three rooms in rear building costs $9 a month; 
85 cents a month is spent for schooling. He pays' 50 cents a 



114 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

month to the lodge, and $1 more when a member dies. He was 
unable to save anything else, because he was forced to buy at the 
company store, where prices were higher than elsewhere. Some- 
times nothing remained of his wages when things purchased 
there — clothes, groceries, etc. — were deducted. Those who re- 
fused to trade with the company had things made unpleasant for 
them. 

Place — Homestead, Pa. 
Nationality — Irish 

S. has two children. He was a pipe worker in the Carnegie 
Steel Mill, with 10 hours on the day shift, 13 hours on the night 
shift, 7 days a week. Every second week he was obliged to work 
from 7 A. M. on Saturday to 7 A. M. on Sunday, with only 
one hour off for rest and food. Then he had to begin work again 
at 3 P. M., and continue until 7 the next morning — thus work- 
ing 39 hours out of 48. (Both he and Mr. C, another striker, 
complained that no time was given for eating meals when a man 
was on a 12-hour shift. He was expected to snatch a bite of 
food as he worked. Mr. C. said he was obliged to work 15 hours 
every Sunday, and often did not get time to eat a mouthful dur- 
ing that period. This, he considered, one of the most serious 
grievances.) There is no chance for advancement in the plant. 
The boss brings in his friends, relatives, or people who have pull 
with him, and gives them the better positions instead of advanc- 
ing others. 

Mr. S. earned 47 cents an hour, and from $74 to $75 in two 
weeks. He was discharged from the Canadian Army about a 
year before the strike, and during that period he had been able 
to save nothing. He bought one $150 Liberty Bond, but had 
only paid $100 on it, and was obliged to dispose of it for $90 
when the strike began. The company had forced him to buy 
it and deducted $15 a month from his pay for it. During the 
strike he had a few odd jobs, but for the most part they had 
been living on credit. 

They pay $15 rent for 4 rooms. This rent is lower because of 
the fact that the house is close beside the railroad and is noisy 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 115 

and dirty. The landlord threatened to raise it soon. Groceries 
for the family cost from $25 to $30 in two weeks. This pur- 
chases a very small and inadequate supply. They do not know 
how much meat costs. Horlich's milk for the small baby costs 
about 25 cents a day. The mother thinks it necessary to pay 
this, as she lost another baby because of improper feeding. She 
says that she can spend very little on clothes. She has had only 
one suit in six years. Friends have given her clothes for the 
children to help out. She says she wishes the strike had never 
happened, and is rather discouraged about it. Nevertheless, she 
thinks the men ought to have better conditions and wants the 
men to win out. She is indignant that so many of the higher 
paid men are still at work, and thinks they ought to come out 
to help the others. 

Place — Homestead, Pa. 

Nationality — Slav from Austria-Hungary 

D. did repair work on machines and furnaces, working 12 
and 13 hours a day, and sometimes 36 hours at a stretch. Once 
he objected to doing overtime work when he was very tired and 
was laid off for a week as a penalty. His work was dangerous, 
yet he earned only 45 cents an hour. He has three children. 

Eent for three rooms, a parlor, kitchen and bedroom, is $16. 
There is water in the kitchen, but the room is so dark that the 
gas must be kept burning all the time. The woman cooks with 
it, and also heats other rooms with it in winter. Groceries cost 
$40 a month, meat from $25 to $30, milk $4.50. Shoes for the 
children last only one or two months and cost from $5 to $6 a 
pair. The man and his wife both belong to two lodges, and 
pay from $14 to $15 a month to them. The children are also 
insured, and 20 cents a month is paid for them. The lodge pays 
$5 a week in case of sickness, $1,000 in case of death of the 
man, $250 in case of death of a child. 

They had bought bonds worth $450, $350 of this they had 
spent before the strike for necessary food and the expenses of 
the baby's christening. The remaining $100 they had spent dur- 
ing the strike. They have no savings. 

I asked the woman if she thought she was better off in Amer- 



116 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

ica than if she had stayed in Austria-Hungary and she said she 
didn't know. She had lived in Homestead for fifteen years and 
could not afford to move anywhere else in order to get better 
conditions. She knew nothing about other parts of America. 
Her husband said he has his first citizenship papers, but had 
not yet gotten his second. He told me indignantly that some 
strikers had applied for their second papers in Pittsburgh, but 
had been refused because they were on strike. 

The wife told me she wanted her husband to stay on strike 
till he got shorter hours and better conditions. She did not 
"want a bad name on her children." 

Place — Homestead, Pa. 
Nationality — Slavish 

V. was a millwright in the open hearth department, working 
12 hours a day, and sometimes 7 days a week. He earned 45 
cents an hour, or from $100 to $105 in two weeks. There are 
seven children in the family. 

They pay $10 a month rent for two rooms in a rear house. 
There is running water in the kitchen, but the only toilet is 
in the yard, which also has open drains. They have tried to get 
a better apartment with three rooms, but cannot find one, for 
landlords object to such a large family of children and will not 
rent to them. Groceries cost them about $60 a month, meat 
about $29 or $30, milk $5. One of the daughters works in the 
grocery store, earning $10 a week, and the family are obliged 
to trade there, so she will not lose her position. Coal costs 
them $20 a year — perhaps more. Monthly dues to the " so- 
ciety" which pays sick benefits and death benefits are $5 for 
the man and his wife, $1.20 for the children. The children 
go to Slavish school, and something must be paid for their 
tuition also. 

They have been unable to save anything with the exception of 
$800 in Liberty Bonds, which they had at the beginning of 
the strike. These have all been sold since then, with a loss of 
$4 or $5 on each one. The company deducted $50 a month 
from the man's pay while he was buying his bonds. The wife 



WAGES IN NO-CONFERENCE INDUSTRY 117 

has been sick a good deal for the last ten years and her illness 
has cost money. 

She says she wants her husband to stay out on strike. Shorter 
hours seem to be most important, but better general conditions 
are also necessary. 

Place — Homestead, Pa. 
Nationality — Slavish 

E. was a laborer, working 12 hours a day with a 24-hour shift 
every other Sunday (one hour being allowed off for break- 
fast). He earned 42 cents an hour, or $60 in two weeks. He 
has four children. 

Rent for the one room in which they live is $4.50 a month. 
Eood cost $60 a month even when they had little but bread 
and potatoes. They sometimes had meat, but never any cakes 
or pies. Three years ago, when wages were only $1.60 a day, 
they could buy more than they can now because of the high 
prices. The shopkeepers find out beforehand when a rise in 
wages is to come and put up the prices at once, the man says. 
They cannot buy any clothes without going hungry, and cannot 
afford insurance or lodge membership. He says he has never 
been able to save anything. He was forced to buy a $50 or $100 
bond of each loan, but had to sell them again at once. He told 
of one case where a man who said he could only afford a $50 
bond instead of the $100 one, which the boss ordered him to 
take, was tarred and feathered by men whom he was sure the 
company had stirred up to do it. This story was also told me 
by two American strikers — Mr. S. and Mr. C. 

The family had been living on his last pay ever since the 
strike began. Higher wages seem as important to them as 
shorter hours. The wife said she wanted him to stay out on 
strike. 

One great grievance was that there was no chance to get 
ahead or change to better work. He had tried hard to get a 
chance to do more skilled work, which he was sure he could 
do just as well as anyone, but though he had worked there for 
thirteen years, he was never given a chance. The foreman kept 



118 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

people back because they were hunkies and brought in his rela- 
tives and those who treated him to booze to take the better posi- 
tions. If anyone complained he was fired. 

The man lost his thumb at the mill and was out for three 
months a while ago. The company paid him $75. 

He has his first citizenship papers and sends his children to 
the public school. 

Place — Monessen, Pa. 
Nationality — Russian 

T. worked as a pipe fitter in the machine shop of the Pitts- 
burgh Steel Co., 10% hours a day, 7 days a week. Sometimes 
as often as twice a week he was obliged to work 29% hours at 
a stretch. For this period he was given overtime pay for only 
5% hours. He earned 46c. an hour or about $100 in two 
weeks. He has two children. 

Rent for three good rooms is $18. Pood, which is quite 
ample, costs $100 a month. Insurance costs $62 a year. He 
had saved about $100 before the strike. He evidently considered 
himself much more prosperous than many of the strikers. His 
principal objection was too long hours. 

During the organizing campaign a company official had asked 
him to go around and find out what " Bolsheviks " there were 
among the men, and what men had joined the union, so they 
could be discharged. He refused but someone he knew undertook 
the job. 



GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL IN A NO-CON- 
FERENCE INDUSTRY 

Analysis of the data gathered in this Inquiry on the 
grievances of workers and the companies' methods of control 
of employees in the iron and steel industry warrants the 
following conclusions : 

The Steel Corporation's " arbitrary " control of hours and 
wages extends to everything in individual steel jobs, re- 
sulting in daily grievances. 

The Corporation, committed to a non-union policy, is as 
helpless as the workers to prevent these grievances. 

The grievances, since there exists no working machinery of 
redress, weigh heavily in the industry because they in- 
cessantly remind the worker that he has no " say " what- 
ever in steel. 

The strike was the workers' revolt against the entire system 
of arbitrary control and for trade unionism. 

The Steel Corporation, here as in hours and wages, is the 
determining factor for the whole industry. " Independent " 
companies, however, have shown far more tendency to break 
away from the Corporation's methods in the case of control 
than in the case of wages and hours. 

This section deals with the industrial effects of a policy of 
"no conference," and arbitrary control; its effects on the 
worker in relation to his job, especially inside the mill; its 
inevitable consequences of rebellion and the means taken to 
soften rebellion. 

Section VII will deal with the social results of such a labor 

119 



120 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

policy; the means taken to combat rebellion when softening 
fails ; the effects on the worker in relation to the community ; 
the effects on the community and state ; and will try to deter- 
mine to what extent social institutions in towns, counties or 
states, i.e. the executive government, the judiciary, the 
church, the press, etc., were bent to the business of maintain- 
ing one corporation's policy of " not dealing with labor 
unions." 

The evidence for both sections is drawn principally from 
public records, private labor files of companies, interviews 
with Corporation officials, also with officers of " labor detec- 
tive " concerns and from affidavits or statements from over 
Hve hundred strikers and non-strikers. 

This section deals mainly with conditions before the strike, 
with the normal conduct of the industry, with the problem 
raised by a friendly critic of Mr. Gary who said : 

" The trouble is that the Corporation's labor policy is still in 
the stage of detectives and toilets." 

That is : a stage of arbitrary control naturally causing unrest 
which is met with espionage on the one hand and sanitation 
and welfare on the other. 

It is important to grasp clearly the distinction between 
the two aspects of control in this or any other industry. The 
distinction is that between " personnel management " and 
" industrial relations " ; the one confined within the plant, 
conditioned primarily by each job's requirements; the other, 
labor policy or the system of relations between the labor 
force and the owners. The first aspect concerns the job, — 
who gets it, how he shall do it, how it shall be safeguarded if 
hazardous, who shall meet the emergency requirements always 
fringing the job, the running of the job for production. The 
second aspect concerns the relations of the workers as a whole 
to the sum of jobs: it concerns the profits of work (wages) , 






GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL 121 

the length of work (hours) and the vesting of authority over 
the separate jobs (control proper, — whether autocratic con- 
trol, trade union control, shop committee control, etc.). The 
first aspect is the primary concern of employment managers, 
or scientific managers or production engineers; the second 
aspect is concerned primarily with who shall control the em- 
ployment manager or production engineer and for what pur- 
poses. Each function tends to encroach on the other and is 
generally nullified when it does. In the steel industry the 
typical employment manager is helpless when he tries to deal 
with industrial relations; he can get the workers a day off 
or a change of job, but he cannot influence hours, wages or 
the foreman's authority. Likewise the Finance Committee 
of the Steel Corporation can decree hours and wages but is 
helpless to direct workers on the jobs. But always the second 
aspect stretches hack with decisive effect over the first. In 
the steel industry this is peculiarly so. 

Section VII therefore deals with the more important 
phase: with the non-union policy of the Corporation, the 
resultant attitude of the w6rkers, the means, — such as espion- 
age, discharge for unionism, blacklists, police, " labor detec- 
tives" etc. — used to combat the workers, the use made of civil 
authorities, courts, press and pulpit, particularly during the 
strike. It analyzes the actually existing alternative to " the 
kind of conference the labor unions wanted/' But before the 
present section's analysis, — which must begin at the opposite 
pole, the organization of the jobs for production, — can be 
grasped, some of the facts concerning the other greater aspect 
of control must be set down. 

The character of the control in the Steel Corporation is 
plain : it is arbitrary control. The workers called it " auto- 
cratic." Mr. Gary's word, 1 spoken to the Senate investigat- 
ing Committee, was " arbitrarily," used by him in reference 

1 Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 226. 



122 REPOKT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

to fixing wages, but applying equally to the whole system. 
With this Mr. Gary coupled his recognition that there was 
possible at least one other system of control — by conference 
— in the statements that " his workmen knew that they were 
always free to come to him or any plant officer or to send 
committees." Coupled with this, investigation proved, were 
the facts that no workers, individuals or committees, do con- 
fer with Mr. Gary, and that actual conferences with plant 
officers, higher than foremen, fell into either of two cate- 
gories: (a) individual or committee conferences which did 
not deal with hours or wages or authority of control, but with 
comparatively minor matters; or (b) conferences by tempo- 
rary committees concerning hours or wages, of such a rare 
character as to prove themselves the exception, the exhibition 
of temerity, almost like strikes. The few instances of such, 
discovered in this Inquiry, are detailed in a sub-report. 

The practice of Corporation plants was by no means uni- 
form, but all practice conformed to the Corporation's policy, 
as perfectly understood and as set forth by Mr. Gary, for 
example, publicly to his own officials as follows : * 

" . . . treating the whole thing as a business proposition, 
drawing the line so that you are just and generous and yet 
at the same time keeping your position and permitting others 
to keep theirs, retaining the control and management of your 
affairs, keeping the whole thing in your own hands, but never- 
theless with due consideration to the rights and interests of all 
others who may be affected by your management." 

In practice, it was found, Corporation steel workers wher- 
ever questioned, recognized that the control of " the whole 
thing " was absolutely in the Corporation's ""own hands." 
Surprise, that the inquirer should be so naive, or contemptu- 

1 Proceedings of meeting of presidents of subsidiary companies of 
Steel Corporation. Empire Building, New York, Jan. 21, 1919. (Senate 
Testimony, Vol. I, p. 242.) 



GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL 123 

ous jeers greeted any serious question concerning the " right 
to see Mr. Gary or the Superintendent." 

A number of " independents " have parted company, to 
slight or great degree, with the Corporation in the matter 
of installing some conferring. This is considered later, hut 
there is no question that the iron and steel industry, as a 
whole, will change its manner of control only as the Cor- 
poration does. 

The Corporation, of course, has been assailed for many 
years for its " autocratic methods of handling workmen," 
and in one instance, after due self-investigation, has gone on 
record approving the policy; Mr. Gary put this record into 
the Senate investigation. 1 This was the " Report of Com- 
mittee of Stockholders,' 7 dated April 15, 1912, which under 
the heading, " Repression of the Men," said that if the term 
" repression of workmen " involved " the question as to what 
measures the Corporation should adopt for the suppression of 
organizations that in the past have, at times, proved irrespon- 
sible and incapable of self-control," then, the Committee finds 
that " while we do not believe the final solution . . . has 
been reached," still, u we do believe . . . that the Steel 
Corporation, in view of the practices often pursued by labor 
organizations in steel mills in past years, is justified in the 
position it has taken/' 

Repression justified and the whole control in their own 
hands is a policy so long practised by Corporation officers 
that they rarely really question it except when disrupting 
strike times compel them to discuss it. So customary is it 
that Mr. Gary cited with satisfaction one example of its 
workings, quoted elsewhere from the Senate testimony, and 
reset down here in part : 2 

For instance, to mention a somewhat trivial circumstance, some 
three or four years ago — not to be exactly specific as to date — 

1 Senate Testimony, Vol. I, p. 232-233. 

2 Senate Testimony, Vol. I, pp. 161-2. 



124 REPORT ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

one of our presidents telephoned to the president of our Cor- 
poration, who is in general charge of operations, that a certain 
number of men — it may have been a thousand or it may have 
been two thousand men — in a certain mill had all gone out, and 
his report was that there was no reason for their going out . . . 
And he said, "It is very easy for me to fill this ■mill, and I 
will proceed to do it." The president of the corporation came 
to me immediately and reported this. I said, " Tell him to wait 
and to come to New York." He came the next morning and he 
made substantially that same statement to me. I said, "Have 
you taken pains to find out ; has anybody spoken to you ? " " No," 
he said, " I have not received any complaint whatever." I said, 
" Are you sure no complaint has been made to anyone ? " He 
said, " I will find out." I said, " You had better do so before 
you decide what you are going to do or what you propose to do." 
He went back; got hold of the foreman. A committee of men 
had come to the foreman and said that they thought three 
things, if I remember, were wrong — not very important, but they 
claimed they were wrong. And the president came back the 
second time and reported that ; and I said, " Well, now, if they 
state the facts there, isn't the company wrong ? " " Well," 
he said, " I don't consider it very important," I said, " That is 
not the question. Are you wrong in any respect? It seems to 
me you are wrong with respect to two of those things, and the 
other, not. Now, you go right back to your factory and just 
put up a sign that with reference to those two particular things, 
the practice will be changed." 

The incident represents completely the Corporation's 
working system of control; — the un-asked-for grievances of 
thousands, the perilous strike, the arbitrary intervention, and 
the episode ended with " just put up a sign." This section's 
analysis centers on the post where signs are put up and the 
foreman who had ignored a committee. But the causes for 
such a system of industrial control must be sought behind 
the post and the foreman. 



GKIEVANCES AND CONTROL 125 

Those reasons involve a phase of which Mr. Gary seemed 
unconscious and which indicates that personal will or per- 
sonal powers of arbitrary intervention may after all be less 
controlling than other forces. These forces molded modern 
industrial development and in two senses they left the Cor- 
poration comparatively helpless. In the first place the trend 
of development forced, or at least made easier, the Corpora- 
tion's first choice of fundamental non-union policy. The 
mere concentration of private financial power tended to oust 
collective bargaining. Professor Carleton Parker put the 
matter as follows : 1 

iln the words of Mr. A. D. Noyes ; . . . "We are in 
the presence of a novel and striking condition of things in 
American finance, whereby active or potential control of a very 
great part both of our financial institutions and our industrial 
institutions is concentrated in the hands of a comparatively small 
group of financiers." 

How does this affect the labor problem in America? 

First, it brings the most complete temperamental and geograph- 
ical divorce of management and worker in industrial history. 

•Second, it leaves the final control of industrial enterprises in 
non-industrial, and in the end, abstract financial, hands. 

Third, it means that the only information from the industrial 
plants which these boards of directors care for or understand 
is that of statistics of output and costs. 

Fourth, it turns over the formation of wage — and labor — 
policies to men supersensitive to the stock market, a market no- 
toriously panicky over labor disturbances. 

In a word, it turns industrial affairs, one of whose major char- 
acteristics is the human quality brought by the worker, over to 
a group of financial minds whose education, environment, and 
ambitions make it impossible for them to obtain an accurate per- 
spective of the human side of industrial production. The con- 
dition is potential for danger. 

1 " The Technique of American Industry." Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 
1920. (Written in 1914.) 



126 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

In a second sense the helplessness of the steel masters is 
daily emphasized by their inability to keep from creating 
grievances. It was not an original object of the Corporation 
when organized in 1901 to go into either the detective busi- 
ness or the welfare business. It was going to make money 
out of plants which were to make steel as much as possible 
and as cheap as possible and it deemed the best way of keep- 
ing down labor costs was to control arbitrarily hours and 
wages. Since unions try to cut hours and increase wages the 
Corporation adopted the anti-union policy which was not so 
widespread in the steel industry in 1901 as the Corporation 
has made it now. After twenty years of this kind of control 
the Corporation finds that in making steel, it must spend 
-Give to seven millions a year for sanitation, stock participa- 
tion, pensions and welfare, and sums for watching its workers 
which are not revealed to investigators. 

It is not merely that the Corporation Executive Committee 
on June 17, 1901, passed the resolution : x 

" That we are unalterably opposed to any extension of union 
labor, and advise subsidiary companies to take a firm position 
when these questions come up and say they are not going to 
recognize it, that is any extension of unions in mills where they 
do not now exist that great care should be used to prevent trouble 
and that they promptly report and confer with this Corporation." 

But on the basis of this fundamental labor policy, laid 
down at the start and pursued so that all unions were elimi- 
nated from the Corporation's mills, the Corporation devel- 
oped its whole productive organization, trained its great 
staffs of executives, superintendents and foremen, organized 
the jobs and picked the labor force until now it makes steel 
through a machinery which makes trouble too. A policy or 
system of industrial relations, on the employing side, becomes 

1 Minutes Executive Committee, see Senate Document 110, Vol. Ill, 
p. 118 and pp. 497-499. 



GEIEVANCES AND CONTKOL 127. 

visibly a body of executives and their methods of action. 
The Corporation's executives are trained anti-union men who 
convert the Corporation's labor policy into action by organ- 
izing labor forces which shall be primarily " tractable." * 
They translate the 1901 resolution into orders such as the 
following, for handling labor : 2 " Catch 'em young, treat 'em 
rough, tell 'em nothing." The Corporation's executives, in 
order to meet the Corporation policy, are forced to grind the 
faces of the " hunkies " and to trust to " welfare " to salve 
the exacerbations. 

The system, of course, is not new. It was typically Ameri- 
can in the heyday of the Captains of Industry; but no big 
corporation has developed it so drastically or clung to it to 
so late a date as has the Steel Corporation. 

The system, in which both sides, employers and employees 
are enmeshed, is subject to two viewpoints appallingly dif- 
ferent: and the viewpoint of the employees is what caused 
the strike. The viewpoint of the directors of the Steel Cor- 
poration is based on examining the reports of millions spent 
for " welfare," the picture books of company houses, clubs, 
hospitals and towns, photographs of groups of smiling old 
pensioners, and finally the Corporation's annual payroll, as 
big as a small nation's national debt: viewing the total the 
directors naturally feel, " the Corporation does a tremendous 
lot for its workmen." The viewpoint of the workman is 
based not on totals but first on the percentage of all these 
things touching him personally. The bulk of employees — 
the unskilled and semi-skilled — have had simply no experi- 
ence of the company houses, " welfare " and pensions, and 
their percentage of stock profits do not impress them. But 

1 Letter of manager of Edgar Thomson works, quoted in " Inside His- 
tory of Carnegie Steel Co.," by J. H. Bridge, p. 81. "My experience 
(in 1875) has been that Germans and Irish, Swedes and what I denomi- 
nate 'buckwheats' (young American country boys), judiciously mixed, 
make the most effective and tractable force you can find." 

2 Quoted by R. 3. Baker, N. Y. Evening Post, Dec. 31, 1910. 



128 EEPOET OF THE STEEL STEIKE 

in the second place, they, as well as the skilled, experience 
the Corporation's hours and wages, about which they have as 
little " say " as about the weather, and were hitherto hope- 
less about getting a " say " ; and they experience daily griev- 
ances about which they cannot help trying to " have a say." 
Now if the system is such that the grievances are excessive, 
and if the grievances seem to them to be met mostly by 
detectives and " welfare " in place of machinery for redress, 
and if the grievances 'perpetually remind them* of the great 
grievance of no control over hours and wages, it is obvious 
that the workers may come to look blackly on what the di- 
rectors regard blandly. 

The data will be analyzed first as to the causal relation be- 
tween the customary organization of the steel industry and 
grievances. 

A Pittsburgh professor of economics, an admiring student 
of the steel industry, described its organization to the Com- 
mission as " highly militarized." Several steel masters 
agreed that his description was fitting. 

" The general stafT of the Carnegie Company," he said, 
" is one of the most efficient in the whole world of business. 
The superintendents, department managers and foremen are 
splendidly loyal efficient officers with high morale. 

" Bound to them are the non-commissioned officers, such 
gang leaders as rollers, blowers, melters and the other top- 
skilled Americans, who are part bosses, part workmen. Alto- 
gether this administrative group, almost a third of the force, 
has a real military efficiency, bound to the company by 
stock participation, bonuses, loans, house-rentals and pen- 
sions." 

The " army " under this group is, of course, almost alto- 
gether made up of low-skilled " foreigners." They are the 
smallest participants in the Corporation's stock offers, ton- 
nage bonuses, company houses and pensions. Before con- 



GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL 129 

sidering how this system impinges on them, let us view it in 
relation to the skilled Americans. 

The first characteristic of the militaristic system is pro- 
motion : promotion by seniority. From the upper half of the 
semi-skilled class on up every steel worker has his eye on the 
next higher joh. He is in line for it, but he has no guarantee 
that he will get it. Seniority is a custom only. The man 
who incurs the displeasure of the Company is not promoted. 
Let him be suspected of " agitating in the mill " or of being a 
" trouble maker " and he has no way of enforcing his com- 
plaint when others are promoted over him. Merely making 
the complaint may be deemed proof of being " undesirable " 
and cause for demotion. In the absence of any enforceable 
rule favoritism results and where it may not exist, it is 
suspected by the workers. The following from the diary of 
a steel worker at Gary in the summer of 1919 is paralleled by 
many other statements to the Commission's investigators : 

" Old hand here tells me : ' Superintendent of this department ? 
He's the cousin of the general superintendent. His assistant? 
Married to his sister. Boss's assistant on this floor is his son- 
in-law/ And so on down a long list of the better jobs. It is the 
universal impression of the lower ranks that favoritism rules." 

There is then an inherent grievance touching the skilled 
worker's most precious possession under this system — his 
right to promotion. 

The second characteristic is " speeding up." An object of 
this militarized organization is the attainment of the high- 
est production. Tonnage bonuses are the commonest method 
of accomplishing it. Supplementary is the incited rivalry 
between teams or crews, between furnaces, between depart- 
ments, between plants. The " record " made by a rival outfit 
is the unceasingly applied spur. Against " speeding up " the 
skilled worker feels he has no defense. All the while he 



130 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

feels that his success in attaining unexampled tonnage — and 
unexampled bonus — may be the excuse for a cut in bonus 
rates. He feels that rates are " shaved," as it is called, just 
to " speed " him harder by egging him on to the attempt 
to regain his former earnings' total. " Speeding " is most 
marked as a grievance in the Pittsburgh District. 

Third, because of their obvious relation to control, the 
Corporation's stock sales, loans, bonuses and pensions are 
viewed as a grievance by many highly skilled. They grad- 
ually see what these mean. If they complain on any score 
whatever they may be told directly: '" You own stock in the 
Corporation? Well, then you don't want to damage that 
stock's price by making trouble for the Company. This com- 
plaint of yours makes trouble." Many workers, taking Com- 
pany jobs, living in Company houses, buying at Company 
stores, obtaining Company loans, holding Company stock, 
working toward a Company pension, feel " all sewed up." 
Every " lay-off " they ask, to recuperate from speeding or 
long hours, depends on the favor of a Company boss and 
reminds them of all their company entanglements. 

Freedom from arbitrary control, then, which was generally 
given by the skilled Americans who did strike as their object 
in going out, seems by the organization of the steel job to 
be denied them. In Youngstown, Johnstown, Wheeling, 
Cleveland, as well as in many Calumet District mills where 
great numbers of Americans struck, the basis of their peculiar 
grievance, aside from long hours, was the system of absolute 
control. These men earned from $8 to $30 a day. Their 
willingness to imperil this and all their prospects indicated, 
how strongly some of them rebelled against having no 
" say." 

Add to this the eternal and increasing grievance of exces- 
sive hours and the state of mind of even the skilled Ameri- 
can tended to become more violent than clear. Here is a 



GEIEVANCES AND CONTROL 131 

page from the diary of the Gary worker, made in August, 
1919, recording the talk of a group of skilled workers : 

** A heater who works eleven hours by day and thirteen by 
night, making $400 a month, says, ' Why shouldn't we get the 
eight-hour day without striking for it? I'd be glad to give 
up three or four dollars a day to get eight hours.' 
("An engineer many years on the job says, e Count me in 
for a six-day week too, like a civilized man. This fourteen hours 
a night, seven days a week, is hell.' 

" The gang boss says, ( Who the devil is this man Gary to tell 
our representatives to go to hell. Somebody's going to get him 
for that.' 

" Another says, c Gary thinks we've worked his old twelve and 
fourteen hours so long we'll stand for anything.' " 

This was before the strike. The following, one of many 
statements made by skilled men during the strike, was ob- 
tained in Youngstown, October 25, from a gray-haired 
stationary engineer : 

" The other day the boss called on me and told me I was 
too valuable a man not to be working for the company, that all 
the places were filled except mine, and that he wanted me to 
come back. I told him I would think it over. The next day 
he came back again and asked me how much was owing on my 
house. I told him it was none of his God damn business. I told 
him there was not a cent owing on my house, but if there was 
my wife and family would follow me into the street before I 
would touch any of his dirty money. There is money owing on 
my house, but I would not give him the satisfaction of knowing 
it. I would rather lose it than go back to work before this 
strike is won. I had relatives in the Revolutionary War, I fought 
for freedom in the Philippines myself, and I had three boys in 
the army fighting for democracy in France. One of them is lying 
in the Argonne Forest now. If my boy could give his life 
fighting for free democracy in Europe, I guess I can stand it to 



132 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

fight this battle through to the end. I am going to help my 
fellow workmen show Judge Gary that he can't act as if he was 
a king or kaiser and tell them how long they have got to 
work ! " 

All the foregoing analysis, finally, applies to only about 
one-third of the employees, and that third the better paid, 
shorter-houred, better treated, the skilled, the " Americans." 
If the Corporation's " welfare," which applies principally to 
this third, leaves so many with such a viewpoint, it becomes 
practically negligible, as an emollient in consideration of the 
two-thirds, the " hunkies," particularly if the Corporation's 
system of production and control creates even more grievances 
among the immigrants than among the Americans. 

How does the basic organization of the steel industry affect 

the " hunky job " ? Below the skilled, who form the apex of 

the pyramid, comes the indefinable mass of the semi-skilled; 

beneath these, the mass of the unskilled, mainly classed as 

common labor. The loyalizing forces of the militarized 

organization are loose among the semi-skilled and scarcely 

exist at all among the unskilled. The bulk of both, sections, 

of course, is recruited from the fifty nationalities, more or 

less, making up the foreigners, mostly Slavs. 1 At the top 

of the semi-skilled there is no sharp dividing line from the 

skilled. Heaters' helpers, inciters' helpers, the helpers closest 

to rollers, blowers, etc., hold jobs requiring a training which 

takes years ; in these jobs the influence of possible promotion, 

the pull of seniority, is almost as strong as among the highly 

skilled jobs. In the jobs below these, where pay and skill 

are less, the influence of possible promotion is also less, and 

so on, down through the whole range of jobs beneath the 

1 Some idea of the number of races in the steel industry is given by 
the following table, submitted to the Senate investigating committee 
by the superintendent of the Homestead plant. It is not typical of the 
industry in two respects: (a) the small proportion of Slavs, Greeks 
and Italians; (b) the large proportion of Americans, due to the un- 



GKIEVANCES AND CONTKOL 



133 



hierarchy of the skilled and the upper half of the semi-skilled, 
the prospect of promotion becomes more and more remote, 
the militarizing influence rapidly lessens, until at the bottom 
the whole mass of common labor, the broad base of the pyra- 
mid of steel, is fluid. The jobs are not clearly defined, the 
capabilities for the jobs are largely brawn, and the holders of 
the jobs can be and are switched about. HSTot but that even 
the heavy common labor jobs in steel require a certain degree 
of training, rather knack, but the "know-how" can be 
learned in a few days or weeks at most, and if not learned 
the job can still somehow be done, though badly and with 



usual number of negroes. Fifty-four races are given, or 52 non- 
American. (Senate testimony, Vol. II, p. 480.) 

Nationality report, Homestead Steel Works, Howard Axle Works, Carrie 

Furnaces, Oct. 8, 1919. 
I Per 



Nationality Number 
American 5,799 



Armenian 

Austrian 

Arabian 

Albanian 

Austro-Servian .... 

Belgian 

Bohemian 

Brazilian , 

Bulgarian 

Canadian 

Croatian (Horvat) . 

Cuban 

Dalmatian 

Danish 



15 

42 

5 

25 

1 

3 

2 

1 

67 

20 

299 

2 

9 

6 

English 424 

Filipino 1 

Finnish 7 

French 7 

German 219 

Greek 267 

Hebrew 11 

Hindu 1 

Hollander 6 

Hungarian (Magyar) 574 

Indian 3 

Irish 443 

Italian 264 

1 



cent. 
39.45 
.10 
.29 
.30 
.17 
.01 
.02 
.01 
.01 
.46 
.14 

2.04 
.01 
.06 
.04 

2.89 
.01 
.05 
.05 

1.49 

1.82 
.07 
.01 
.04 

3.91 
.02 

3.02 

1.80 
.01 



Nationality 
Kreiner (Slovanian) 

Lithuanian 238 

Macedonian 4 

Mexican 130 

Negro : 

American 1,734 

British 1 

East India 1 

West India 1 

Norwegian 4 

Polish 432 

Portuguese 1 

Porto Rican 18 

Roumanian 49 

Russian 628 

Ruthenian 1 

Saxon 4 

Scotch 226 

Slovak 2,373 



Per 

Number cent. 
6 0.04 



Servian 
Spanish 
Swede . 
Swiss . . 
Syrian 
Turk .. 
Welsh . 



26 

48 
74 
11 
9 
53 
91 



1.62 
.03 

.89 

11.80 
.01 
.01 
.01 
.03 

2.94 
.01 
.12 
.33 

4.28 
.01 
.03 

1.54 
16.15 
.18 
.33 
.50 
.07 
.06 
.36 
.62 



Total ...14,687 100.6 



134 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

bad effects on the clumsy worker. Every sort of long, hard, 
hot, heavy work, from shoveling weighty substances into the 
maws of white-hot furnaces or sledging to pieces still-hot 
masses of metal or slag, to picking up or putting down or 
heaving or carrying pipes, hot bricks, planks, great iron, 
hooks, sheets of metal, largely with an accompaniment of 
grease, noise, sweat or danger — these make up the steel jobs 
and the dirt, grease, heat and long hours generally increase 
the lower the job is in the pyramid. Finally, the pay-rate 
of the common labor at the bottom, the lowest of all, of 
course, is the base from which all other wage rates are ranked. 

The semi-skilled is the growing group in the whole in- 
dustry. The mechanizing of processes in fhe past two de- 
cades has revolutionized the industry, each new machine dis- 
placing skilled men at the top and unskilled at the bottom. 
More and more the steel job tends to become the job of a 
machine, each new machine tending to abolish either the 
occupations of a dozen common laborers in favor of one semi- 
skilled man or of a few skilled men in favor of one not so 
skilled. More and more the making of steel requires a type 
different from either the brawny Fafnir who used to wield 
the " peel " or the versatile brainy man who could do many 
things with many complicated machines. The new type is 
the slighter, weaker man with intelligence a little above the 
common laborer, who can handle with accuracy a few levers 
on some crane, charging machine, or " skip." He must not 
have too much brain or he will revolt at the deadly monotony 
of moving his few levers on his one machine ten to fourteen 
hours a day and from three hundred to three hundred and 
forty days in the year. 

In these jobs, of the lower half of the semi-skilled and all 
of the unskilled, two things are all-important: the disagree- 
ableness of the job and the length of time the worker is kept 
at it. The lure of immediate promotion is small, one or two 



GEIEVANCES AND CONTKOL 135 

cents more an hour, no change in the length of the day and 
mainly the added satisfaction of slightly greater security, 
inasmuch as it is always forty-two-cent common labor that 
gets laid off or fired first when work is slack. Hours and 
wages, then, are the great grievance of common labor, with 
denial of promotion entering in according to the job's height 
in the scale of the semi-skilled. In the upper half of the 
semi-skilled the lure of promotion takes hold of the worker 
out of all proportion almost even in comparison with the 
skilled American worker higher up; for it is this almost- 
skilled worker, of five to fifteen years' experience in the busi- 
ness, who remembers most keenly the dirt, heat and drudgery 
from which he ascended and who feels most poignantly the 
failure to win promotion still higher if the discrimination 
against him is based solely on the one thing he cannot get 
away from, — his race. 

For common labor, then, grievances primarily concern too 
low wages, too long hours and the arbitrariness of the fore- 
man; he feels little their connection with the company's 
labor policy; for the semi-skilled, grievances are less con- 
cerned with wages, more with hours and most sharply with 
discrimination based on race and preventing promotion, and 
through this, a great deal with the company's labor policy. 

Here is the sum of grievances and the life and progress 
of the immigrant steel worker as determined from hun- 
dreds of interviews: The Slav, Pole, Serb, Croat, Kussian, 
Greek, Magyar, Jew, Roumanian or Turk is nine times out 
of ten, a peasant, taking an industrial job for the first time. 
At the start, only as the wages fail to keep him and his 
family as he wants them to be kept, or the hours break down 
his health, does he care much about " controlling " either 
wages or hours. What matters most to him is that if the 
mill is shut down he is the first to be laid off; if the job 
is unusually hot, greasy or heavy, he is the first to be set to 



136 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

it. He is the most arbitrarily, often brutally, shifted and 
ordered about ; if he takes a lay-off, he is the most likely to 
pay for it with his job; if he is late a few minutes he is 
the most likely to be heavily docked and he is the most likely 
to be kept beyond his hour with no additional pay. If there 
is sickness in his home or he is otherwise kept away, his 
excuses get the shortest shrift. If he is the butt of unusual 
prejudice in either his foreman or some fellow-worker, 
evinced in profanity or the penalties of always the nastier 
task, he knows least where to go for redress or how to speak it. 

As the years go on and he works on up, the right to his 
job, the fear of losing it or of being shifted become more im- 
portant and he is the one to value most his security in pro- 
motion. He finds he is the one whose personal preference 
counts least and the bar that stands out strongest in his mind 
is not being an " American." " That job is not a hunky's 
job ; you can't have it," is the answer that destroys his confi- 
dence in himself. He can't change his race ; he can't change 
his foreman and he cannot get above the foreman. By this 
stage in the progress he has become sufficiently Americanized 
to want higher wages and shorter hours, he wants better 
living and more recognition as a human being and less as a 
hunky, but he finds himself in the grip of a system which 
regulates his hours by whistle, his wages by bulletin-board, 
his grievances by rebuff. In this stage the union organizer 
found tens of thousands in the steel industry to whom the 
strike was very considerably a revolt against arbitrary con- 
trol, as it was principally for the Americans and hardly at all 
for the common laborer. Of the " foreigners," this class is the 
one left by the strike in the most rebellious frame of mind 
and most likely to answer another strike call. 

It is entirely possible that this state of things is almost 
unknown to the corporation officials who assured the public 
and the Senate investigating committee that the steel workers 



GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL 137 

were " satisfied " and " contented/' and that " there was no 
cause for the strike." It has heen pointed out elsewhere that 
Mr. Gary has admittedly no functioning open and above- 
board system of learning what his workmen think. If the 
Corporation even had an efficient system of redressing daily 
grievances, leaving totally out of consideration hours and 
wages, Mr. Gary would inevitably learn these things. Most 
of the companies now have employment systems which are 
efficient in turning out statistics concerning the labor force 
gleaned from two points of contact; hiring and firing. In 
between, the most important time of all, these systems ad- 
mittedly have no contact. The employment managers rely 
on the foremen, " cooperate " with the welfare workers and 
fundamentally are powerless to do anything. Consideration 
of wages and hours is clean out of their province, and as more 
than half the remaining grievances deal with the foreman, 
who is their co-worker, they are a futility as far as any 
redress is concerned and not only do they know it, but the 
mass of steel workers know it too. The general test of an 
employment manager's success, in the estimation of his super- 
intendent, is whether or not he is successful in keeping com- 
plaints from bothering the superintendent. What with his 
powerlessness and with the prevalence of the system, the em- 
ployment manager, whatever his human desires, quickly falls 
into the way of steel — to refuse, rebuff, browbeat, or, finally, 
to " get-to-hell-out," that is, fire. 

Here are typical statements of grievances of the lesser 
skilled taken from Inquiry investigators' notebooks or from 
Senate Committee testimony, just as the workers disjointedly 
spill them out. They could be duplicated to the point of 
boredom. 

J W , a Czech, (Homestead) was a miner during 

his first two years in this country. Learned to speak 
English in the mines. Is married, with two children, owns his 



138 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

own home and has his first citizenship papers. In the steel mills 
he is a pipe fitter, $8.50 a day, of IOV2 hours day shift and 
14 hours night shift. Thinks the hours are altogether too long 
but the pay is fair. During the war the workers were paid, he 
said, for every hour they put in; now they are paid for 10 hours 
during the day but must work 10% hours. At night they are 
paid for 12 hours but work 14. Those who complained were 
told to get-to-hell-out if they did not like it. 

W declares that the workers have never been able to 

learn the rate of pay which they get. The foreman does not tell 
the worker, who must wait until pay day to see how much he 

will receive. Once W found out from the timekeeper 

what his hourly rate was but soon after it was announced that 
the rate of pay was increased although no definite rates were 
posted. When he applied again to the timekeeper for informa- 
tion he was refused. 

He had never heard about the I.W.W., until the present strike 
when the newspapers told about it in their attack on the union. 
He believed in the A. F. of L., as he thinks they have shown 
results at the mines. 

M U , a Czech, (Homestead), in this country 

eight years and is married but he " never could find time to take 
out citizenship papers since he would have to go on a week day 
to Pittsburgh, which would mean that he would have to pay 
the wages of his two witnesses and lose his own." While he was 
out on strike he would have taken out papers but he understood 
from the newspapers that the strikers were not granted citizen- 
ship. He owns his own home and a little Company stock. He 
can read, write and speak English fluently. Chief grievance the 
unbearably long hours. He wants an 8-hour day with present 
pay, $8.50 a day. 

This man feels that he is discriminated against because he 
is a hunky. Several times when he has asked for promotion he 
has been told that the good jobs are not for hurikies. . He feels 
that the clean, decent jobs are for Americans only. 



GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL 139 

A T , a Czech, millwright's helper, 47 cents an 

hour. During the war he worked as a millwright but has been 
demoted since and feels that he is discriminated against because 
he is a huriky. 

Would be willing to forego a raise in wages if the hours were 
shorter. He thinks the long hours the worst part of the steel 
work. 

M (of Donora) feels that he is being cheated by the 

Company officials in regard to the pay for tonnage. He says 
he has never been able to find out how much tonnage he is 
entitled to and that the rest of the workers feel that the count 
is not accurate but they have no means of checking it. 

M is a Lithunian who speaks English fluently and reads 

and writes it; electrical craneraan, 12 hours a day, 13 hours at 
night, at 50 cents an hour and tonnage. " The hours are alto- 
gether too long; eight hours a day is long enough for any man 
to work." 

That the long hours are unendurable and destroy family life 

is the grievance of J McG , born in Scotland, (now of 

Natrona). He works lO 1 /^ hours a day and 14 hours night, 
alternating each week, at $5.50 a day, which he says is inadequate 
to support his family. 

P Y , a Lithuanian (Vandergrift), 6 years a citi- 



zen, family, rougher at $6 a day of 8 hours, declares that 
while the wages are insufficient his chief grievance is discrimina- 
tion and contempt. The foreigners are given the dirtiest and 
hardest jobs and are lorded over by the skilled American workers. 
He is always told to wait by the foreman when he asks for a 
better job, although his hands are maimed because of the hard 
work which he must do. In the meantime young Americans 
who have worked in the mills only a short time are promoted 
over him to the better jobs. 

W S , Russian-Pole (Natrona), in America six years, 

first papers and served in the A. E. F. Works as a laborer, $5.50 



140 REPORT ON THE STEEL STKIKE 

for a day of 10 hours and 14 hours at night, alternating each 
week. 

Although he was in the Army he feels that he is now being 
discriminated against and is very bitter about it. He says 
that the Americans call him a "foreigner." He was unable to 
get his old work back when he came out of the Army but finally 
after getting to the superintendent with his complaint he did 
receive back his old place. 

S G , a Neapolitan, water-tender at $7.50 for a 



12-hour day (New Kensington), joined the union because the 
foremen are arbitrary and won't listen to anyone's grievances and 
because the hours are altogether too long for any man to work. 
He has never heard about the I. W. W., or Socialism, cannot 
tell what they mean and knows almost nothing about the A. F. of 
L. Never heard the term " closed shop " and does not know what 
it means. Never has read any literature on trade unionism either 
in Italian or English. 

]£ 9 a Pole, works in galvanizing shop, 12-hour day for 



$5.00 (East Vandergrift), says that the foreigners get the hardest 
and most unpleasant jobs and are always discriminated against. 
Says it makes no difference about the foreigner's ability or 
whether he speaks English, he is looked down upon and con- 
sidered fit only for jobs Americans won't take. 

Says he has a younger brother, born in this country, who 
had a knack for learning and was sent to the high school up 
on the hill in the American section. But the other children 
would not play with him because he was a hunky. Now he 
is at work in the mills. 

K complained that the shop is very unhealthy, full of 

acid fumes and the vapor was so thick a person could not be 
seen a few feet away. Everybody in it has complained again 
and again to the foreman who promises relief but nothing ever 
happens. Nobody dares go to the superintendent for fear of 
angering the foreman. 



GKIEVANCES AND CONTKOL 141 

L , a Kussian, (Natrona) naturalized, laborer, $5.50 a 

day, 10 hours days and 14 hours nights, declared he cannot 
support himself and family on $5.50 a day. Complained at great 
length about the hours being much too long. Finds it does not 
help to complain to foremen or superintendent because " all the 
higher-ups have offices somewhere else." Unions seemed to him 
the only way of getting anything done. 

Two Poles, (Yandergrift) both roughers, 8 hours at $5.50 a 
day, complained bitterly that the foreigner has no chance at the 
better jobs, that they are looked upon with contempt and con- 
sidered fit only for the dirty and heavy work that Americans 
would not do. They feel they are exploited by the heater and 
roller who can rest at intervals while the remainder of the gang, 
the foreigners, must work steadily and even snatch bites of their 
lunch while working. "Always when they aslc for tetter jobs 
they are told to wait." 

Again and again investigators found this attitude of the 
immigrant worker repeated with an added intensity of bit- 
terness by the son of the immigrant, the native born " for- 
eigner," speaking English, dressing and largely living like an 
" American." In the steel mills he is a " hunky." One of 
these, a striker, released a few months before from the army, 
summed up the attitude of many when, asked what his job 
was in the mills, he answered, " Oh, the same as the other 
hunkies." 

It is the same story on examining the volumes containing 
the testimony offered by the Senate Committee's investiga- 
tion: 

George Mikulvich, a Dalmatian, in the coke works at Clairton, 
complained to the Senate Committee which interviewed a group 
of strikers on a street corner that the " reason why these people 
went out on strike and he went with them was because they 
want to work shorter hours and get more money and better 



142 EEPOBT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

conditions; better treatment from the bosses and the foremen." 
He worked on shifts of 12 hours and 14 hours for 42 cents an 
hour straight, no time and a half for overtime, and none in his 
gang got overtime pay. 

(Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 524.) 

George Miller, a Serb, thirteen years in the mill at Clair- 
ton, a naturalized citizen, was interviewed by the Senators as 
follows : 

Mr. Miller: If my family gets sick and I ask my foreman 
that I want off that day, because my woman is sick at home, 
he say " All right," and he will go around and get another man 
if he can, and if he cannot he will let me off. The next day 
I will come back and there will be a man in my place and I say 
to him " My woman is better." He will say " You can go 
home and stay home ..." 

There is not enough money for the workmen. We work 13 
hours at night and 11 hours at day, and we get 42 cents an 
hour. 

Senator McKellar: And how much is that a day ? 

Mr. Miller: For a 12-hour day it makes $4.20 and for the 
longer day it makes $5.04 . 

Why did we strike? We did not have enough money so 
that we could have a standard American living . 

I have a wife and two children . 

And take all I make and I can not put one penny aside, and 
if my family gets sick and I call a doctor, he won't come down 
for nothing, and I do not make enough money to pay a doctor 
and he won't come for nothing . 

There is another thing. If I get in the mill but three-quarters 

of a minute late in the morning, they take off an hour, off of me. 

Then if I stay five minutes over the hour I should quit in the 

mill, they won't give me an hour for the five minutes at all. 

(Senate Testimony, Vol. II, pp. 524, 525.) 



GRIEVANCES AND CONTROL 143 

Frank Smith, a Hungarian, testified as follows (Clairton) : 

The Chairman: How long have yon been in this country? 

Mr. Smith: Thirteen years. The reason that I am not 
naturalized is that I have never stayed long enough in one 
place; stayed long enough to get my papers. 

Senator McKellar: Do you expect to be naturalized? 

Mr. Smith: Yes; I expect to be naturalized, of course, be- 
cause I have got my family here, my woman, and I have five 
children; and I have that family, and I would like to know 
how a man is going to make a living for himself and his wife 
and five children on $4.75 a day. 

The Chairman: How many hours do you work? 

Mr. Smith: I work 10 hours a day and I get paid for straight 
10 hours time. 

The Chairman: And how many days in the week do you 
work? 

Mr. Smith: Seven days — sometimes six days and sometimes 
seven days. 

He was asked about treatment by the corporation on joining 
a union. 

Mr. Smith: Oh, they won't allow us in there if they know 
that we are union men. 

The Chairman: And you want the right to belong to the 
union, too? 

Mr. Smith: Yes, sir; we do. This is the United States and 
we ought to have the right to belong to the union 
We were all for the United States. We worked day and night 
for that. 

The Chairman: And how many of you contributed to the 
Red Cross and the Y.M.C.A.? 

Mr. Smith: Every one of us contributed $3 to them. 

(Senate Testimony, Vol. II, pp. 526, 527.) 



VI 

ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 

In this section are analyzed the Commission's data on 
how steel workers were organized as trade unionists, the plan, 
methods, aims and personnel of the organizing campaign, 
the object and conduct of the strike, its successes, if any, and 
the causes of failure inherent in the organization, if any. The 
evidence was drawn from union records, interviews with labor 
leaders and talks with the rank and file and with company 
officials and government agents. Findings may be sum- 
marized thus: 

The organizing campaign and the strike were for the purpose 
of forcing a conference in an industry where no means 
of conference existed ; this specific conference to set up 
trade union collective bargaining, particularly to abolish 
the 12-hour day and arbitrary methods of handling em- 
ployees. 
ENb interpretation of the movement as a plot or conspiracy 
fits the facts ; that is, it was a mass movement, in which 
leadership became of secondary importance. 
The strike failed in its object; part of the failure was due 
to defects in the labor movement. 
In analyzing the organization resulting in the strike it is 
necessary to draw a distinction which however cannot be 
clearly kept throughout the discussion ; that is, the distinction 
between the leadership and the body of strikers. The leader- 
ship came from the organized labor movement, the American 
Federation of Labor, having comparatively few footholds in 
the steel industry. The labor movement initiated the organiz- 
ing campaign, invited by the steel workers, according to the 

144 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 145 

labor leaders, invading where it was not wanted, according 
to the employers. Both statements are correct and neither 
lays emphasis on the principal fact — the isolation of the mass 
of immigrant steel workers, nnable to nnite their thirty 
nationalities, ignorant of, or fearful of, the ways by which 
workmen act to change their conditions of labor. These 
steel workers are more important than their leaders, in analyz- 
ing causes of the strike, and in this section of the report 
the emphasis laid on the leadership must be clearly grasped 
as over-emphasis, due to the fact that it is organization which 
is being analyzed. Such analysis must begin with the list 
of the twenty-four 1 participating A. F. of L. unions, whose 
officers composed the National Committee for Organizing 
Iron and Steel Workers, of which John Fitzpatrick, President 
of the Chicago Federation of Labor, became chairman, with 
William Z. Foster as Secretary-Treasurer. The list whose 
relative unimportance compared with the hundreds of thous- 
ands of nameless steel workers must not be forgotten is as 
follows : 

Blacksmiths, International Brotherhood of; J. L. Kline, presi- 
dent, Chicago, 111. 
Boiler Makers and Iron Ship Builders of America, Brotherhood 

of; L. Weyand, acting president, Kansas City, Kans. 
Brick and Clay Workers of America, The United ; Frank Kasten, 

president, Chicago, 111. 
Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers International Union of 

America; William Bowan, president, Indianapolis, Ind. 
Bridge and Structural Iron Workers, International Association; 

P. J. Morrin, president, Indianapolis, Ind. 
Coopers International Union of North America; A. C. Hughes, 

president, Newton Highlands, Mass. 
Electrical Workers of America, International Brotherhood of; 

J. P. Noonan, acting president, Springfield, 111. 

i The list, as officially furnished to the Senate Committee, includes 
a 25th union, added in the latter months of the organizing campaign. 



146 EEPORT ON" THE STEEL STRIKE 

Foundry Employees, International Brotherhood of; A. R. Linn, 
president, St. Louis, Mo. 

Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union of North 
America, International; D. D'Allessandro, president, 
Quincy, Mass. 

Iron, Steel and Tin Workers Amalgamated Association of; 
M. F. Tighe, president, Pittsburgh, Pa. 

Machinists, International Association of; L. H. Johnston, pres- 
ident, Washington, D.-'C. 

Metal Polishers International Union; W. W. Britton, president, 
Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers, International Union of; C. H. 
Moyer, president, Denver, Colo. 

Mine Workers of America, United; Frank J. Hayes, president, 
Indianapolis, Ind. 

Moulders' Union of North America, International; J. F. Valen- 
tine, president, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Pattern Makers' League of North America ; James Wilson, pres- 
ident, Cincinnati, Ohio. 

Plumbers and Steam Fitters of the United States and Canada, 
United Association of; John R. Alpine, president, Chicago, 
111. 

Quarry workers, International Union of North America ; Fred W. 
Suitor, Barre^ Vt. 

Carmen of America, Brotherhood Railway; M. F. Ryan, pres- 
ident, Kansas City, Mo. 

Seamen's Union of America, International; Andrew Fureseth, 
president, San Francisco, Calif. 

Metal Workers' International Alliance, Amalgamated Sheet; 
J. J. Hynes, president, Chicago, 111. 

Firemen, International Brotherhood of Stationary; Timothy 
Healy, president, New York, N. Y. 

Engineers, International Union of Steam and Operating; Milton 
Snellings, president, Chicago, 111. 

Switchmen's Union of North America; S. E. Heberling, pres- 
ident, Buffalo, N. Y. 

Steam Shovelmen and Dredgemen, International Brotherhood 
of; W. M. Welsh, president, New York City, N". Y. 



ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 147 

One man, it was generally admitted inside and outside of 
this heterogeneous group, stood out among his fellows and was 
so far as personal characteristics went the central dominating 
influence. This was John Fitzpatrick, the chairman. His 
broad human qualities, it seemed to observers, justified his 
national reputation. An uncalculating idealism, quite sim- 
ple, but quite determined, was in him. 

It is much easier to give an accurate surface record of the 
strike than to detail the underlying essential facts which are 
largely facts of psychology. A list of all committees, a chrono- 
logical history of all the organizing mass meetings, trans- 
cripts of executive meetings held, copies of correspondence 
between Mr. Gompers and Mr. Gary, might conceivably shed 
no light on the fundamental question: — 

What made 300,000 steel workers leave the mills on 
September 22nd and stay away in greater or fewer numbers 
for a period up to three and a half months ? 

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that a strike does not 
consist of a plan and a call for a walkout. There has been 
many a call with no resultant walkout ; there has been many 
a strike with no preceding plan or call at all. Strike con- 
ditions are conditions of mind. 

The frame of mind of steel workers in late 1918 and early 
1919, first and foremost, as detailed in other sections of this 
report, grew out of their conditions of labor, things with 
which Mr. Gompers, Mr. Fitzpatrick and the strike organizers 
had little to do. That three quarters of steel employees, who 
were forced to work from 10 to 14 hours a day, developed a 
frame of mind of more or less chronic rebellion, largely the 
physical reaction from exhaustion and deprivation. Ee- 
bellious reactions from having no " say " in the conduct of 
the job was also chronic, though less so. These were funda- 
mental facts in steel workers' minds, of which they were 
constantly reminded by endless " grievances " ; these facts Mr. 



148 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STKIKE 

Foster was thinking of when he said that if the steel com- 
panies had shortened hours and granted some sort of repre- 
sentation, " this movement would never have had a show." 
In this respect the Finance Committee of the U. S. Steel 
Corporation was the principal organizer of the strike. 

This rebellious state of mind had existed a long time 
without a mass strike. The high labor turnover in steel 
plants 1 means that thousands of steel workers have been 
going on " individual strikes " for several years. The 
" labor shortage " which steel companies experience is a per- 
sistent evidence of this " strike " frame of mind. The high 
rate of absenteeism is another evidence. Whetting this 
state of discontent were two other psychological factors, both 
growing out of the war and previously referred to in this 
report. Together they were far more important than Mr. 
Gompers or Mr. Foster or anybody possibly except Mr. Gary. 

The first factor was the increased consideration accorded 
steel workers, by foremen daily and by high company officials 
frequently, in the course of the national war effort. The 
steel worker was made to feel that he was mightily helping to 
win the war, with his steel shells, steel guns, gun carriages, 
ship plates, etc., etc., etc., in short, with his maximum pro- 
duction. The " foreigner " found himself sworn at less by 
the foreman, actually conversed with, finally promoted to 
semi-skilled or even skilled jobs, periodically solicited by the 
plant superintendent himself to buy Liberty Bonds, subscribe 
to the Eed Cross, the Y. M. C. A., etc. More especially the 
American worker read in his newspaper that he was an im- 
portant person, that President Wilson, General Pershing and 
other great men were relying on him and were telling him so 
in " greetings," " appeals " and " proclamations " in which 
" labor " and especially " organized labor " was " recognized " 

1 Labor turnover in Homestead Steel Works for 1919 was 575 a month 
or 6,800 a year to maintain the force of 11,500. Testimony of Home- 
stead Superintendent, Senate Testimony, Vol. II, p. 481. 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 149 

in a fashion hardly recognizable to the old steel worker. 
Most important of all, the Government was putting its seal of 
recognition on Mr. Gompers personally, and the War Labor 
Board was making " collective bargaining " and the " right 
to organize in trade and labor nnions " the text of business 
awards. The mistake was quite natural for the worker to 
suppose that this recognition was based on his worth as a 
steel maker, not on the coincidence of war time needs. 
Naturally, on November 11, 1918, he made a mistake about 
the armistice which seemed to him to have no connection 
with this recognition. 

The data before the Commission show that at the beginning 
of the strike steel workers in great numbers had the liveliest 
expectation of governmental assistance in getting their or- 
ganization " recognized " by the Steel Corporation. Particu- 
larly the " foreigners," with their tradition of awed respect 
for constituted authority, talked about the government com- 
ing to the rescue ; some believed " Mr. Wilson will run the 
mills." Months before, others of the " foreigners " had been 
disillusioned ; they lost the skilled jobs, the foremen resumed 
swearing and reminded them in so many words that they 
were " hunkies." The solicitous superintendent and the 
published proclamations vanished. Instead there was rumor 
of cuts in wages. Once again the vital link between the 
steel worker and the steel employer was the wooden board 
where notices were posted. During the strike instead of Mr. 
Wilson, Mr. Palmer came and the Senate Committee's re- 
port. Thus, in two aspects, the Federal Administration was 
an organizer of the strike. 

The second psychological factor growing out of the war, 
with which American labor leaders had even less to do, 
sprang from events in Europe. The news of two years 
happenings there deeply influenced all labor, of course, but 
the evidence indicates peculiar influence on steel workers. 



150 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

English speaking workers were impressed by what happened 
in England; the mass of Slavic workers, constituting from 
30 per cent, to 70 per cent, in many mills, were stirred by 
Russia. 

The evidence supports no sweeping conclusions about exact 
effects of British and Rfussian influence. Weeks of care- 
ful interviewing in the Pittsburgh and Chicago districts in- 
dicated that it was results rather than methods which " got 
over" to the American worker from London and Moscow. 
The inference is not warranted that all " American " steel 
workers become converts to political action by labor and all 
•Slav workers to a dictatorship of the proletariat. " Ameri- 
cans " talked about British labor a great deal but they were 
vague on the details of organizing labor parties. The one big 
thing they grasped was the news of the probability or pos- 
sibility of a labor government of the British Empire, how to 
be obtained they did not exactly understand. 

Slav workers were even more vague about Russia. A 
sub-report x demonstrates that the immigrant leadership in 
Russian, Slovak, Serb, Hungarian, Polish and Roumanian 
communities in steel areas has been largely conservative, mid- 
dle-class, " characteristically bourgeois." It is the leadership 
of priests, editors, small business men, and officers of benefit 
societies ; only lately has there been much labor leadership, 
and the little radical labor leadership has not been widely 
effective. 

One or two nationalities, Magyars and Finns, for example, 
are politically Socialist by tradition and the Finns are 
economically of radical trend. The mass are principally con- 
cerned with " bettering themselves " in the fashion usual to 
pioneers, — better houses, better food, better hours and wages, 
better social recognition, especially from " Americans." But 

1 " Intellectual Environment of the Immigrant Steel Worker," by 
David J. Saposs. 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 151 

they came from Eastern Europe and now Eastern Europe 
means to them mainly the overthrew of autocracy. They 
have a vague idea that big rich people who run things 
" arbitrarily," even in mills, are coming down in the world. 
Russia, moreover, means to them the rise of workingmen to 
power. They have a vague idea that poor people who have 
been run for a long time, on farms and in mills, are coming 
up in the world and are beginning to run themselves. 

Communists, looking for evidence of Lenin as an organizer 
of the steel strike, found little to please them. Two students 
of Lenin's method, one a Communist enthusiast, returned 
from rather hasty investigations of the Pittsburgh strikers in 
a state of dejection. They reported that the Slavic workers 
" were mad enough but didn't know anything." They "laid 
the blame to the strike leadership and to the lack of propa- 
ganda. They recommended breaking down the influence of 
A. E. of L. organizers, Foster especially, and " a campaign 
of education by leaflets." They said the steel workers were 
not ripe for " action " (Communist) but would be particu- 
larly ripe for " education " after the strike was lost. One of 
these investigators termed Fitzpatrick " a menace because he 
wanted to lead the workers away from economic direct action 
and into a labor party, to follow the losing by-path of 
bourgeois political action ; " he considered Foster " worse than 
useless because his reputation as an old radical spoiled the 
true picture of the strike — the worst kind of an A. F. of L. 
strike." 

The Commission's own investigators noted the following 
fact which relates to the above gentlemen's discouragement 
about " spreading knowledge of proletarian tactics :" 

Slavs in this country have a high percentage of illiteracy ; 
and most of the papers of large circulation which they can 
read don't even print " labor news," let alone revolutionary 
methods. Radical foreign language papers to " counter-act " 



152 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

these newspapers, seem to be few in number and without 
established means of circulation. There is plenty of evidence 
of a militant minority, informed on Russia, among the im- 
migrant races, just as there is in any " American " com- 
munity. But these militant immigrants, it is undisputed, 
had no connection and no power with the national leaders of 
the strike. The " Russian idea " imbedded in the minds of 
the great majority of immigrant workers, as revealed in many 
interviews, was this : That Russia now is a worker's repub- 
lic. This, of course, is pretty much the " American " work- 
er's conception, according to observers who have talked much 
with the rank and file of American workers : — that the Rus- 
sian revolution was likely a bloody business and Bolsheviks 
are doubtless dangerous and wild but the Russian Govern- 
ment is a laboring man's government and it has not fallen 
down yet. Two years of newspaper reports that the Russian 
republic/ was about to fall seem to have given workingmen, 
even here, a sort of class pride that it hasn't fallen. 

The above represents about the best that can be made 
in the direction of analyzing out the ingredients comprising 
"foreign influence" on immigrant workers. What is a 
common sense way of regarding it all? When Gen. Smuts 
said that now " humanity is on the march " and that men 
everywhere, workingmen too, feel that sweeping social read- 
justments are necessary, he spoke the every-day belief of sen- 
sible men in America. Steel workers felt that in this period 
workers everywhere were moving to get rid of things which 
chained them, — czaristic dynasties in some lands, in others 
slavish hours of labor and subjection to industrial machines. 
This is a rather more sensible view than to suppose that 
several hundred thousand immigrants, many of them illiter- 
ate, struck in 1919 because they had carefully read and 
mastered rules for forming Soviets. Their intention, analy- 
sis seems to indicate, was to reach an agreement with the 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 153 

Steel Corporation about hours, wages and bosses, rather than 
to send armed workers to seize the Allegheny County court 
house or the Pennsylvania railroad station. What immi- 
grant and native-born learned from Europe in 1919 was that 
it seemed a good time to end the autocracy which they knew — 
the Corporation's way of running its workers. 

Therefore, from all these causes, the length of hours and 
arbitrary control inside the mills and the deep influences 
growing out of war events, steel workers were individually 
in a strike frame of mind; it was the job of the National 
Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers to make 
a machine for moving these individual frames of mind into 
mass action. Mr. Foster, its Secretary-Treasurer, could never 
have supplied the first part of the necessary conditions but 
he did furnish the second. 

The overshadowing importance of basic states of mind is 
only emphasized by seeing how a strike machine works. The 
vital thing about the Fitzpatrick-Foster campaign organiza- 
tion was that it dealt in psychological factors. It wasn't so 
much the system of organization as the handling of states of 
mass-mind that counted. To the very end the Foster machine 
was a poor thing as a system of control; the strike moved 
on its own legs, it was a " walkout " of rank and file. 

Inspection of the records makes this plain ; that while Mr. 
Foster's disposition of organizers and his series of mass 
meetings brought members into the unions, the thing that 
fetched steel workers to sign up in big numbers was the in- 
fluence of an idea which Mr. Foster's men skilfully wielded. 
The idea was not culled from the " Eed Book " nor from Mr. 
Gompers' speeches; it was the same idea which is the back- 
bone of most American political campaigns, the idea that 
" this thing is going to succeed — this movement is getting 
somewhere — "we're winning." The fact is proved in such 
detail that it makes impossible the explanations of steel com- 



154 EEPOET ON* THE STEEL STRIKE 

pany officials that " the men joined "because milk drivers and 
barkeepers tricked their wives into signing " or " the men 
were intimidated into joining." Steel officials who said " the 
organizers promised them everything " came a little nearer 
the explanation. 

The union tabulations show how this psychology of success 
worked, how " red " ideas had as much to do with it as blue 
or green. The two great jumps in tabulated memberships 
came first when the strike ballot was ordered among those 
already signed up and word went round among the others, 
" they are doing something — they're off." During the strike- 
balloting the enrollment jumped 50 per cent. Setting a 
strike date brought in .the next large increment. Likewise 
the two great drops in active membership had occurred, first, 
after the " flu ban " in the Chicago district had caused the 
National Organizers to be withdrawn, giving the rank and file 
the idea that " there was nothing doing after all ; " and 
second, after the congress of 500 rank and file workers in 
Pittsburgh on May 25. The inexperienced delegates, eager 
for a strike, found that they were not empowered to call one, 
and immediately the whole movement sagged, again in the 
belief that the leadership was getting nowhere. 

Herd psychology was far more powerful than any set of 
trade union doctrines preached in meeting. It proves, too, 
how essential to such a movement were the states of mind 
induced by long hours, arbitrary control and aspirations de- 
rived from the war. This business — of gauging the feelings 
of the masses in the mills — was the all-engrossing duty of 
Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Foster, a task of which the public 
knew nothing and which Mr. Fitzpatrick did not promulgate. 

Conversely, the leaders' greatest difficulty, beginning in 
the spring and almost unmanageable by August, was in with- 
standing the mass-feeling they had fostered. The " situation 
nearly got away " from them several times in Johnstown, and 



ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 155 

in places in Ohio and Indiana ; that is, the men in these dis- 
tricts nearly went on strike before other districts were organ- 
ized. As it was ; " the dam broke before this district was 
more than half worked/' according to one organizer in Pitts- 
burgh. The movement, before getting to the 100,000 mark, 
reached a point where, by the working of the very idea that 
built it, it threatened to break out in sporadic strike-lets or 
break down altogther. That point was when Mr. Gary re- 
fused to confer: right then the " this-thing-is-succeeding " 
idea began to change to " this-thing-is-not-succeeding " along 
the negotiating line, and the leaders had to let it go on to a 
strike as the next means of success or let it go all to pieces. 

The inside story of the strike puts out of consideration 
descriptions of it as a " plot " or " dark Bolshevik conspir- 
acy." A strike movment of 300,000 men in a dozen states is 
about as secret as a presidential campaign. 

Conversely again, the great blow to the strike in October 
and November was the growth of the feeling that " this 
thing is not succeeding." The steel companies' most powerful 
single weapon was creating and fostering the feeling that 
" it's a fizzle, we're making steel, strike's all over." That 
feeling, more than arrests or suppression of meetings or 
" Cossacks," wore down the strike. Mr. Foster built up the 
movement from the idea that " the steel trust can be beaten." 
The companies won out by restoring the idea that the Steel 
Corporation can't be beaten. During the campaign the I. W. 
W. used the same argument as the companies, with this dif- 
ference : " Don't join the A. F. of L. ; the A. F. of L. loses 
its strikes." 

To these psychological facts, which are the nub of the 
history of the strike movement, many details can be added 
from the Commission's evidence by examining the plan of 
the organization movement, the industrial situation of the 
period, the men who formed the National Committee and 



156 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

their ideas of what they were after. Such examination must 
begin with Mr. Foster and his resolution to organize the 
workers in the steel industry passed by the A. F. of L. con- 
vention at St. Paul, June 17, 1918. This raises at once 
the matter of " radicals boring from within/' over which 
public opinion was greatly exercised as the strike began. 
Organized labor, however, seemed to regard " boring " as an 
old story. Its explanation may shed light on why the trade 
unions have not " ditched Poster," as many " friends of 
labor " expected them to do and why the trade unions have 
no intention of ditching him. 

Mr. Foster's business might be described as making the 
labor movement move. His main personal characteristic is 
intensity. When he followed the sea he is reported to have 
been intensely a sailor for he qualified an A. B. and learned 
all the knots on a 4-sticker. When he was a homesteader, in 
the Coast mountains, he was intense enough to stick at it 
alone for five years, prove his claim and clear twenty-two acres 
of land. When he took up making the labor movement move, 
he tried it first as a very intense syndicalist, an I. W. W. 
outside the trade unions. Little motion resulting, he " re- 
pudiated " syndicalist methods and joined the Eailway Car- 
men's Union in order to " bore from within " the A. P. of 
L. In the steel campaign he was most intensely boring from 
within and the labor movement knew it and let him bore. 
It was considered that his boring might be through the unions' 
but was certainly against the anti-union employers. 

That is, he decided that the labor movement was the 
A. P. of L. and not the I. W. W. and that his job was 
making the A. P. of L. move. The A. P. of L.'s first job, he 
conceived, was organizing men. He saw that even the 
strongest A. F. of L. unions, the United Mine Workers, had 
only about half the coal miners organized; perhaps he 
noticed that Mr. Gompers' own union, the Cigar Makers, had 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 157 

its industry only 25 per cent, organized. He saw the stock- 
yards unorganized, the steel industry unorganized. Instead 
of merely trying to sting the A. F. of L. into moving on 
the stockyards, he thought out a plan of action which was 
to get all the unions having " claims " on stockyard trades to 
unite in one onslaught instead of attempting separate attacks 
and being beaten separately. He took the plan to Mr. Fitz- 
patrick, who saw its possibilities, the A. F. of L. endorsed it 
and they led the united unions triumphantly through the 
stockyards. Then they turned to steel. 

In each case besides offering the plan, Mr. Foster offered 
himself, a liability from one viewpoint, an asset according to 
the trade unionists backing the plan. For this reason : a new 
kind of man was necessary: a large-scale promoter instead 
of small salesmen. Mr. Foster's advent in the steel industry 
was like Mr. Gary's. Mr. Gary came in from outside to help 
consolidate the efforts of separate concerns. Twenty years 
later Mr. Foster was the newcomer, to help consolidate the 
efforts of a score of unions, not in the industry but trying to 
get in ; his, too, was a large scale business proposition. The 
officers of A. F. of L. trade unions, it is alleged, tend to be 
job holders rather than apostles; they are more expert, it is 
asserted, in figuring out the scale of dues for their own 
organizations than in figuring out what is due to laborers 
outside their locals. Some of the unions in the steel drive 
were stumped to the end by the following problem: how to 
admit recruits at the $3 initiation fee, set for the drive, 
when their union constitutions set initiation fees at from 5 
to 3000 per cent, higher. Mr. Foster flattered himself on be- 
ing a broad gauge executive, able to look past such details and 
to offer a prospectus of " trust " magnitude. The officials 
of the unions flattered him by regularly nominating and 
electing him Secretary-Treasurer of the National Committee, 
under two bonds, inspected by three auditors, responsible 



158 EEPOKT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

for the minutes and more noting than noted during com- 
mittee meetings. 

Thus the supposition that " boring " is a Machiavellian 
business does not seem to fit the facts. It does not mean join- 
ing the Republican party and boring from .within throughout 
a campaign in the confident expectation of having all the 
Republicans on election day vote the Democratic ticket. It 
did not mean a campaign among the steel workers at the end 
of which they voted the I. W. W. ticket, or Mr. Gary's 
ticket, or for anything but " strike " for their unions. It 
does mean putting inside the trade unions radically minded 
men who will make more trade unionists. It does in- 
volve the possibility that after all the unorganized are 
gathered into the old-line trade unions, these radically minded 
organizers may convert the trade unions, if they can; that 
is the trade unions' lookout. Inside the unions the critics of 
the " borer " are old officials who feel he is a reflection on 
them; which he is. To Mr. Foster personally the steel 
organization campaign was largely a matter of conciliating 
old unionists who were not used to having the movement 
move. Beyond that, his task was persuading the twenty-four 
rival unions involved to obey Marshal Foch, alias Fitzpatrick. 

Let this analysis of Mr. Foster and of u boring " be dis- 
tinctly understood in its relation to the labor movement as a 
whole ; it is much the smaller side of the real problem which 
confronts A. F. of L. trade unions. That problem is indus- 
trial unionism and the larger side of it is not " borers " 
but economic conditions. Ten years ago " boring " was a 
fairly live topic in the conventions of both camps — craft 
union and industrial union — and both camps are now little 
interested in it. The I.W.W. official decision was against it 
on the ground that it would depopulate the I.W.W. and that 
industrial unionists inside the craft union would become 
denaturized. I.W.W.'s in 1919 pointed scornfully to Foster 



ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 159 

as a " horrible example " of the emasculation of an industrial 
unionist. The A. F. of L. decision was to welcome the 
" borer " as a " convert from heresy/' welcome to enter and 
act like other craft unionists. And there the American con- 
troversy has rested, revived occasionally, as during the steel 
strike or when some British exponent of " boring/' like 
Tom Mann, is elected head of an old craft union, or when 
William D. Haywood proclaims that any real " borer " must 
ultimately bore to the outside, that is, must get out of the 
A. F. of L. 

The far more important side of the labor movement's in- 
dustrial union problem lies in those economic conditions 
which latterly have exposed weaknesses in craft unions and 
have driven them to essay " amalgamations " and other ap- 
proximations of industrial organization. When a craft union 
on strike sees brother unions in the same industry sticking to 
work or even filling the strikers' jobs, that craft union begins 
to do a lot more thinking about industrial unionism than a 
hundred " borers " could inspire. When craft unions pro- 
mulgate ambitions, as did the A. F. of L. in 1919, about 
" sharing control and democracy in industry," they are forced 
automatically to considering industrial union problems. 

Neither in plan nor practice was the work of the National 
Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers industrial 
unionism. 

During a year of Committee meetings on the campaign 
there was never discussion of " general policy as regards ideas 
to be used " by the speakers, except once. There was no dis- 
cussion because the international craft unions and the experi- 
enced organizers they supplied all knew what the ideas would 
be: the orthodox pure and simple trade union text of 
" organize." Heresies such as industrial control or industrial 
unionism or political organization or, least of all, " Soviets," 
never were an issue in the Committee ; the undisputed gospel 



160 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

was " organize and all these things shall "be added unto you," 
with no speculation as to what " all these things " might turn 
out to be in actual terms of hours, wages and conditions for 
steel workers. The one exception was a reference at the start 
in 1918 when President Gompers warned " lest the move- 
ment be turned to other than trade union ends." Scenting 
the bare possibility of industrial organization, he wanted 
early to make it plain to the Committee, meeting for the 
first time, that his endorsement in no way meant any personal 
leaning toward One Big Unionism. But the twenty-four 
unions had no doubt about what they wanted, — more numbers 
for each of their separate craft organizations; and that is 
what they got. Mr. Foster, as the string around the pack- 
age, might have been a very red string, and still he couldn't 
have incarnadined the multitudinous locals from Maine to 
Mississippi which put up the money to pay the organizers to 
get new craft unionists in steel towns. 

Data were gathered by the investigators on whether the 
viewpoint expressed by Mr. Gompers and carried out by Mr. 
Foster resulted in the same harmony among the newly 
organized rank and file as among the National Committee- 
men. The evidence is clear that it did not. In many plants 
the instinct of the immigrant recruit was to associate with 
his shopmates of different " crafts " rather than with his 
" craft " mates from other shops. He fell more easily into 
a shop or plant union, which, however, would have been 
an industrial union. Some local leaders so organized him. 
Thus an internal conflict arose which had serious conse- 
quences (set forth elsewhere) for the strike. In local unions, 
the artificial harmony of the twenty-four International 
Unions conflicted with the " inexperienced " immigrant drift 
toward real industrial unionism. The twenty-four crafts 
smothered this drift. The end of the strike saw different 
unions pulling out of the National Committee, each with its 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 161 

separate booty of recruits and even the specious " industrial " 
effort represented by the Committee openly disrupted. If 
Mr. Foster, as a former industrial unionist, had still in the 
back of his head a hope of an industrial union in steel, the 
outcome was a joke on him as it was on those of the rank 
and file who moved with the drift. 

Ideas of industrial control and the ideal of One Big Union 
were urged at different times from, the outside by I.W.W.'s, 
by Socialists, by " friends of labor " in publications and per- 
sonally. One of the Committeemen was told : " Don't 
answer the Bolshevik stuff by making yourself out so con- 
servative. It's just a ruse of the Steel Corporation to make 
you admit you're conservative, so that those foreigner steel 
workers will distrust you. Those Slavic steel workers are 
radical and won't respond to conservative pleas." 

The Commission's investigation of Slavic communities, as 
referred to before, indicates that the ideas influencing immi- 
grant steel workers hitherto have not been radical. When the 
above theory was repeated to a national strike leader he dis- 
played no interest beyond saying, " I don't think Mr. Gary 
is that smart." Mr. Foster's comment was : " That advice 
sounds like one of those intellectuals who are always telling 
Sam Gompers how to run trade unions. The trouble with all 
radicals is that they don't know the labor movement or the 
laboring man or what we're up against." 

At the Commission's Pittsburgh hearings in November, 
Mr. Foster was asked directly whether he did not think the 
Slavic worker brought to this country radical leanings in 
industrial ideas. He replied that so far as knowledge of 
trade unions or any industrial organization was concerned, 
" they brought a blank in their skulls." The record of his 
conception reads as follows : 

"They are really a new factor in American trade unionism. 
They are just learning unionism since the war started. They 



162 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

are just breaking into it. So far as I can see the foreigner wants 
more money. He is confronted with the immediate problem of 
life. His idealism stretches about as far as his shortest working 
day. The percentage of them that have any vision for future 
conditions is very small. It is not a determining factor at all. 
It is more wages, shorter hours — the regular trade union de- 
mands are the things that count. 

" Take an organization like the brotherhoods — they have a 
vision among them far in excess of anything among these people. 
The American makes the best type of union man. He is hard 
to organize, and he hasn't got that collective sense so highly 
developed as the foreigner has. He is individualistic and critical, 
and he has some ten or twelve excuses why he shouldn't belong 
to an organization ; but once you can win them, once you can get 
them on your side, you have a splendid type. 

" The foreigner is a different type. He has that group idea 
very strongly developed. In his own country individualism plays 
a small part. He is labeled and tagged and oppressed, and he 
is classed, and his psychology is pretty simple over there. He 
knows what he is, and if there is any possible chance for him to 
do anything he feels that it is as a group, not as an individual. 

u He comes over here and he seems to respond to an appeal 
better than Americans do. But he is very materialistic in his 
demands. You know you can convince the Americans and you 
can hold an organization for years in a plant without getting a 
cent benefit out of it directly. But the foreigner you can't hold 
that way. He comes in for increase of wages and shortening 
of hours. He comes in quite readily, but if you don't get him the 
results he drops away quite readily also. 

" Then, a peculiar thing happens. When the fight occurs, he 
is a splendid fighter. He has the American beaten when it comes 
to a fight. I don't say that in criticism of the American, but 
I think it is due to the position he occupies in industry. The 
American usually holds the good job, and he has a home half 
paid for, and he is full of responsibility; whereas the foreigner 
is more foot-loose; has a poor job anyway, and he doesn't feel 
that so much is at stake. 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 163 

"He will stick, while the American will go back to work. 
That is what happened in the mills just now. When the fight 
occurs the foreigner displays a wonderful amount of idealism, 
a wonderful amount of stick-to-it-iveness, that is altogether dis- 
similar to the intensely materialistic spirit he shows in his union 
transactions." 

Question : " There has been a difference in response to your 
appeals in the district here between the unskilled foreign workers 
and the skilled American workers. Could you give any further 
explanation, — other than what you have given, — of why the 
skilled American in this district was slow to join the organ- 
ization ? " 

Mr. Foster : " The reason is simply this : The most irre- 
sponsible elements rally first. Mr. Gary rules by fear — pure un- 
adulterated fear; fear of losing their job; the fear of having 
their life's occupation taken away from them. That is what 
keeps them from joining the unions. 

" If Mr. Gary would post a notice in his mills tomorrow that 
every man could join a union if he saw fit, they'd break down 
the doors all over the country trying to join. A first-class proof 
of this was shown by what occurred to the railroads. Our 
unions fought along for years and years and years in the face 
of no response at all from the workers. There was violent 
opposition on the part of the company to trying to organize 
the men, but as soon as the railroad administration took the 
position that the men could join the union, a million and a 
half joined in practically two or three months. The great 
Pennsylvania Railroad was organized in about two or three 
months, which for forty years they had worked on before and 
couldn't touch. As soon as the fear was removed they flocked in. 

"When we came into the Pittsburgh district we were con- 
fronted with the proposition of breaking down this fear. Those 
men who had less to fear were first to respond. They are the 
unskilled, and naturally, the foreigner. They don't care whether 
they are discharged or not. 

"Here is what usually happens to a plant. At first the 
American doesn't like to say he is afraid. No, he won't admit 



164 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

that, but lie says the union can't do anything; it is no good. 
Naturally, every man likes to develop some philosophy to pro- 
tect his own particular brand of weakness. 

" But we go ahead and organize those who will come in, and 
we get more and more into the union, and the first thing you 
know the American begins to prick up his ears a little bit, and 
begins to be not quite so sure about the union being a failure. 
And so, as we go into the mill we get into the better class of men, 
and eventually get them all. We get the very best of them. 
But it is a question of time. 

" The reason we didn't get them here was because our or- 
ganization was immature. In this Pittsburgh district it was 
due to the fact that we couldn't hold meetings and couldn't 
reach the men. In Johnstown, where we had a free hand, we 
organized them right off the bat, and right up to the office. 
;We had the office help in our organization up there. 

" The creation of an organization among or in a group of 
workingmen is wonderful. After the bonds of organization 
are created it is just as hard to break them as to create." 

Mr. Foster's testimony is cited because it typifies the 
statements of the National strike leaders investigated by the 
Commission. It is borne out by all the National Committee 
records accumulated by investigators. Whether its reasoning 
is based on fact or not, it seems to be a fair statement of the 
ideas actually carried out in the campaign, and so far as the 
strike's failure rested with ideas, these were the ideas 
responsible. 

What ideas were responsible for the actions of the leaders 
in the next phase of such a movement — the attempt to ac- 
complish something for the men when organized, by forcing 
a conference with the employers? This phase, from mid- 
summer, 1919, on, is the story of continued attempts to 
arrange a conference or to mediate, attempts made by the 
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, then 
by the National Committee, then by Mr. Gompers, then by 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 165 

President Wilson, then during the President's National In- 
dustrial Conference and last by the Commission of Inquiry 
of the Interchurch World Movement. All these attempts 
were successfully defeated. It seemed as if the public 
approved the denial of anything which might eventuate in 
" the kind of conference the labor unions wanted." What 
kind of conference was this? What exactly was in Mr. 
Fitzp a trick's mind in writing to Mr. Gary ? 

Mr. Fitzpatrick himself gave the Commission the clearest 
possible picture. The personal element was the first element 
in it. Mr. Fitzpatrick showed the most downright, unquali- 
fied, belief in the idea that " if only both sides could get 
together around a table, it could all be straightened out." 
Personalities as a stumbling-block did exist strongly in the 
minds of both sides. Mr. Gary objected to conference partly 
because of " the character of the leadership." He reminded 
the Commission that " Mr. Foster is a slick one." Mr. Buf- 
fington told the Commission that " Mr. Fitzpatrick is a bad 
lot." Mr. Fitzpatrick, in a discussion of general conditions, 
said, " When I think of those trust magnates and the condi- 
tions their workers live in and work in and die in — why 
their hearts must be as black as the ace of spades." But 
he seemed to think more deeply that " it could all be 
straightened out" if he could convince the other side that 
labor leaders were not bad men and that their plans were not 
bad. 

What Mr. Fitzpatrick wanted was what he got at the end 
of the 1918 campaign to organize the stockyards of Chicago. 
Then he began attempting to arrange a conference with Mr. 
Armour, the leader of the packers. Mr. Armour's offices were 
on the seventh floor of a Chicago building, Mr. Fitzpatrick's 
on the sixth. The efforts reached the point where Mr. 
Armour's secretary acted as messenger, reporting to Mr. Fitz- 
patrick, " John, he won't meet you " : and on being persuaded 



166 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

to go back again, reporting as a finality, " John, he says 
you're a very fine man and he has nothing against you, but 
he won't deal with union labor and he's very busy." 

Just as happened later in the Steel Industry, Mr. Fitz- 
patrick set a stockyard strike date and President "Wilson 
intervened to effect a conference. The President promised 
to do everything in his power to obtain that conference, just 
as he tried later to approach Mr. Gary. Meanwhile Mr. 
Fitzpatrick gave the President " two hours, two weeks, or 
two months " to get the conference, extending the strike limit 
indefinitely. The President ordered the five big packers and 
the union leaders to meet in the office of Secretary of Labor 
Wilson. 

" There," Mr. Fitzpatrick said, " we all sat in a circle, 
about twenty of us, Armour and the packers on one side 
and our fellows on the other side, and the Secretary in the 
middle on a kind of pedestal. It was war-time and the 
Secretary made a most eloquent, patriotic speech. At the 
end, Armour's lawyer got up and began to argue against 
conferring with union men. I saw he was simply cutting 
the ground out from under the speech and out from under 
everything, so I just stood up and said, ' Gentlemen, it all 
seems to turn on whether or not Mr. Armour is going to 
meet anybody, and I want to say right here that I am now 
going to shake hands with Mr. Armour.' So I just walked 
across that circle, had to walk about twenty feet, over to 
where Armour was sitting, and I stuck out my hand. He got 
red and looked up at me very funny and then he stood up 
very courteously and shook hands and said, i Of course I'll 
shake hands with Mr. Fitzpatrick.' And then I went right 
on down that line of packers and shook hands with every one 
of them, and the lawyer's argument and the whole confer- 
ence went bust for twenty minutes. 

"If the argument had gone on, we would have just got 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 167 

nowhere. But, after that twenty minutes of mix-up, we sat 
down and quickly arranged a conference between the packers 
and union labor." 

There was the picture in the mind of the leader of the 
steel strikers. His ideal was to overcome the personal re- 
fusal of Mr. Gary to deal with labor leaders personally and 
to bring about a peace meeting which should be first a simple 
meeting of men ; and then what ? Mr. Fitzpatrick explained 
to the Commission his next idea. 

" Suppose Mr. Gary had met us and had said, ' Let us 
negotiate. 7 I wouldn't have been able to do it, I don't know 
steel. Then we should have said, c All we want to do, Mr. 
Gary, is to tell you with whom to confer to carry out the 
details.' And these men would have been Mr. Gary's own 
employees, with the union leaders somewhere nearby to 
advise." 

There, frankly set forth, is the union leaders' position, 
under Mr. Gompers' tenets. To Mr. Fitzpatrick it was a 
very simple proposition. He was undeniably surprised that 
the Government did not support it and that public opinion 
did not enforce it. 

He might be surprised if reminded that in this frankness 
he had put his finger on two points which often, rightly or 
wrongly, leave pure and simple trade unionism, with so little 
support in " public opinion " and with such opposition from 
the employer. " To tell him with whom to confer " typifies 
in many minds all that goes with the phrase " labor autoc- 
racy." The second point, " I don't know steel," typifies all 
the repugnance in the mind of the employer conveyed by the 
phrase, " dealing with outsiders." So far, A. F. of L. unions 
have answered the two objections in but one way, by saying 
that if you won't confer, we'll make you confer, we'll strike. 
That is, union labor's tactic simply accepts the gauge of 
" autocracy of labor " and sets to to fight it out against an 



168 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

** autocracy of capital." Certain unions outside the A. F. 
of L., and abroad, have begun to formulate another, — not a 
substitute but an additional, — answer: — the acceptance of 
responsibility for production, the learning of the problem of 
production for public sendee and the clarified demand for a 
decisive share in control and in earnings. 

What part had this limited " force against force " doctrine 
of the A. F. of L. in the responsibility for the failure of the 
strike? What were the causes of failure? It would be a 
serious mistake to consider causes within the labor organiza- 
tion without reference to other causes which were more im- 
portant, for example, the active opposition waged by the 
U. S. Steel Corporation. And before analysis of either set 
of causes can be made, the character of the new steel workers' 
organizations and of the twenty-four-headed leadership must 
be clearly grasped. 

The respective positions of the organized steel workers, the 
National Committee and the twenty-four International 
Unions, may be summarized as follows : 

The raw recruits, particularly the immigrant workers, wanted 
to strike soon after they had joined up, since they could 
conceive of both protection and " results " only in a 
universal walkout. 

The twenty-four old unions willingly put money into a cam- 
paign for new members but hesitated greatly over back- 
ing a strike in behalf of the new steel locals, which might 
possibly jeopardize their old membership outside the 
steel industry. 

The National Committee tried to unify the twenty-four Inter- 
nationals for (a) the organizing drive (in which it had 
difficulties) ; (b) the strike (in which it was partly 
successful) ; (c) the concerted conduct of business in 
the industry, through the establishment of a Steel De- 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 169 

partrnent in the A. F. of L. (in which it was easily- 
beaten) . 

The facts are detailed with greater exactness than has 
usually been attained in histories of strikes, in the snb-report 
on " The National Committee/' based on the Committee's 
minutes. It is the story of a conciliating body, made up 
principally of representatives of the Internationals rather 
than of the International presidents themselves, which per- 
suaded and cajoled the twenty-four unions, all rivals for the 
booty of new recruits, into subordinating their differences and 
contributing a modicum of cooperative effort. The Com- 
mittee struggled with ancient jurisdictional disputes between 
the Steam Shovelmen and the Stationary Engineers over 
the disposition of cranemen ; between the Amalgamated Asso- 
ciation of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers and the Hod Carriers' 
Union over the disposition of common laborers; it argued 
unceasingly with constituent unions whose constitutions and 
by-laws threatened to bar out steel recruits. It tried to im- 
press the wishes of the newly organized rank and file, clamor- 
ing for action, upon the absentee officialdom of the Inter- 
national Unions and the conservative A. F. of L. overlords. 
As an administrative machine the Committee never attained 
a remarkable degree of perfection. " This organization," one 
of the strike officers said 1 , " has as much cohesiveness as a 
load of furniture." 

The first meetings of the embryo National Committee were 
held June 17-20, in St. Paul, Minn., coincident with the 
1918 convention of the A. F. of L. Organization meetings 
were convened in Chicago August 1 and August 16, at which 
W. Z. Foster was elected temporary, then permanent Secre- 
tary-Treasurer, in active charge of the organizing drive, and 
John Fitzpatrick succeeded Mr. Gompers as Chairman. It 
was decided to make the campaign simultaneously nation- 



170 KEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

wide; to use a uniform application blank and a universal 
low initiation fee of $3, of wkick $1 should go to tke National 
Committee's fund, the other $2 to tke International Unions; 
to obtain from eaok union a $100 initial contribution as an 
organizing fund ($2,400 to organize an entire industry!) and 
as many experienced organizers as could be donated. Organi- 
zation was to be tkrougk mass meetings, at wkick applicants 
would be signed up, tke applications tken " segregated 
according to crafts, and tke segregated applicants tken organ- 
ized into separate locals or inducted into locals already 
existent in separate localities, tkenceforward to be dues-pay- 
ing members subject to tke laws of tke International to 
wkick tkey were assigned. Tke industry was divided into 
tke following "Districts": Ckicago, Betklekem, Joknstown, 
Pittsburgk, Youngstown, Cleveland, Wkeeling, Steubenville, 
Buffalo, Pueblo (Colo.) and Birmingkam (Ala.) ; in eack 
was formed a " Steel Workers' Council," a Poster idea, re- 
sulting in tke most effective organizing means outside tke 
National Committee. 

Inspection of tke records demonstrates kow tke tkree mam 
parties to tke movement reacked tkeir differing positions, 
(a) Bank and file of new recruits. 

Witk tke first mass meetings in September, 1918, tke rank 
and file began to indicate tkeir general attitude and tkeir 
need,— protection. At tke National Committee meeting of 
September 28, delegates reported " splendid mass meetings at 
Soutk Ckicago, Gary, Hammond, Joliet and Betklekem." A 
delegate reported 1,500 signed up at one Ckicago meeting. 
A delegate from Gary reported " fifteen boilermakers dis- 
charged for union affiliation.' 

' Prom September, 1918, to September, 1919, the new 
unionists with increasing power urged action,— and tke only 
action tkey understood was serving " demands " and striking. 
At tke January 4 meeting reports were keard on "good 



ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 171 

movements on foot at the steel plants at Bethlehem, Coates- 
ville, Sparrows Point, Steelton, Johnstown, Bntler, Mones- 
sen, Wheeling, Youngstown, Buffalo, Cleveland, Lorain, Mil- 
waukee, Gary, Indiana Harbor, Joliet, South Chicago, 
Minnesota, Pullman, Pueblo." The Secretary " announced 
that beyond all question the steel industry is being organ- 
ized." The South Chicago workers asked " whether or not it 
was advisable for them to begin wearing the union button." 
Apparently even that much show of " action " was urged by 
the rank and file but the Committee advised holding buttons 
" in abeyance for the time being." Discharges of workmen 
for union activity began to be reported from the Pennsylvania 
districts. 

At the March 8 meeting "hundreds" of Johnstown 
workers were reported as " discharged point blank " ; affi- 
davits were read of union men discharged "after ten to thirty- 
five years service." Similar " obstructionist " tactics had 
been reported from Youngstown. On May 25 a congress of 
583 rank and file delegates from eighty steel centers, un- 
trained in trade union practice, clamored their abuses and 
urged a strike which they thought themselves empowered to 
call. The Internationals' representatives counselled modera- 
tion. At the July 11 meeting the reports read that " in 
Johnstown, Youngstown, Chicago, Vandergrift, Wheeling 
and elsewhere great strikes are threatening. The men are 
letting it be known that if we do not do something for them 
they will take the matter into their own hands. Where they 
are not threatening to strike they are taking the position 
that they will pay no more dues until they can see some 
results from their efforts." Prom then on until September 
the records show a long tussle between the erupting rank and 
file and the International officers — with the National Com- 
mittee as buffer — while demands were served, a strike ballot 
taken and a strike date set. In the last tense debates over 



172 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

postponing the date it was the impact of many telegrams like 
the following which forced the issue (meeting of September 
17): 

W. Z. Foster, 303 Magee Bldg., Pittsburgh, Pa. 

We cannot be expected to meet the enraged workers, who will 
consider ns traitors if strike is postponed. 

Organizers Youngs town District. 

The rank and file through the local leaders thus over-rode 
the Internationals, the A. F. of L. and President Wilson's 
request to wait for the October Industrial Conference. 

(b) The Internationals. 

The position of the twenty-four International Unions is 
indicated with similar clearness from the earliest Committee 
meetings. Few of the International Presidents, nominally 
members of the Committee, ever attended the meetings per- 
sonally and at one meeting there were demands that the 
unions' representatives be at least a vice-president, rather 
than a powerless organizer. They agreed to the financing 

plan pro-rata distribution of expenses in ratios of each 

union's total votes in A. F. of L. conventions— but, from 
September, 1918, on, many of the Internationals had to be 
" jacked up" persistently for moneys pledged. In organ- 
izers they contributed in all about 100; at the May 25 con- 
gress of rank and file, resolutions were passed that " there is 
sadly lacking a sufficient number of labor representatives " 
for the campaign and, " Whereas, without straining their 
resources all the various cooperating unions could easily in- 
crease " their organizers and " financial assistance," the 
Internationals were urged to " double the number of organ- 
izers now in the field in this work." Other resolutions called 
on Mr. Gompers and the A. F. of L, " to lend their assist- 
ance." 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 173 

Particularly this conference, and the local leaders per- 
sistently, called on the Internationals to back up the National 
Committee's " free speech fight " in western Pennsylvania. 
Committee meetings from November, 1918, on, were much 
concerned with Pennsylvania's " time honored tactics of sup- 
pressing the right of assembly." In Pittsburgh, McKees- 
port, Braddock and Homestead, the Secretary reported, mass 
meetings were forbidden flatly or the money for rented halls 
was returned " under pressure of the steel interest " and the 
meetings " cancelled." The minutes of November 25 wax 
indignant : 

In Rankin, the hall-owner having more than the usual share 
of independence, the city officials were unable to make him 
abandon the meeting. A lick-spittle Board of Health was called 
into service and gotten to arbitrarily close the hall. 

The November 25 meeting of the Committee adjourned to 
go before the City Council of McKeesport to demand " the 
right of organized labor to have a hearing in McKeesport." 
They were rebuffed : the minutes add that " after this dis- 
gusting evidence of subserviency to the Steel Corporation " 
the Committee called on the A. P. of L. and all the Interna- 
tionals to hold " a meeting as soon as possible in Pittsburgh " 
to test the right of assembly and settle the " free speech 
fight." 

No such meeting resulted: the A. F. of L. took verbal 
action at its June convention and some International presi- 
dents promised to " fight it out in McKeesport " personally. 
The records, however, indicate no change in western Penn- 
sylvania's administration of its laws of assembly, etc., as a 
result of " concerted action " by the Internationals and the A. 
F. of L. 

The last and by far the most important positions taken by 
the Internationals; at variance with the new steel rank and 



174 ffiEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

file, concerned the strike — both as to calling the strike and as 
to supporting it. It was natural that Internationals, such as 
the Machinists, with old established locals in a dozen other 
industries, should hesitate to burden these with a strike in 
behalf of their new machinist locals in steel. They were 
divided between the desire to keep the steel locals, with their 
revenues, and the fear of possible consequences in carrying 
through to the limit what they had inaugurated. At the 
May 25 congress it was the Internationals' representatives 
who quickly asserted their authority over the impatient rank 
and file. At the critical July 20 meeting where the advisa- 
bility of a strike ballot was debated, some of the Inter- 
nationals, especially the Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel and Tin Workers and the United Mine Workers, op- 
posed the ballot and all impressed on the Committee that 
only the Internationals were authorized to take strike votes. 
After the locals' balloting, — resulting in a 98 per cent, vote 
for a strike — tense meeting followed meeting of the National 
Committee. On September 4 President Gompers warned the 
Committee " of the great power of the steel trust, its ruth- 
lessness and the glee with which it would deal Labor a heavy 
blow." He advised " caution " and called a meeting of 
the twenty-four presidents. Another message was sent to 
President Wilson, in the west, who telegraphed back his fail- 
ure to influence Mr. Gary. At the September 9 meeting for 
the twenty-four presidents, those present were divided, some 
urging " caution," some seeing " no way out," and all worried 
about financing so huge a strike. By a vote of 14 to 4 it 
was decided to send a last telegram to President Wilson. 
The President's answer " contained no assurance of a con- 
ference " and the Committee set the strike date. But when 
the President appealed to Mr. Gompers for a postponement, 
Mr. Gompers (minutes of September 17) wrote to " the 
International presidents requesting them to postpone action 



OEGANIZING FOE CONFEKENCE 175 

until after the Industrial Conference of October 6, if possible 
to safeguard the unions' interests while doing so." Mr. 
Gompers did not notify Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Foster of 
his action in writing to the presidents on the Committee. 
" In consequence (of Mr. Gompers's letter) a number of 
delegates came to the conference (of September 17) with 
definite instructions as to how to vote on the postponement." 
Eight Internationals, it was revealed, either had instructed 
to vote for postponement or had telegraphed against the 
strike. 

In opposition came a flood of telegrams and protests from 
local leaders urging that " it would be absolutely dangerous 
for our organizers to meet the men if the strike is called off." 
The Committee sent telegrams to the absent International 
presidents " requesting them either to come to Pittsburgh 
or to give their delegates the powers to act as the needs of 
the situation would seem to indicate." The debate lasted over 
a day and the consensus of those present was that if post- 
poned the steel workers would " make short work of the 
organizations " and strike sporadically. Some of the Inter- 
national representatives wavered ; the vote was for the strike, 
12 to 3. 

The record concerning the actual support of the strike by 
the Internationals is not clear. The Stationary Engineers 
and the Switchmen, two of the twenty-four Internationals, 
did not call their members out of the steel plants and yards, 
but a number of Switchmen's locals did. The Amalgamated 
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, after a month, 
began ordering its men back into " independent " plants, and, 
after the strike, withdrew from the Committee, taking away 
70,000 to 90,000 members^ all of whom were recruits from 
the drive. The United Mine Workers had their own strike of 
^November on hand. Locals of the Internationals all over the 
country contributed to the strike relief fund but the bulk of 



176 EEPOET OK THE STEEL STEIKE 

this fund camje from the Jewish clothing unions, one of 
which, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, an industrial 
union fought by the A. F. of L., sent a check for $100,000 
to the A. E. of L. for the steel strikers. 

Thus the brunt of the strike lay on the steel workers who 
had forced it, not on " the organized labor movement of 
America " which had initiated the drive. 

(c) The National Committee. 

The position of the National Committee, in relation to 
the rank and file, has been indicated except in one matter. 
The Committee attempted to carry the temporary and arti- 
ficial unity of the twenty-four Internationals into permanent 
organization in two directions. One was in setting up Dis- 
trict Steel Councils, designed to maintain united, or quasi- 
industrial, action in dealing with separate plants. In most 
districts the weight of organizing and striking was carried 
chiefly by these councils; some of them survived the strike. 
The other Committee effort, specifically authorized by the 
May 25 congress, was toward setting up a national council, 
or Iron and Steel Department within the A. F. of L., like 
other trades departments in the A. F. of L. The A. F. of 
L. convention, on the recommendation of an administration 
committee, gave short shrift to this project. 

With the foregoing analysis in mind, it is possible to sum- 
marize the principal causes of the failure of the strike, list- 
ing all but laying chief emphasis (in this section) on the 
apparent defects in the labor organization. To clarify the 
issue it is necessary to view the strike in two aspects : first, 
as the struggle of 300,000 newly organized workers against 
the Steel Corporation, — a limited aspect; second, the larger 
warfare of which the strike was a part, — the after-war battle 
for power between organized employers of the nation and 
organized labor, or as it has been termed, " between the 
money trust and the labor trust." 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 17? 

In the narrower aspect, the first cause of failure was the 
size of the Steel Corporation. The United States Steel Cor- 
paration was too big to be beaten by 300,000 workingmen. 
It had too large a cash surplus, too many allies among other 
businesses, too much support from government officers, local 
and national, too strong influence with social institutions such 
as the press and the pulpit, it spread out over too much of 
the earth — still retaining absolutely centralized control — to 
be defeated by widely scattered workers of many minds, 
many fears, varying states of pocketbook and under a com- 
paratively improvised leadership. The " independent " steel 
companies gave the Corporation solid speechless support ;« not 
a spokesman was heard but Mr. Gary. In the crucial west- 
ern Pennsylvania districts two decisive factors were the Gov- 
ernor of Pennsylvania, who sent in the State Constabulary, 
and the Sheriff of Allegheny County, who controlled an army 
of deputies. In a dozen towns the burgesses and police chiefs 
are salaried employees of the steel companies. It is im- 
possible to pass over such facts as illustrating the size of the 
steel interests. 

The second cause was the successful use of strike breakers, 
principally negroes, by the steel companies, in conjunction 
with the abrogation of civil liberties. As a fighting proposi- 
tion the strike was broken by the successful establishment of, 
first, the theory of " resuming production w and, second, the 
fact of it. Production was maintained without any inter- 
ruption in some plants. On this basis the companies created 
a belief that it was being resumed everywhere. Then by the 
use of strike breakers they spread the actual resumptions and 
reinforced the theory. Negro workers were imported and 
were shifted from plant to plant: in Gary the negroes were 
marched ostentatiously through the streets; in Youngstown 
and near Pittsburgh they were smuggled in at night. " Nig- 
gers did it," was a not uncommon remark among company 



178 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

officers. Besides the comparatively small bands of avowed 
strike breakers, shifted from plant to plant, it is evident that 
the great numbers of negroes who flowed into the Chicago 
and Pittsburgh plants were conscious of strike breaking. For 
this attitude, the steel strikers rightly blamed American 
organized labor. In the past the majority of A. F. of L. 
unions have been white unions only. Their constitutions 
often so provide. Through many an experience negroes came 
to believe that the only way they could break into a unionized 
industry was through strike breaking. The recent change in 
A. F. of L. official attitude toward negroes has not had time 
to be effective. At Youngstown, for example, one lone negro 
machinist striker, who stuck to the end, was never admitted 
to the striking machinists' local. 

Through strike breakers the companies played on one of 
the two great fears which always contend in workers' minds 
in time of strike. One fear is, " My job, somebody will get 
my job." The other fear is, " What will my neighbors say 
if I go back % " " Eesuming production " makes the first fear 
overbalance the second. Fears of other communities were 
played on. In Pittsburgh the strikers heard, " They are 
going back in Chicago." In Chicago they feared, " They ar© 
going back in Pittsburgh." Committees of strikers, some- 
times sponsored by mill officials or by Chambers of Com- 
merce, went from Milwaukee to visit Chicago, and from 
Chicago, from Cleveland and from Wheeling to inspect Pitts- 
burgh. The newspapers kept reporting resumptions every- 
where ; other businesses were getting steel and were declaring 
they were getting all they wanted. 

In their efforts to counteract this, in the pivotal Pittsburgh 
district, the strikers were in the main denied the rights of 
picketing and of assemblage. The local leader could not 
reach them; he feared to visit strikers' homes lest he be 
arrested for " intimidation." To counteract the newspapers 



ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 179 

they had only their strike bulletin, no local labor press. 
Constabulary and sheriffs proclamations kept them scattered. 
Separated, the great fear undermined them. By mid- 
November over half had forgotten the pure and simple trade 
unionist doctrine, — " organize and all these things shall be 
added unto you," — and had gone back convinced that " this 
thing is not succeeding." Mr. Foster's dictum that " no 
worker is worth his salt who isn't willing to eat his hide in 
a strike " turned out to be " a counsel of perfection." 

The third cause was the disunity of labor, limiting this 
consideration to the twenty-four unions involved and to the 
steel workers themselves. The skilled workers feared the 
semi-skilled, the semi-skilled feared the common labor : in the 
vast hierarchy of steel jobs each feared being put in a lower 
rank even if the strike were won. The Americans feared 
that the " foreigners " were pushing into the skilled jobs; 
the foreigners feared that the Americans were going back in 
the mill to conspire " to keep the hunkies down." Americans 
in the Pittsburgh district, who stayed at work, justified them- 
selves on the ground that " the organizers had not appealed to 
them, only to the ' foreigners.' " The foreigners felt the 
newspaper criticisms that the strike was one of " un-American 
aliens." The strike's end saw the racial split deepened, many 
immigrants feeling that they had been " let down " by the 
American labor movement. Many immigrants told their 
leaders, " When you ' Americanize ' the Americans and the 
negroes, we'll strike again." 

Among the twenty-four unions, besides the fights over seg- 
regating recruits, there came up in devastating form the un- 
solved problem of the " sacredness of contracts." The Amal- 
gamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, which 
had had agreements with certain " independent " mills, 
finally " remembered " these contracts and began " living up 
to them." The Amalgamated was acrimoniously charged 



180 BEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

with choosing between its contracts with employers and its 
contracts with fellow unions ; its choice was called "treason." 
Rather, the difficulty was the recrudescence of an old dilemma 
hitherto unsolved by A. F. of L. unions in mass action. 

Moreover there was no unity , at all comparable to that 
among the steel companies, as between the steel unions and 
the A. F. of L. The A. F. of L. sent out the strike fund 
appeal and Mr. Gompers battled for the strike in the Indus- 
trial Conference in Washington, but from the start the knowl- 
edge was widespread that Mr. Gompers had tried to have 
the strike postponed. 

Three attitudes were distinguishable, at the end of the 
strike, concerning labor unity. One was that of Mr. Fitz- 
patrick and Mr. Foster, that " the strike had wonderful sup- 
port from unions all over the country ; Mr. Gompers and the 
A. F. of L. did everything that could have been expected in 
view of all the other strikes and troubles at the same period ; 
the steel workers appreciate how the unions stood by them." 

A second view was that expressed by an International 
president not involved in the strike : " The A. F. of L. doesn't 
control strikes and the International Unions are primarily 
business organizations for carrying on constructive negotia- 
tions for workers. Why should they bankrupt themselves for 
immigrants who originally took the steel jobs away from 
Americans and who wouldn't go on strike for Americans in 
the next trouble ? " 

A third view was put by a local strike leader, an experi- 
enced American unionist, without bitterness, as follows: 
" The A. F. of L. was not ' massed behind this strike.' The 
A. F. of L. didn't even hold a mass-meeting that I know of. 
When the hunkies tell me they were let down, I know it. 
The unions say they're ' always on the firing line ' for labor 
and one reason they're always there is because they've never 
learned to fire together. If the railwaymen in the steel plant 



ORGANIZING FOE CONFERENCE 181 

yards had struck, this strike would have been won. In 
October the railway men's locals near Pittsburgh voted to 
strike but they got no assurance of support from their 
Brotherhoods. In the Calumet district the Switchmen re- 
fused to pull out their men because, the organizer said, ' trade 
control was at stake.' The Switchmen were rivals of the 
Trainmen for the men in the plant yards and if they'd have 
struck the Trainmen would have stuck, filled up the places, 
broke the strike and the Switchmen could never have got 
back. The Amalgamated's stand made them strike breakers. 
When Mike Tighe [President of the Amalgamated Associa- 
tion of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers] ordered back his men at 
that mill near Cleveland, he started an avalanche. One Amal- 
gamated organizer got four hundred men into one big union 
with an Amalgamated charter at a mill near Steubenville 
#nd they all struck. Mike ordered them all back and tore 
up that organizer's card. 

" At Wheeling, after the gun riot there, some hunkie 
strikers went to their A. F. of L. organizer for a lawyer to 
get their fellows out of jail. He told them he wouldn't use 
union funds for . that ; let them hire their own lawyer. 
Foster, I believe, made him move. At Gary, Central Union 
officials, jealous of the Steel Council, made speeches advising 
the men to go back. At Sparrows Point a big Amalgamated 
official did the same thing. I've heard Electrical Interna- 
tional officers say their people didn't want steel organized, 
because electrical workers, during slack times in union shops, 
like to be free to get steel jobs, which they couldn't if steel 
was organized. 

" All these old habits of our unions played hob with the 
strike. There's no use denying it — the Steel Corporation 
knows these things and counts on them. And all the remedies 
for them, like having all contracts date from the same day, 
get tied up with radical proposals, like May Day. During 



182 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

the strike, Cleveland foreigner locals tried to get together in 
one separate steel industrial union. They got jumped on by 
the Internationals there. After the strike half a dozen towns' 
Steel Councils met in Gary to start an independent Steel 
Industrial Union. They'll get nowhere. If they take 
I.W.W. leadership, or W.I.I.U., they'll be outlawed. If 
they go it alone, secessionist, they'll be fought tooth and nail 
by the A. F. of L., with more success than the A. F. of L. 
fought the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. 

" And all the while the twenty-four Internationals won't 
install the universal transfer card or the low re-installment 
fee or remit dues or do any of the things they've got to do to 
keep these new steel locals alive. They'll let 'em slide because 
there'd be no money in it. 

" These selfish narrow habits wreck the movement. But 
we've got to take things as they are. Still there's no use 
being just optimistic like Foster. We'd better admit it since 
the steel companies just bank on our making the same mis- 
takes." 

The above is cited as a temperate statement of what many 
strikers and strike leaders expressed savagely. 

The fourth cause of defeat was labor's failure to state its 
war aims, meaning, in the narrower aspect, the steel workers' 
plight and the unions' intentions in regard to steel jobs. 
Those most involved were the steel workers; they did the 
fighting ; they seemed sometimes totally forgotten as workmen, 
The facts about their lives, their earnings, their jobs, were 
not set forth. The press may or may not have been hostile 
to such facts, but the facts were not prepared by the leaders 
and were not offered to the press. The facts mostly were not 
known to the leaders. Particularly when it came to actual 
knowledge of steel jobs and what changes might be necessary 
to make steel under union conditions and how the country's 
steel consumers might fare, such research had not been made 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 183 

by the unions. It was consciously ignored, partly on the 
ground that " the press and public opinion never count in a 
strike/' and partly on the ground that the whole problem 
was not their business, which was solely " to organize the 
workers as they found them and any business can stand hav- 
ing its workers organized." But even this position was 
never clearly published. The leaders' overwhelming concern 
was with their strikers as union men. But the strike was 
to force a conference: that "public opinion" which might 
have helped to force it, never had an oversupply of facts on 
which to proceed ; not even " workmen's opinion," outside of 
steel areas, was furnished with the facts. 

As to the effects of unions on the steel industry, and labor's 
" failure to state its war aims," it is necessary to turn to the 
wider aspects of the strike, to that greater war in which the 
steel strike became engulfed and, in the public mind, almost 
forgotten as a separate entity after October. 

This greater war was the clash between employer and em- 
ployed experienced by each belligerent nation in the " read- 
justments " after the war, marked in America by more un- 
thinking simplicity than in most countries. In England, for 
example, this clash was pressed by the workers, organized 
both economically and politically; in this country the drive 
seems to have been made by big industrial interests, bent on 
halting the unions' development or " encroachments." Par- 
ticularly, big business associations were determined to end 
what they termed the " unfair gifts to labor in war time."' 
The result was that a pretty solid association of manufac- 
turers caught the inchoate body of labor at a time of crisis, 
split everywhere by a gulf between leadership and rank and 
file, split between old ideas and new, without a unifying pro- 
gram in terms of public service such as it had during the 
war, or even a plan of fighting for things that had been 
" given " to it during the war. Despite organized labor's 



184 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

boasts of power it was rather handily beaten everywhere in 
the fall of 1919. 
Y"~"*"Why did " public opinion " apparently join with the 
nation's employers generally to support a corporation, which 
in time past it had often attacked as the " menacing steel 
trust " ? 

First, because of the size and ramifications of the Steel 
Corporation. By its root connection with other businesses 
and especially with the sources of money-control, the Cor- 
poration has been, and is, naturally fitted to head the coun- 
try's private producing employers. Its business ramifications 
lead: 

(1) into the "independent" steel companies. Corporation 
men frequently head the " independents." 

(2) into railroads. The Corporation operates thousands of 
miles of railroads, primarily for the transportation of 
ore. Also its directors are heavily involved in the di- 
rectorates of the large railroads. 

(3) into mines. The Corporation owns vast coal fields and 
limitless metal mines. 

(4) into shipbuilding and ships. The Corporation owns 
ship lines, docks, etc. ; it owns great ship-building yards. 

(5) into general industries. The Corporation owns cement 
works, many by-product plants, and its regular product 
goes into a dozen basic utilities from railroads and build- 
ings to farm implements and household utensils. 

(6) into banks. The Corporation, primarily a great finance 
concern, is most closely tied into the country's financial 
reservoirs and in a directing capacity. 

The Corporation owns towns. In many localities institu- 
tions, such as churches, schools and newspapers, are depen- 
dent on it for existence. Through its very size its social in- 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 185 

fluence is enormous. Its power over national legislation in 
the past has been the text of voluminous criticism. During 
the war it paid no more attention to the national labor policies 
as enunciated by the War Labor Board than as if the govern- 
ment had never made awards based on the " right to organ- 
ize in trade and labor unions " and the " right to collective 
bargaining." 

Apart from its size, what ideas obtained for the Corpora- 
tion such support ? Analysis indicates why so many smaller 
business men, employers who had " scorned to take their labor 
policy from trusts," and representatives of public opinion 
generally supported Mr. Gary in all sincerity. 

In the first place, employers all over the country were 
paying higher wages than they were used to before the war 
and as consumers were paying prices which seemed to them 
unreasonable, for all sorts of commodities from " labor " to 
laundry. Especially was this true of little employers and 
what may be called middle business men. 

These new wage scales, insofar as they were set hy the 
action of labor, resulted from the operation of Mr. Gompers' 
theory of pure and simple trade unionism. The theory con- 
sidered nothing but wages, hours and conditions, and jacked 
these up as high as the traffic would stand, having little 
regard to comparisons with other industries, or to the inherent 
value of the service rendered, or to any standard (with the 
exception of roughly approximating rises in the cost of liv- 
ing). Comparative standards were " not labor's business." 

Moreover, organized labor was showing no disposition to 
share responsibility for production, nor had it had oppor- 
tunity to demonstrate marked ability to " share industrial 
control," an ambition newly proclaimed by it. Labor was 
emphatically refusing the kind of " responsibility " advo- 
cated by employers, that is, incorporation of trade unions and 
making them subject to the courts, whose tradition, rooted in 



186 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

the old conspiracy laws, is far from friendly to labor unions. 
For all that, labor was showing no disposition to supply any 
other schemes for assuming responsibility for production or 
responsible share in control. As the steel strike broke, the 
American labor movement was definitely opposed to any har- 
ness of "responsibility." This was a big fact in the con- 
sciousness of the country's employers and of the public. 

Then came (1) the threat of the steel strike, and the strike 
itself; (2) a month later the great coal strike; (3) all along 
the threat of great railroad strikes. The upshot was that 
the country's employers as a class took fright at what seemed 
to be the rolling up of uncontrolled power by trade unions. 
Because the government after the war, as before, had shown 
no ability to formulate any plan for having labor share 
responsibility and control, employers were afraid of the gov- 
ernment. They saw no leadership there. 

The only leadership they saw was Mr. Gary's. Employers 
who feared the sweeping character of his statements about 
labor, men who were getting along very well with trade 
unions in their own businesses, " supported Mr. Gary " be- 
cause they could not see where it would all end if labor won 
the steel strike, the coal strike, the railroad strike and every 
other strike. 

Moreover, all through the country, the middle classes, or 
great body of consumers outside of organized labor, were 
mainly conscious that prices of everything consumed were 
getting beyond reach. In considerable part they accepted the 
explanation that labor was partly to blame; "high wages, 
high prices." They too " supported Mr. Gary," though 
many expressed fear as to what the outcome would be if they 
supported Mr. Gary to the hilt. Against him they saw only 
Mr. Gompers; they never really saw the steel workers or 
learned anything about the hunkies and the twelve-hour day. 

It is quite true that " public opinion," especially in these 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 187 

days of organized propaganda, may be a singularly meaning- 
less, vague and artificial thing. It is notorious that public 
opinion is ordinarily " roused " in behalf of strikes chiefly 
by murder, preferably murder of women and children, by 
flame and machine gun for choice, as at Ludlow, Colorado. 
In this sense too few strikers were killed, or those killed 
were not young enough or not the^right sex to " rouse public 
opinion " for the steel strikers. [_So far labor leaders of the 
old type merely retort, " When unions are strong enough we'll 
take care of public opinion." J 

On the other hand it is possible that the unions' present 
lack of strength is caused considerably by failing to take 
thought for the public now. When labor thinks out where it 
purposes to go and publishes its fair intent and even its clear 
ambition, it may demolish much adverse public opinion. 
Otherwise another 300,000 strikers in another industry may 
find their justified cause hopelessly entangled in another lost 
battle over the " open shop " or some even more indefinite 
shibboleth. 

In England, in the same week in which the steel strike 
started, the labor unions, far more powerfully organized than 
the American unions, spent $100,000 in six days for pub- 
licity to " care for public opinion " and by forcing that pub- 
lication of their case they added a weight sufficient to save 
their national railroad strike against the government itself. 
The steel strike leaders in 108 days did not spend 100,000 
cents to present the steel workers' case to " public opinion." 
In taking care of public opinion, moreover, the British 
leaders were automatically informing and fortifying their 
own forces, the workingmen's public opinion, which now- 
adays is becoming decisive. The American steel leaders tried 
to maintain their strikers' morale with a lonely weekly bul- 
letin, which however good, was not good enough to offset the 
same strikers' reading of hostile newspapers, 



188 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

Conclusions, which are not so remote as they seem from 
the hunky in the steel towns, may be summed up as follows ; 

Causes of defeat, which were second in importance only to 
the fight waged by the Steel Corporation, lay in the 
organization and leadership, not so much of the strike 
itself, as of the American labor movement. 

The immigrant steel worker was led to expect more of the 
twenty-four Internationals than they, through indiffer- 
ence, selfishness or narrow habit, were ready to give. 

" Public opinion " cannot reasonably demand consideration 
or generosity from trade unions as long as trade unions 
are kept fighting for existence or for ordinary human 
rights, denied them under the sanction of " public 
opinion." 



OEGANIZING FOE CONFEEENCE 189, 

APPENDIX TO SECTION VI 

Organized by the National Committee 

The following extracts from the duly audited and approved 
final report and accounting of the Secretary-Treasurer of the 
National Committee give illuminating statistics on the strike. 

The first tabulates, 'hj districts and by crafts, the recruits ob- 
tained by the National Committee directly, based on the financial 
accounting. That is, each direct recruit is represented in the 
Committee's finance accounts by $1, the Committee's share of 
the $3 initiation fee. The Committee claims that the number 
of workers " swept out " with the walkout of new union mem- 
bers was 100,000. It seems probable that half that number was 
nearer correct. 

The first extract reads: 

"250,000 members enrolled by the National Committee for Organiz- 
ing Iron and Steel Workers during the American Federation of Labor 
organizing campaign in the steel industry, from August 1, 1918, to 
January 21, 1920/ 



190 



REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 



Location 



South Chicago 

Chicago Heights 

Misc. Chicago. Dist 

Pittsburgh 

Johnstown 

Butler 

Monessen, Donora 

New Castle 

Homestead 

Braddock, Rankin 

Clairton 

McKeesport 

Gary 

Indiana Harbor 

Joliet 

Milwaukee 

Waukegan 

De Kalb 

Aurora 

Pullman 

Kenosha 

Hammond 

Wheeling District 

Farrell, Sharon 

Cleveland 

Sparrows' Point . .■. 

Brackenridge, Natrona . . 

East Pittsburgh 

East Liverpool 

Warren, Niles 

Minnesota Dist 

Pueblo 

Coatesville 

Steuben, Mingo, Wierton 

Birmingham 

Canton, Massillon 

Vandergrif t 

Buffalo, Lackawanna . . . 

Youngstown . 

Peoria 

Decatur 

Total by Trades . . . 



Black- 
smiths 



153 
41 

128 

571 

503 

75 

145 

18 

136 

91 

39 

109 

129 

161 

52 

4 

8 

1 

1 

157 

4 

62 

38 

106 

2,230 

'23 



37 

3 

41 

36 

65 

37 

91 

389 

3 

12 



5,699 



Boiler 
Makers 



143 

*23 

99 

137 

30 

25 

3 

63 

110 

48 

33 

285 

95 

50 

2 



1 

3 

'ii 

57 

231 

35 



17 

40 

35 

13 

56 

2 

101 

336 

3 



2,097 



Brick 
and 

Clay 
Wkrs. 



156 



1 
3 

18 



187 



Brick 

Layers 



Coopers 



21 

2 

22 

43 

122 



1 

2 
10 
21 

4 
95 
11 
48 



4 

2 

22 

1 



40 

io 



16 
67 



1 
71 



65 



581 



138 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 



191 



Elect. 


Foundry 


Hod 


Iron, 
Steel 


Iron 


Machin- 


Metal 
Polish- 
ers 


Mine, 
Mill and 


Wkrs. 


Employees 


Carriers 


and Tin 


Workers 


ists 


Smelter 








Workers 






Workers 


1,078 


139 




2,112 


326 


676 




798 


16 


27 




145 


2 


148 




4 


73 


228 




212 


1,673 


657 


"5 


3 


402 


444 


787 


4,089 


280 


965 




320 


719 


108 




4,452 


731 


1,131 




437 


21 


26 


• • . 


290 


15 


126 




236 


320 


7 




5,543 


103 


451 




792 


12 




*60 


1,116 


6 


317 




221 


216 


i78 


71 


2,307 


144 


237 




8 


148 


184 


102 


1,265 


276 


353 




1,022 


136 


11 


105 


947 


70 


166 




1,158 


91 




14 


2,452 


69 


249 




500 


761 


i2i 


83 


2,855 


353 


929 




534 


270 


407 


26 


1,494 


235 


473 




212 


152 


66 




1,814 


180 


142 




444 


21 




. . . 


547 


16 


19 






11 


i39 


• . . 


758 


9 


73 


*2i 


'22 


4 


1 


2 


256 




24 






3 


13 


31 


3 


'is 


119 






193 


12 




106 


4 


255 


' 5 




42 


17 




187 


34 


165 


7 




207 


6 






2 


34 






127 




• . . 


3,i09 


28 


226 


226 


535 


150 




10 


2,386 


22 


118 




403 


434 




33 


7,820 

93 

1,007 


38 


1,296 


'85 


2,599 


i54 


'22 


492 


'is 


ios 




'63 






... 






146 










... 


*50 








. 


*22 






240 


27 


*36 




24 
















185 


*6i 




. . . 


2,28i 


*26 


US 




279 


48 






632 


21 


32 






238 




. . , 


2,499 




288 




319 


26 






115 


174 


195 




691 


397 




*63 


1,929 


208 


335 




16 


92 


"3 


13 


1,560 


16 


87 




60 


539 


191 




2,242 


242 


477 




1,033 


1,273 




443 


10,364 


449 


1,019 




2,305 


23 


ii 




746 


17 


71 






1 


45 




3 




120 






8,481 


2,406 


2,335 


70,026 


5,829 


12,406 


349 


15,223 



192 



EEPOET ON" THE BTEEL STEIKE 



Location 



South Chicago 

Chicago Heights 

Misc. Chicago Dist 

Pittsburgh 

Johnstown 

Butler 

Monessen, Donora 

New Castle 

Homestead 

Braddock, Rankin 

Clairton 

McKeesport 

Gary 

Indiana Harbor 

Joliet 

Milwaukee 

Waukegan 

De Kalb 

Aurora 

Pullman 

Kenosha 

Hammond 

Wheeling District 

Farrell, Sharon 

Cleveland 

Sparrows' Point 

Brackenridge, Natrona . . 

East Pittsburgh 

East Liverpool 

Warren, Niles 

Minnesota Dist 

Pueblo 

Coatesville 

Steuben, Mingo, Wierton 

Birmingham 

Canton, Massillon 

Vandergrif t 

Buffalo, Lackawanna . . 

Youngstown 

Peoria 

Decatur 

Total by Trades 



United 
Mine 
Wkrs. 



1,427 



111 



Molders 



1,538 



46 
13 
94 
168 
71 

*5i 

11 

3 

56 
2 
31 
98 
211 
12 

*14 

1 
4 

11 
1 

17 

2 

6 

319 

*14 



1 
41 
14 
38 
31 



1,382 



Pat- 
tern 
Makers 



Plumb- 
ers 



195 

8 
38 



24 



210 
78 
39 



103 

23 

2 

6 

21 

25 



19 
87 



45 



84 

354 

4 

2 



1,369 



Quarry 
Wkrs. 



616 



109 



725 



Rail- 
way 
Carmen 



38 

17 

267 

22 

566 

329 



20 

17 

20 

42 

2 



2,819 

75i 

*30 
50 



17 



38 



5,045 



OBGANIZING FOE CONFEEENCE 



193 



Sea- 
men 


Sheet 
Metal 
Wkrs. 


Station- 
ary En- 
gineers 


Station- 
ary Fire- 
men 


Steam 
Shovel- 
men 


Switch- 
men 


Unclassi- 
fied 


Totals hy 
Localities 




19 


116 


585 




68 


94 


6,616 








64 


4 


6 








1 


71 


569 








14 


7 
43 


18 
196 








... 


408 
541 


3,871 
8,970 












324 


441 








207 


314 


11,846 












1 


9 










1,337 


2,519 












32 


52 
41 








"i 


1,144 

287 


8,665 
2,710 












*47 


118 








10 


11 


3,571 












19 


300 










108 


4,044 












66 


73 










111 


2,970 












20 


64 










327 


3,963 








23 


99 


250 






I 


'34 


210 


7,092 








5 


105 


298 








40 


487 


4,654 








9 


84 


255 








14 


45 


3,497 








11 


3 

2 

1 


27 
50 
22 








2 
2 


29 

98 
20 


681 

1,212 

332 








'i6 


• . . 


6 










30 


242 








38 


48 


48 










269 


4,073 








2 


3 
3 


12 










88 
3 


585 
1,102 












287 


233 










152 


5,028 












156 


10 










123 


3,794 












28 


509 








"4 


1,734 


17,305 

93 

2,110 












'i.6 


*78 








'w 


*<)i 












• • • 














146 


























50 














"5 










'56 


474 
185 












'77 


'80 










'14 


3,113 












52 














828 












205 


206 










io6 


4,108 








19 


64 












7 


1,470 








17 


32 

30 

148 


'is 

20 
366 








' '4 

8 


2,527 

43 

627 


5,705 
1,986 
6.179 








119 


71 


900 








'25 


804 


19,040 








5 


1 


26 








1 


73 


984 








16 




2 










119 


320 








1 


Ml 


2,194 


5,321 




t 


> 


440 


12,552 


156,702 



194 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

"This detailed report includes only those members signed up by the 
National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers and from 
whose initiation fees $1.00 each was deducted and forwarded to the 
general office of the National Committee. It represents approximately 
50 per cent, to 60 per cent, of the total number of steel workers organ- 
ized during the campaign and is a minimum report in every respect. 

" The report does not include any of the many thousands of men 
signed up at Bethlehem, Steelton, Reading, Apollo, New Kensington, 
Leechburg and many minor points which felt the force of the drive but 
where the National Committee made no deductions upon initiation fees. 
In Gary, Joliet, Indiana Harbor, South Chicago and other Chicago Dis- 
trict points, the National Committee ceased collecting on initiation fees 
early in 1919, hence this report makes no showing of the thousands of 
men signed up in that territory during the last few months of the 
campaign before the strike. Likewise, at Coatesville and Sparrows' 
Point, during only a short space of the campaign were deductions made 
for the National Committee. Many thousands more men were signed up 
directly by the multitude of local unions in the steel industry that 
were not reported to the National Committee. These do not show in 
this calculation. Nor do the great number of ex-soldiers who were 
taken into the unions free of initiation fees — in Johnstown alone 1,300 
ex-soldier steel workers joined the unions under this arrangement. Of 
course no accounting is here included for the army of workers in out- 
side industries who became organized as a result of the tremendous 
impulse given by the steel campaign. 

" In view of these exceptions it may be conservatively estimated that 
well over 250,000 actual steel workers joined the unions during the 
campaign, notwithstanding the opposition of the Steel Trust, which 
discharged thousands of its workers, completely suppressed free speech 
and free assembly in Pennsylvania and used every known tactic to pre- 
vent the organization of its employees." 

In publishing this report, Mr. Jay G. Brown, who suc- 
ceeded Mr. Foster as Secretary-Treasurer, made the follow- 
ing claims (undiscouraged, to say the least) : 

" It represents an accomplishment without a parallel in the history 
of the labor movement. This report will forever silence if not shame 
the class of men who are fond of saying, 'The steel industry cannot be 
organized.' It was organized. It also furnished a crushing answer to 
Judge Gary who asserted that only about 10 per cent, of the steel 
workers were organized. This report represents an irreducible minimum. 
Local unions when organized did not as a rule make accounting to the 
National Committee for additional members enrolled." 

" The National Committee began its work on the theory that any men 
in any industry could be organized if they could be reached with the 
message of unionism. This report proves the correctness of this theory. 
This report should convey a lesson and furnish an inspiration to the 
labor movement of this country. It means that with the application 
of those same principles any industry in America can be organized. 

"The report of the Relief Fund is equally noteworthy. It must be 
remembered that at the beginning of the steel strike, there were, as 
nearly as could be calculated, 367,000 men involved. 100,000 of these 
men were still on strike when it was called off." 



ORGANIZING FOR CONFERENCE 



195 



Another extract is from the twenty-four-page printed 
financial account dealing with strike relief. It includes the 
following summaries of the moneys contributed through the 
A. F. of L. officials to the steel strikes. Note the late date 
at which efforts to raise a fund were inaugurated ; six weeks 
after the strike began (September 22). 

" Report on Receipts and Disbursements. 
" All moneys contributed to the undersigned for the Steel Strike 
Relief Fund, except those from organizations regularly affiliated with 
the National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers, were 
forwarded to Mr. Frank Morrison, Secretary of the American Federa- 
tion of Labor, and appear in his report. The moneys contributed by 
the affiliated organizations are duly accounted for in the regular 
monthly reports of the Secretary-Treasurer of the National Committee 
for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers. 

RECEIPTS 

Frank Morrison per John Fitzpatrick $ 2,400.00 

5,000.00 
17,665.13 
13,783.50 
57,835.70 

8,387.53 

107,067.39 

17,438.56 

45,208.82 

9,658.47 
10,807.28 

8,522.03 
12,845.73 
19,918.10 

9,519.12 
24,147.04 

9,738.92 

15,125.76 
11,043.30 
12,028.76 



1919 




Nov. 


4 From 


a 


15 


a 


tt 


19 


a 


tt 


20 


a 


tt 


21 


it 


a 


21 


a 


it 


23 


ft 


tt 


23 


a 


tt 


28 


ft 


Dec. 


1 


ft 


« 


6 


tt 


<( 


9 


" 


« 


9 


tt 


tt 


11 


a 


ft 


15 


tt 


it 


26 


a 


It 


27 


tt 


1920 




Jan. 


3 


tt 


u 


8 


a 


it 


30 


a 



a 
n 


ti a 


ft 
tt 


a 


tt a 


tt 


a 
tt 


a tt 
n ft 


tt 


ft 


tt tt 


ft 


it 


a ft 


tt 


tt 


a ft 


tt 


tt 


a ft 


it 


ft 


tt it 


tt 


a 


tt ft 


tt 


it 


a tt 


ft 


a 


a tt 


tt 


tt 


a a 


t* 


it 


a ft 


ft 


it 


ft it 


tt 


a 


tt ft 


« 


a 


tt tt 


tt 


it 


it tt 


a 



Total Recei 

DISBURSEMENTS 

Meat and Groceries $178,695.64 

Commissary Checks for points outside Pittsburgh District . . 93,082.82 

Labor and Expenses 3,612.44 

Freight and Drayage 3,757.24 

Bread 46,739.54 

Potatoes 22,622.04 



Total $348,509.72 



196 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

RECAPITULATION 

Total Receipts from Nov. 4, 1919, to Jan. 31, 1920 (com- 
prising total fund) $418,141.14 

Total Disbursements from Oct. 27, 1919, to Jan. 31, 1920 .... 348,509.72 

Bal. Deposited in Gen'l Fund of Natl Com. for Organizing 

Iron and Steel Workers * $ 69,631.42 

In addition to the above extracts it may be noted that the 
bulk of the strike relief fund came from the Jewish clothing 
and furriers' unions, principally of New York, some of these 
unions being outside the A. F. of L and long opposed by it. 

Approximately $100,000 additional to the above was con- 
tributed by the twenty-four unions affiliated with the Committee. 
The year's organizing campaign cost the Committee approx- 
imately $75,000. It was reported that the financial cost of the 
year's work to one or two of the twenty-four unions of the 
Committee, in maintaining organizers, contributions, meetings, 
etc., approximated $200,000 apiece. 



VII 

SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ARBITRARY 
CONTROL 

In this section are analyzed the data obtained by the 
Commission on the second or larger phase of control, i.e. 
industrial relations, outlined in Section V. Analysis war- 
rants the following conclusions : 

Inasmuch as the Steel Corporation never offered plans or 
developed a working substitute for arbitrary control, 
present conditions in the industry constitute the actually 
existent alternative to " the kind of conference the labor 
unions wanted." 

Maintenance of this non-unionism alternative entailed seri- 
ous social consequences for steel communities and for 
the nation. The consequences were normal in the in- 
dustry; they became pronounced and grave during the 
strike. 

Maintaining the non-unionism alternative entailed, for the 
employers, (1) discharging workmen for unionism, (2) 
blacklists, (3) espionage and the hiring of "labor de- 
tective agencies' " operatives, (4) strike breakers, prin- 
cipally negroes. 

Maintaining the non-unionism alternative entailed, for com- 
munities, (1) the abrogation of the right of assembly, 
the suppression of free speech and the violation of per- 
sonal rights (principally in Pennsylvania) ; (2) the use 
of state police, state troops and (in Indiana) of the IT. S. 
Army; (3) such activities on the part of constituted 
authorities and of the press and the pulpit as to make 
the workers believe that these forces oppose labor. 

197 



198 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

In sum, the actually existent state of the steel industry is 
a state of latent war over rights of organization con- 
ceded by public opinion in other civilized countries. 

The analysis centers around the Steel Corporation because 
" independents " such as the Midvale-Cambria, Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube, Inland Steel, Harvester and Colorado Euel 
& Iron, have offered or developed other alternatives to arbi- 
trary control in the shape of shop committees or company 
unions ; and smaller " independents " have signed trade 
unionist agreements. 

The analysis attempts to investigate to what extent the 
Steel Corporation's policy of non-unionism modifies American 
social institutions. The following problem, at once larger 
and more specific, is not dealt with : the relation between the 
facts that (1) America's trade union movement is, relative to 
industrial populations, the smallest, with the possible excep- 
tion of that of France, among the Atlantic industrial nations ; 
(2) America's private industrial monopolies or trusts are the 
largest among the western industrial nations. 

The social consequences of arbitrary control by corpora- 
tions are set forth in the present Main Summary Section, 
which attempts to analyze the subject as a whole, and in the 
following sub-reports : 

1. Civil Liberties, in western Pennsylvania; including an 

analysis of some 300 affidavits or statements from 
strikers. 

2. Blacklists, Evictions and Discharges for Unionism; in- 

cluding several hundred signed statements from strikers 
and letters and lists sent out by steel companies. 

3. " Undercover " Men; being a study of 600 reports in the 

" labor file " of a steel company, together with affidavits, 
interviews and revelations by " labor detectives." 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 199 

4. The Press and the Strike; being an intensive analysis of 

the Pittsburgh newspapers. 

5. The Pulpit and the Strike; an analysis of the Pittsburgh 

Protestant churches, including the answers to a question- 
naire sent out during the strike. 

6. History of Steel Corporations Labor Relations, in- 
cluding developments during preceding strikes. 

To be considered with these are many separate interviews 
or observations made by the Commission or its investigators 
and public records, etc. 

Consideration of social consequences is consideration of 
that larger, decisive aspect of industrial relations outlined in 
Section V on " Grievances and Control." Two aspects of 
control were distinguished; one, the problem of personnel 
management, lying largely within the plant and centering in 
the separate jobs ; the second, the problem of industrial rela- 
tions, extending outside the plant, decisively influencing the 
first problem, and concerned with the relation of the mass of 
workers to the sum of jobs. Bringing this distinction to a 
statement of conclusions (a) hitherto discussed and (b) 
treated in the present section, the following is warranted by 
the analysis: 

The system of arbitrary control — the actually existent alter- 
native to trade union collective bargaining — resulted 
in — 

(a) markedly excessive hours for half the workers, under- 
payment for three quarters of the workers and daily 
grievances due to arbitrary management of personnel; 
and — 

(b) opposition and repression, exerted primarily by the com- 
panies and secondarily by governmental officers and 
social institutions, against workers' organization for 
change of their industrial relations. 



200 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

Viewed chronologically, in normal times the Steel Corpora- 
tion's system of industrial relations functioned under the 
dominating idea of opposition to workers' organization. In 
strike times the Corporation's opposition was more actively 
supplemented by similar repression by organized society. 
This section, then, concerns — 

1. The causes and characteristics of the Steel Corporation's 

opposition to trade union collective bargaining ; 

2. The effects of such opposition on the worker as citizen 

and on executive and judiciary authorities and pulpit 
and press, particularly during the strike. 

A record of the minutes of the Corporation's Executive 
Committee meetings preceding and during the strike would, 
of course, shed much light on the personal character of 
arbitrary control. Lacking such data it is necessary to use 
the Executive Committee minutes which the Government ob- 
tained and published ten years ago, giving the financial con- 
trol's ideas and debates in adopting the Corporation's labor 
policy in 1901 ; comparison seems to indicate that the same 
ideas govern the present-day execution of that policy. 

The minutes 1 record the Corporation's manner of adopt- 
ing a labor policy (previously quoted) in the following reso- 
lution : 

That we are unalterably opposed to any extension of union 
labor and advise subsidiary companies to take firm position when 
these questions come up and say that they are not going to 
recognize it; that is, any extension of unions in mills where 
they do not now exist; that great care should be used to pre- 
vent trouble and that they promptly report and confer with 
this corporation. 

Printed in Senate Document 110, Vol. Ill, pp. 497-506. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 201 

The following extracts from the minutes give the ideas 
adopted by the Committee. (The names, of course, are the 
names of the original financial control whose formulation 
of policies has since been followed by the Steel Corporation.) 

April 20, 1901. 

Mr. Edenborn thinks it expedient to inform the newspapers 
and the public generally that the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion is not the one employer, but that the individual companies 
are distinct and separate for themselves 1 ; that the labor troubles 
of any one company must be settled by that particular company 
as an individual company, and a strike in one must be settled 
independently of any other company. 

Attention was called to the fact that certain newspapers 
seem to publish any and everything that will create sufficient 
sentiment to influence newspaper sales; that we ought to do 
all we reasonably can to keep public sentiment right and the 
facts before the public. It was the opinion of one member 
that he would like to have the workmen understand that ive do 
not purpose to allow them to run our mills, but that we do pur- 
pose always to treat the men fairly as individuals and give them 
good, liberal wages. 

At the close of this whole discussion it was decided that the 
sense of this iCommittee is that the general policy should be 
to temporize for the next six months or year until we get fully 
established, and that the prevalent conditions of labor and labor 
unions at the different plants should be undisturbed, and that 
if any changes do occur later they can be handled indi- 
vidually. 

Three members of the Committee have very positive ideas on 
the expediency of permitting any change in the labor relations 
now prevailing at the different plants. They insist that they 
believe we must accept whatever conditions now exist at our 
plants; that it is not wise at this time to institute any change 
ourselves; that any attempt on the part of anyone else to bring 
about an alteration in a certain direction should be promptly 
1 Italics are the editor's. 



202 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

discouraged by the ordinary means; that if it is found and de- 
sired that changes be brought about later by our companies they 
can be done when business reasons would permit. These gentle- 
men further maintain that long experience in these matters has 
taught them that if certain situations which naturally arise 
from time to time be not quickly disposed of on the spot with 
a firm hand, you will then witness the beginning of the\ 
end. 

They favored the prompt reporting here of any trouble and 
stated that matters that were serious or are likely to cause 
trouble should be handled upon the advice of this Committee. 
They do not approve of the local manager attempting to decide 
any and all questions of this kind that may arise at the plant, 
but these small affairs that require nipping in the bud should 
be disposed of by him and then reported here. 

One gentleman thinks this whole question is so big and grave 
in its possible effect to the United States Steel Corporation that 
we ought to proceed with great caution and if necessary consult 
with some of our associates on the subject. 

He believes that it would be a great mistake if it were under- 
stood we had adopted a policy of antagonism: that the effect 
might be disastrous ; that we must not lose sight of the financial 
interests of the corporation and must endeavor to keep clear of 
anything that might be prejudicial to these interests. 

June 17, 1901. 
The next question is, Should we establish a rule and announce 
that rule to presidents, viz., that they are authorized to take 
up the question and dispose of it promptly on the basis that 
under no circumstances will any union be recognized where there 
are no unions ? ... It has been suggested in this Committee 
that when that question comes up the president of the sub- 
sidiary company should reply that he wished to consider and 
would make answer the next day, and in the meantime could 
take it up with the president of this company, and then finally 
report to the representative that the matter had been carefully 
considered and the decision reached is so and so. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 203 

To this last proposition the president commented that it would 
then be perfectly clear that such president had taken it up with 
this corporation. 

Mr. Converse feels . . . that public opinion would be with us 
inasmuch as we had not attempted to crush unions, bu)t had 
simply accepted the various situations as they were; that we 
had left the management at the individual plants just as here- 
tofore and advised the local officers to use their judgment. He 
pointed out that we are assured by certain presidents that they 
can run everything in their non-union plants. 

(The following lines in the minutes occur immediately after 
an expression by the one member of the Finance Committee 
expressing any toleration for unions.) 

The president informs the Committee that there is in the 
air a well defined feeling that the corporation is indifferent as 
to fighting the extension of the labor unions. 

(The situation before the Board on June 17, 1901, was tBe 
threat of a strike by the Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel and Tin Workers. In this the labor union for the first 
time grappled with the new conditions of consolidation brought 
about by the formation of the Steel Corporation. This Asso- 
ciation had agreements in about one-third of the Corporation's 
mills.) 

Mr. Converse put this proposition that as a matter of fact 
it is not a question of finessing the situation except up to a cer- 
tain point; that the very worst the Association can do is with 
about 33 1-3 per cent., and he believes it will not do it with 
that low percentage; that if our president says to the presidents 
that they will please understand that the United States Steel 
Corporation is a large financial institution and it expects you 
to go ahead now and handle this situation just exactly as if the 
United States Steel Corporation did not exist, they will be very 
careful not to get into trouble. 

This met the unqualified approval of the president, Mr. 
Steele, and Mr. Eeid. 

(The following from the minutes of July 2 refer to the 
growing threat of a strike by the Amalgamated Association and 



204 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

the ' specific statement of the understood remedy hinted at 
throughout the minutes.) 

The chairman stated that he would be willing to concede 
two mills as union mills, to sign the scale for the McKeesport 
mill and to keep it shut down, 

July 2, 1901. 

The chairman stated that probably the men would be satis- 
fied if they gained a point; that while it is very humiliating, 
nevertheless it is a critical period and we had better temporize 
if it can be done. 

(After a decision to send representatives to confer with the 
Amalgamated Association.) 

The chairman stated that it should be clearly understood that 
the United States Steel Corporation has nothing whatever to 
do with it; that the representatives of the three subsidiary com- 
panies are not to state that they are acting in concert, or even 
by consultation, with any of the officials of the United States 
Steel Corporation. 

The chairman explained his opinion that the men who go 
should be pretty big men and able men, who if necessary might 
be competent to decide pretty promptly what to do ; they should 
be men with sense enough not to be antagonistic to the views 
here without full consultation with New York. 

In response to an inquiry from the chairman, the president 
stated that he had been assured by the head of the financial 
house that he will stand by whatever action the president thinks 
best. The president has also stated that the junior partners 
expressed themselves as very anxious to have this matter set- 
tled, but did not at any time state that it should be settled. 

The chairman called attention to the fact that it seems from 
the statements made to be clearly understood what policy ought 
to be pursued. 

(The tense situation between the Amalgamated Association 
and the Corporation over signing the new scale was greatly 
increased by the episode recorded in the minutes of July 8, 
1901.X 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 205 

The president reported that the superintendent of the Wells- 
ville sheet mill down on the Ohio Eiver had discharged twelve 
men who were endeavoring to institute a lodge. Later in the 
meeting the chairman read an Associated Press dispatch refer- 
ring to this and stating that the men were discharged on Sat- 
urday last and that Shaffer 1 had announced that the men would 
have to be reinstated before any conference could be had. 

[Mr. Edenborn believes that we have the matter well in hand 
and that even if we have to face a tin-plate strike we should 
not give in to labor. 

The mill is not a union mill because it has not been recog- 
nized by the owners as a union mill. 

The president would now approve of meeting the people and 
making the best arrangement possible and learn what they 



The chairman stated that we all labored under the impres- 
sion based on the statement of the president that we could keep 
so close track that we would know pretty well what the men 
were doing; but that if this union at McKeesport mill had been 
formed between last April and the time the presidents were here 
we did not have the information. 

July 12, 1901. 
Mr. Steele reported to this meeting that an informal talk 
over the labor situation had taken place this morning between 
such of the directors as could be reached at that time, and there 
were present Messrs. J. P. Morgan, H. H. Eogers, Eobert Bacon, 
Abram Hewitt, Charles Steele, and the president of this com- 
pany; that during this talk the whole labor situation was again 
gone over; . . . that it was the unanimous opinion of those 
present that we should say we were willing to sign the scales 
in all of our union mills as we had last year as submitted, but 
that we refuse to negotiate with the association in any 'particular 
for the mills Tcnoivn as non-union mills. 

Analyzed, these minutes indicate that — 
President of the Amalgamated Association. 



206 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

1. The Executive Committee (financiers) control absolutely 

the Steel Corporation's labor policy. 

Mr. Gary told the Senate Investigating Committee that 

this was true today. 

2. The nature and extent of the Executive Committee's con- 

trol was to be kept secret from the public and the an- 
nouncement made that each subsidiary company con- 
trolled its own labor policy. 

3. Opposition to labor unions by the financial control was 

instinctive and complete. The bases of opposition were 
pride and fear ; e.g. "we do not purpose to allow the 
workmen to run our mills." " If certain situations 
which naturally arise be not disposed of with a firm 
hand, you will then witness the beginning of the end." 
Fear of colleagues' opinion existed, e.g. the president's 
reference to the feeling in the air that " the Corporation 
is indifferent as to fighting the extension of labor 
unions." 

4. Opposition to labor unions was to be kept secret and not 

avowed ; e.g. " public opinion would be with us inas- 
much as we had not attempted to crush labor unions but 
had simply accepted the various situations " ; and " it 
would be a great mistake if it were understood that we 
had adopted a policy of antagonism." 

5. Opposition to labor unions was to be through " the ordi- 

nary means " with final reliance on shutting down union 
mills where agreements had to be signed and turning the 
production over to the corporation's non-union mills; 
e.g. " to sign the scale for McKeesport mill and to keep 
it shut down." 

6. Subsidiary presidents and superintendents were respon- 

sible for any methods of their own, which must " not be 
antagonistic to the views " of New York and which in- 
cluded discharge of workers for forming labor unions. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 207 

Methods were questioned only when the results threat- 
ened to be " disastrous," i.e. strikes. 

7. Opposition to union labor included " temporizing/ ' 

" finessing " and opportunistic reliance on subordinates 
with concern only for " results." 

8. Workmen were not consulted and no systematic above- 

board means of hearing workmen's views was considered. 
Workmen's right to organize was considered a " natu- 
ral " thing, to be repressed. 

9. Final decision on labor policy rested with Wall Street 

which was ready to support the anti-union policy. 

The sole concern of the Steel Corporation was whether 
the anti-union policy could be carried out, without too great 
damage to immediate profits. The decision was on a weigh- 
ing of chances; the decision did not concern the rights of 
man. 

The history of the Steel Corporation's dealings with labor 
since 1901 shows a consistent and successful carrying 
out of the anti-union policy. Largely by shutting down 
mills " conceded " to be " union" and by discharging 
workmen for forming other unions this result has come 
about: whereas in 1901 one-third of the Corporation's mills 
dealt with unions, in 1919 these and all other unions had 
been ousted; no unions were dealt with. Besides the stock- 
holders' report of 1912 hitherto quoted, which " justifies " 
the Corporation's " repression of the workmen," Mr. Gary 
made plain to the Senate Investigating Committee that the 
same ideas and the same methods held all along. 

He told the Senate Committee that " unionism is not a 
good thing for employer or employee." At the same time he 
declared that the Corporation did not carry this belief into 
practice by " opposing labor unions as such " ; that no work- 
man " was discriminated against because he was a union 



208 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

man " ; that the Corporation did not attempt to crush unions. 
All this was in accord with the principles of 1901 of disclaim- 
ing the opposition, in the belief that " it would be a great 
mistake if it were understood that we had adopted a policy of 
antagonism." 

Decisions in 1919 were made the same as in 1901, on the 
basis of what the Corporation might have to do, not what 
ought to be done. Mr. Gary said, " Now of course when 
there is only one thing to do or when there are various evils 
confronting us, the position to take is the one least unfavor- 
able." His judgment on the vastly different conditions in 
England in no way concerned whether labor had reached 
power there because of any justice in labor's position ; "I 
think England is inclined to go further than the people of 
this country would go, simply because she is compelled to." 
So far the Steel Corporation has not been " compelled to ; " — 
"we are not obliged to contract with unions if we do not 
choose to do so." 

It is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between Mr. 
Gary's arguments based on possible evils, — the " closed shop " 
argument, — and his arguments based on the Corporation's 
actual practice. The difference was illustrated in this state- 
ment by Mr. Gary to members of the Commission of Inquiry 
on December 5 : " I am just as much opposed to one big union 
of all the steel companies of the country as to one big union 
of all the steel workmen. Both would be bad for the nation." 
Mr. Gary was not brought to a discussion based on the actual 
fact: whether one big union of half the steel companies of 
the country, with no recognized union among that half's steel 
workmen, was " bad for the nation." An analysis of fact, 
such as attempted in this report, must deal with the badness 
or justice of what actually exists, — with the alternative en- 
forced by the Corporation's practice. 

In sum, then, Mr. Gary could tell the Senate Committee 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 209 

in the same breath that " of course workmen had a right to 
belong to unions " but that " it is my policy and the policies 
of the Corporation not to deal with union labor leaders at 
any time." The Corporation never proposed any plan be- 
tween the horns of this dilemma. The dilemma was actually 
resolved by the Corporation's practice. What the Corpora- 
tion actually did, and does, is dealt with here. 

The Commission's data show that the practice of the anti- 
unionism alternative by the Corporation and by a large num- 
ber of independents entailed in 1919 — 

1. Discharging workmen for unionism, just as the twelve men 
were discharged at Wellsville in 1901 " for forming a lodge "; 
also the eviction of workmen from company houses and sim- 
ilar coercions. 

2. Blacklisting strikers. 

3. Systematic espionage through " under-cover men." 

4. Hiring strike-breaking spies from " labor detective agencies." 

These will be considered before passing on to the wider social 
consequences affecting governmental and social institutions. 
In 1919 the Corporation had no further need for the practice 
of signing up agreements with unions in certain mills and 
then shutting those mills down. The threat of this practice, 
however, was well understood in 1919. In half a dozen towns 
investigators found evidences of it ; for example, this remark 
made by a roller in New Kensington, once a union man but, 
in October, 1919, no union man and no striker, " If the 
union is started again you've got to remember that there is 
nothing to keep the company from starting its old policy of 
shutting down the mills. Then where'd you be with your 
better wages and shorter hours 1 " 
1. Discharge for unionism. 

The Commission's special evidence consists of hundreds of 
signed statements by steel workers who were discharged. 



210 KEPOBT ON THE STEEL STKIKE 

Mr. Gary flatly denied to the Senate Committee that such 
was the practice. He said : 

" If that has been done in a single case or a few cases, if it 
has ever been done, which I deny, it has been contrary to our 
positive instructions and would not have been permitted, and 
the man would be disciplined if he disobeyed these instructions 4 
the second time. ... 

" Now, it is quite possible that a man, or more than one man, 
who is a member of a labor union, unknown to us or -known to 
us — that is unimportant — has gotten up some proposition, has 
built up some straw man, for the purpose of making trouble, 
and of reporting that he was discriminated against because he 
was a union man. Or, it is possible, though I do not think 
probable, that some foreman may in some instances have shown 
some feeling against a union man when he discovered it. I do 
not know of any such case. It would be directly contrary to 
our orders, contrary to all our reports and contrary to the in- 
formation I have. I have denied the proposition emphatically. 
It is not true." * 

It is true and Mr. Gary's subordinates explained one phase 
of how it works. |Mr. Bumngton of the Illinois Steel, also 
Mr. Williams' representative for the Carnegie Steel and other 
officers put it uniformly in these words : " We don't discharge 
a man for belonging to a union, but of course we discharge 
men for agitating in the mills." 

Who settles what constitutes agitating in the mills? The 
foreman. Two men during a breathing spell in the mill con- 
verse for a moment. One has been found out to be a union 
man. That talk, a word in passing, a gesture (which may be 
a union lodge secret sign in the foreman's belief) is sufficient 
for the foreman's judgment, once he has learned that the com- 
pany wants the man got rid of. 

1 Senate Document No. 202. Vol. I, p. 166, p. 174. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 211 

Mr. Burnett, assistant to the President of Carnegie Steel, 
volunteered the information in a conversation that the dis- 
charge of eight men at a shears in their works was because 
" they were agitating in the mill " by having invited labor 
leaders to come and organize them. The practice varied 
widely: it was worst in the Pittsburgh District. And this 
fact must be borne in mind in considering the number of men 
discharged : the discharge of a single man in a department 
may be enough to stop unionizing among the five hundred 
men left. The spectacle of one old employee summarily fired, 
and the union he belongs to helpless to give him a job, may 
settle the fate of that union for a whole works. ' Only where 
" examples " fail to deter was discharge by the hundred 
resorted to, as at Johnstowmj 

The statements of discharged workers included cases where 
the foreman admitted the cause of the discharge and told who 
gave the order ; cases of men secretly elected officers in a new 
union local and fired the next day; cases of men thirty-five 
years in companies' employ and fired after admitting joining 
to some man later proved a spy;. 

These are specific casesj More important is the feeling 
throughout the Corporation s workmen that the price of join- 
ing a union may he discharge at any minute. All workmen 
know it. J Their first concern after secretly signing up is 
" protection." Moreover discharge is only the symbol for a 
whole system of opposition just as persistent and almost as 
effective as the more drastic act. The system works in dis- 
charge from a job, but not from the plant, i.e. in transfer of 
known union men from good jobs to worse ones, even from 
skilled jobs to common labor, until the man discharges him- 
self from the industry. Finally, discharge is peculiarly ef- 
fective in steel towns because generally no other jobs exist 
there. The discharged man must move himself and his 
family. 



212 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

"Agitating in the mill" may include the mail a man 
receives at his home. At the Jones & Laughlin plant in 
Woodlawn, Pa., one department had twenty-four Finns. 
Finns are known as especially intelligent workmen and espe- 
cially likely to join unions. In February, 1919, the plant 
management learned that these Finns were visiting a great 
deal with each other at night, meeting in the cellars of their 
own houses. Finally it was observed that the Finns seemed 
to be getting more mail than the other " foreigners," includ- 
ing newspapers and pamphlets. The twenty-four were called 
up one morning and fired without explanation. In Sep- 
tember, 1919, the plant management were congratulating 
themselves: they observed in the list of union workers de- 
ported by plant guards from Weirton the names of some of 
their Finns. The plant had " spotted 'em all right." 
f Discharges for joining the union were so common in the 
months before the strike that the union organizers did not 
even keep records of the cases. Cases were too common to 
need provingfand the organizer could only say to the victim, 
" After werrc recognized you'll get your job back." 

Pencil marks on a typewritten slip of paper in the Mones- 
sen " labor file " illustrated the principle of discharge. The 
paper was the report of a spy, plainly inside the union, and 
contained a list of names which were referred to in a letter, 
also in the file, from a labor detective agency. The appear- 
ance of the paper with the first five names crossed out, was 
as follows : 

MONONGAHELA LODGE NO. 127, PA. 

The employees of the Page Steel and Wire Fence Company, 
Monessen, Pa., have formed a strong lodge of the A. A. Or- 
ganizer M. E. Donehue acted as master of ceremonies in insti- 
tuting this new addition. The officers of Monongahela Lodge 
No. 127, Pa., are : 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 213 

President, AnthonV PauWesld, wire mill. 
Vice-President, JoseVi Firer, 'wire mill. 
Eeeording Secretary, \judy Gladysz, wire mill. 
Financial SecretarV\Foseph Kissell, wire mill. 
Treasurer, FranJ^Stockufc, wire mill. 
Guide, Nick Bachovehese, open. hearth. 
Inside Guard, John Uring, page. 
Outside Guard, Akym Cymbale, page. 
Journal Agent, John Baran, wire milL 
Corresponding Jtepresentativc, Paul KisSell, 216 Knox Ave.> 
Monessen, Pa. 

It is the Capuan punishment principle — strike off the heads 
of the leaders. The " examples " will take care of the rest 
of the would-he unionists. 
/ In Johnstown w T here unionism spread through the entire 
Midvale-Cambria works, including even the office force, 
" examples " were not sufficient and literally thousands of 
men were summarily discharged. An investigator in Novem- 
ber, 1919, obtained in two days about two hundred signed 
statements and sworn affidavits of discharged workmen who 
had been told or who believed that the cause was union af- 
filiation./ The forty pages of these statements make monoto- 
nous reading ; specimens follow : 

Joseph Yart, 216 Woodville Ave., Johnstown, was em- 
ployed by the Cambria Steel Company for forty years in the 
car works and was never discharged before. He became a mem- 
ber of the union on February 3rd, and was discharged on May 
12th by Superintendent Hill. When Mr. Yart asked him for 
the reason of his discharge, he was told " there is no more work 
for you here." He went to the employment agency to apply 
again in June and was told by Agent McGrew, " You can't work 
for Cambria any more, better look for something outside." Mr. 
Yart protested that he had worked there for forty years, that 
he is now 54 years of age and can't work very well on the out- 



214 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

side and the only reply he got was " Yon can't work here any 
more — yon are an agitator and a disturbance maker in the car 
department." Mr. Yart denied this charge and protested that 
he never spoke to anyone there about his union affiliations, but 
no attention was paid to his protest. Mr. Yart has been unable 
to find another job ever since and has been out of work now for 
the past eight months, as every place he goes to his age handi- 
caps him in securing a job. Mr. Yart was born and lived all 
his life in Johnstown and was one of the first employees that 
helped to organize the Cambria Employees' Beneficial Associa- 
tion. One of Mr. Yart's sons was in the army of occupation, and 
Mr. Yart now complains : " My son went to fight for democracy 
and I am thrown out on the streets without any means of live- 
lihood." 

(Signed) Joseph Yart. 



Charles Bacha, 811 Virginia Ave., Johnstown, was employed 
by the Cambria Steel Company for seven years and never 
discharged before. On April 1st. he participated in the miners' 
parade, and although he was not a member of the union at that 
time, he was discharged on the 2nd of April by Superintendent 
Donk May. The foreman, May, gave him no explanation for 
his dismissal. He tried to find further employment with the 
Cambria and when he saw Mr. Lumpkin, the General Superin- 
tendent, he was told, " My boy, if you want union work, go down 
to a union town and get it — no work for you here." 

Mr. Bacha applied again four times, but was refused work 
continuously. Mr. Bacha is a U. S. citizen and has been out 
of a job now for eight months, as he could not find another 
job. 

(Signed) Charles Bacha. 



William Barnhart, 50 Messenger St., Johnstown. On Oc- 
tober 24, 1918, he was hired by Telford & Jones Coal Company 
and started to work, when the foreman came over and said, " I'm 
sorry, I'll have to take you off— they telephoned me from the 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 215 

main office to take you off." He asked the foreman whether this 
was because he belonged to the union, to which the foreman 
replied, " I have nothing against the union, but I got to be on 
the other side." Mr. Barnhart is a U. S. citizen. 

(Signed) William Barnhart. 



Bernard Heeney, 336 Honnan Ave., Johnstown, worked for 
the Cambria Steel Company for seven years and was never dis- 
charged before. He joined the union on March 24, 1919, and 
was discharged on June 6th by Assistant Superintendent F. W. 
Bryan. When he asked the Assistant Superintendent why he 
was laid off and explained to him that he was in charge of about 
twelve men and was the oldest employee in the department, 
Bryan said, " I don't know — we have orders here to take you 
off." When he asked him where these orders came from he 
said, " They may have come from New York, Philadelphia or 
Chicago." Mr. Heeney is a native of the TJ. S. 

(Signed) Bernard Heeney. 



Joe Mandorgotz, 1320 Virginia Ave., Johnstown. Worked 
for the Cambria Steel Company on and off for about twenty 
years. He joined the union about March, 1919, and took part in 
the miners' parade on April 1st. About April 7th, Davie Mal- 
comb, foreman, asked him whether he belonged to a union. He 
admitted he did and was discharged two days later. Mr. Man- 
dorgotz is a IT. S. citizen, lived in Johnstown for twenty-seven 
years and has a wife and three children to support. He could 
not find another job for four months. 

(Signed) Joe Mandorgotz. 



Theodore Salitski, 206 Broad Ave., Johnstown, Pa., worked 
for Cambria seven years — never discharged before. Was dis- 
charged by foreman, Donk May. Joined the union March 17th 
and was discharged April 7th. Took part in parade held April 1, 
1919. When asked for reason, told him " Because you stayed 



216 EEPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

home April 1st." Applied again and was told by May that 
" There is no work for a Bolshevist." Out of work six weeks. 
Married man — wife and one child. Lived in Johnstown eight 
years. 

(Signed) Theodore Salitski. 



I, the undersigned, do hereby testify that I have been employed 
by the Cambria Steel Company for almost eight (8) years in 
the capacity of unloading steel. 

I have at all times been an efficient and reliable employee. 

W. H. Walter, the Foreman of the stockyard Department 
called me into his office this morning and then he asked me if 
I belonged to the Union. I answered " Yes." He then asked 
why I joined the Union. I told him the men were joining and 
I thought I should belong. Mr. Walters then asked " If the 
men jumped into the furnace would you follow them ? " I 
answered "Yes, if they would I would." I did not believe it 
was any of his business, as I believe I have a right to join a 
labor organization for my protection. 

I asked Mr. Walters why he discharged me. He answered 
"Because you joined the Union." 

The foregoing occurred the forenoon of February 22nd, 1919. 

his 
(Signed) Nick (X) Poppovich. 
mark 



Ivania, ) 

y ss. 
na, ) 



Witness to mark: Thos. A. Daley. 
State of Pennsyh 
County of Cambria, 

Before me, a Notary Public, in and for said County personally 
came Nick Poppovich, who being by me duly sworn according 
to law deposed and said that the foregoing statement is true 
and correct. his 

(Signed) Nick (X) Poppovich. 
mark 
Witness to mark: Thos. A. Daley (Signed). 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 217 



Sworn and subscribed, before me 
this 22nd day of February, 1919. 
Ray Patton Smith (Signed), 
Notary Public (Seal). 
My commission expires March 12, 1921. 
Paper not drafted by Notary. 



State of Pennsylvania, ) 
County of Cambria, I 

Personally appeared before me, Myrtle E. Johnston, a Notary 
Public in and for said County and State, John Kubanda, per- 
sonally known to me, who being by me first duly sworn deposes 
and says: 

That I worked for the Cambria Steel Company for nine 
(9) years, the 1st two (2) years in the blast furnace department, 
always was a steady and dependable man. On Thrusday, Feb- 
ruary 13th, 1919, Peter Riley, Foreman, sent a man to tell me 
to come and get my time. I went in to the office and asked 
him why I was laid off. He said " I got my orders from the 
office." I told him I don't belong to the Union. He said, 
" What were you doing at the meeting ? " I said, " Anyone 
can go over to the meeting." He said " go down to the general 
office and fix it up with them." 

I verily believe that it was through Union affiliations that 
I was discharged. 

(Signed) John Kubanda (Seal). 
Sworn and subscribed, before me 

this 24th day of February, A. D. 1919. 
(Signed) Myrtle R. Johnston, 
Notary Public (Seal). 

My commission expires February 27th, 1921. 



Affidavit on affidavit, the cases prove incontestibly the ter- 
rorism, sometimes with purpose avowed, more often with 
purpose disavowed, so that the discharged man has nothing 
left even for argument if argument would be heard. The 



218 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

nameless terror was more commonly applied, the answer, 
" You know why," as if the cause were some secret unspeak- 
able disease in the victim, like leprosy. 

It was much the same in Corporation mills : 

Joe Mayor, 440 Beach Way, Homestead — Aug. 15, 1919. 

Mayor said that he had worked for the Carnegie Steel Co. 
in the car wheel shop 12 years and had never been discharged 
before. 

He joined the union on August 5th. He was discharged 
August 15th by Supt. Munle, who called him into his office 
but said "Were you at the meeting Tuesday night ?" 

M. — I was. How do you know? 

Supt. — Somebody turned your name in and I am going to 
discharge you. 

M. — What's matter? what I do, rob company of couple of 
dollars ? 

Supt, — We don't want you to attend union meetings. I don't 
want union men to work for me. 

When the Superintendent inquired what they had told him 
at the meetings he refused to answer and further refused to 
answer when the Superintendent asked him for the names of 
others present at the meeting. The Superintendent then called a 
policeman and he was taken out of the shop. 

M. got a job for two weeks under a different name, as he 
knew himself to be blacklisted. Is a citizen and married; has 
lived in Homestead 14 years. 



John Dablonski, 320% Syria St., Duquesne, Pa. 

Dablonski said that he had worked three years in the Carnegie 
Steel Plant and had never before been discharged. Early in 
September, he attended a Sunday meeting, at which Mother 
Jones spoke, in Duquesne, a few days later, Mr. Buswick, a 
foreman of the Carnegie Steel Co., told him he was discharged. 
D. asked why but Mr. Buswick would not tell him. 

He is married and has taken out his first papers. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 219 

I 
These are examples. The range of the Commission's data 

is given in a sub-report. The Pittsburgh District saw the 

most extensive use of this weapon. 

2. Blacklists. 

Blacklists as an integral part of the anti-union alternative 
of course are ordinarily kept secret by the companies. The 
steel plant in Monessen, however, which freely lent its " labor 
file " to an investigator to study, included among the detec- 
tives' reports, etc., several blacklists. To most actual plant 
managers, as distinguished from Mr. Gary, blacklists seem 
after all too common to be deeply concealed. With the lists 
examined by the Commission are evidences of the system of 
inter-company exchange like the detective reports where the 
names of " independent " and Corporation mills were mixed 
together. 

Pittsburgh Steel Products Company 
Mill Office 
M. Wikstrom, 
Gen'l Supt. 
Jas. H. Dunbar, 
Ass't to Gen'l Supt. 

Monessen, Pa., November 7th, 1919. 
George A. Paff, Supt., 
Page Steel and Wire Company, 
Monessen, Pa. 
Dear Sir: 

Attached hereto is list of former employees who have failed 
to return to work in our Plant. 

This list is forwarded to you so that proper action can be 
taken — should they apply for employment at your Plant. 
We would ask that you kindly consider this as confidential. 
Yours very truly, 
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company, 

(Signed) M. Wikstrom, 
SW/F • Gen'l Superintendent. 



220 KEPOKT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

November 20, 1919. 
Mr. M. Wikstrom, General Superintendent, 
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company, 
Monessen, Pa. 
Dear Mr. Wikstrom: 

In compliance with your request, we are submitting herewith 
a complete list of our employees who have not as yet returned 
to work. 

Naturally, we expect to re-employ the larger portion of these 
men, although we have underscored the names of some radicals 
who, I believe, nobody would want around a plant. 
Very truly yours, 

Page Steel and Wire Company, 
GAP/M General Superintendent. 



Monessen Foundry and Machine Company 

Monessen, Pa., November 4th, 1919. 
Mr. Geo. Paff, 

Page Steel and Wire Co., 
Monessen, Pa. 
Dear Sir: 

We attach herewith list of former employees, who are striking 
for Closed Shop. This list is forwarded to you at this time, as 
we understand several of these men are applying for work at 
your plant. 

Very truly yours, 
Monessen Foundry & Mach. Co., 

(Signed) Louis X. Ely, 
LXE/OH Secretary. 

Copy to PMW 11/15 



It is a regular system ; " in compliance with your re- 
quest." It is secret; "consider confidential." It is dis- 
ingenuous ; " striking for closed shop." The attached lists, 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 221 

principally " hunkies," run from fifty to two hundred names 
apiece. A sub-report gives the range of the Commission's 
data, of which the above are samples. 

3. Espionage. (" Under-cover " men.) 

Great systems of espionage are an integral part of the anti- 
union alternative; spies are integral to warfare. 

Espionage was of two general classes : spies directly in the 
employ of the steel companies ; and spies hired from profes- 
sional "labor detective" agencies. The Steel Corporation 
plants have their own detective forces ; one case of hiring out- 
side agencies by a Corporation subsidiary was charged pub- 
licly during the strike. 

Espionage was of two general characters: spies pure and 
simple who merely furnished information; and spies who 
also acted as propagandist strike breakers, mingling with the 
strikers and whispering that the strike was failing, that the 
men in other towns had gone back, that the union leaders were 
crooks, etc. The Monessen " labor file " contained some six 
hundred daily reports by " under-cover " spies of both char- 
acters, mere detectives and strike-breaking propagandists. 

These company spy-systems carry right through into the 
Vhited States Government. 

Federal immigration authorities testified to the Commis- 
sion that raids and arrests, for " radicalism," etc., were made 
especially in the Pittsburgh District on the denunciations and 
secret reports of steel company " under-cover " men, and the 
prisoners turned over to the Department of Justice. 

The Monessen " labor file " enabled the student to follow 
one such paper through to the government. It is given here 
as offering light upon the question why many workingmen, 
especially steel workers, have come to suspect that the gov- 
ernment, as government, has taken sides in industrial war- 
fare; has taken sides against workingmen. 



222 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

In this freely offered " file/' among the blacklists, detec- 
tive agency contracts, u nnder-cover men's " reports, typed 
letters of big concerns on high grade paper with luxurious 
letter-heads, there was a scrap of dirty paper the size of one's 
palm. Scribbled on both sides it read exactly as follows : 

Charleroi, Pa., Oct. 13th, 1919. 
Dear Sir: 

I am an employee of the Pitts Steele Proct of Allenport I 
went to work last Fri and would like to work so I will give you 
some names of some Belgian dogs that made it so hard for me 
and my family I had to quite they are a menace to our country 
so Please keep there names in mind 

Yours truly 

Over 

Charle Ballue 

209 Shady ave Charleroi Pa 
Arthur Ballue 

Oakland ave between 3 and 4 st Charleroi Pa 
Tony Jarruse 

208 Shady ave Charleroi Pa 
Gus Vanduzene 

312 Shady ave Charleroi Pa 
Albert Balue 

3 st Charleroi Pa 

Make these suffer as they are making other just now when 
you start your mills. 

The investigator of the file wondered what happened to 
spiteful scraps of paper in the steel industry. Beside the 
scrap was a letter as follows : 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 223 

Pittsburgh Steel Products Company 

MH1 Office 

Monessen, Pa., October 15, 1919. 
M. Wikstroni, Gen'l Supt. 
Jas. H. Dunbar, 

Ass't to Gen'l Supt. 
Messrs : 

George A. Paff, 

C. J. Mogan, 

U. S. Smiley, 

W. S. Bumbaugh, 

W. C. Sutherland, 

J. W. Connery, 
Gentlemen : 

We are in receipt of an anonymous communication under date 
of October 13th, which reads as follows: 

" I am an employee of the Pittsburgh Steel Products Company 
of Allenport. I went to work last Friday and would like to 
work, so I will give you some names of some Belgian Dogs that 
made it so hard for me and my family, I had to quit. They 
are a menace to our country — so please keep these names in 
mind when you start your mill. 
Charles Ballue, 

209 Shady Ave., Charleroi, Pa., 
Arthur Ballue, 

Between 3rd and 4th Sts., Charleroi, Pa. 
Tony Jarouse, 

208 Shady Ave., Charleroi, Pa., 

(Formerly worked in our mill under Check No. 5321). 
Gus Vanduzen, 

312 Shady Ave., Charleroi, Pa. 
Albert Ballue, 

3d St., Charleroi, Pa. 

Make these men suffer as they are making me suffer just now 
when you start your mill." 



224: REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

This is for your information and files. 
Yours very truly, 
Pittsburgh Steel Products Company, 
(Signed) Malcolm Wikstrom, 
JDH/W General Superintendent. 

The list at the top of the letter represented every steel 
concern in Monessen. The promptness with which the list 
of names was speeded back and forth among the companies 
was illustrated in another letter in the file, sent out the same 
day the above was received. 

Pittsburgh Steel Company 
Mill Office 
Monessen, Pa., October 15, 1919. 

C. J. Mogan, Genl Supt. 

D. P. King, Ass't Genl Supt. 
A. Allison, Ass't Genl Supt. 
Messrs., 

M. Wikstrom, Pgh. Steel Products. 

U. S. Smiley, American Sheet & Tin Co. 

F. D. Bumbaugh, Monessen Fdry. & Mach. Co. 
J. L. Hoffman, Carnegie Steel Co. 

G. A. Pan 3 , Page Steel & Wire Co. 
Dear Sirs: 

Enclosed is a list of men who are some of the leading agitators 
in keeping the men from going to work by all kinds of 
threats. 

Yours very truly, 

(Signed) C. J. Mogan, 
CJM/C General Superintendent. 

Attached to this letter was a copy of the same little list, 
with one additional name. Of the mills catalogued, beneath 
the letterhead, as on the circuit of vital information, two 
were Corporation subsidiaries, — American Sheet & Tin ; and 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 225 

Carnegie Steel, — the rest " independents." The letters 
crossed and recrossed, so that the Pittsburgh Steel Products 
Co. officer who started the list out got the same list hack 
from the Pittsburgh Steel Co. (another " independent ") the 
same day. 

Finally in the file was the carbon of a letter transmitting 
the same list to the Department of Justice at Washington, 
asserting that the men named were " leading radicals." 

From a scrap of dirty paper, rising through stages of 
typed and embossed letterhead dignity, to those dossiers, 
marked " Important — very secret," in Government 
Bureaus in Washington! The circumstances at either end 
of the chain were not investigated. 

The testimony of a Federal officer of long official experi- 
ence, made at a hearing of the Commission of Inquiry in 
November in Pittsburgh was : 

... 90 per cent, of all the radicals arrested and taken into 
custody were reported by one of the large corporations, either 
of the steel or coal industry. I mean by that, that these cor- 
porations are loaded up with what they call " under-cover " 
men who must earn their salaries, and they go around and get 
into these organizations and report the cases to the detectives 
for the large companies. The detectives in turn report to the 
chief of police of the city. Generally, the chiefs of police in 
these small cities around Pittsburgh were placed there by the 
corporations. 

Tne corporation orders an organization raided by the police 
department, the members are taken into custody, thrown into 
the police station and the department of justice is notified. They 
send a man to examine them to see if there are any extreme 
radicals or anarchists among them. They usually let all but a 
few go. In one instance seventy-nine were taken. The Depart- 
ment of Justice let all go but three; of those we asked for 
warrants for two, and at the hearing we made a case against 
one of them. 



226 REPORT ON THE STBEIi STRIKE 

The Steel Corporation has been using every possible endeavor 
for the last 20 years to fill its mills with foreigners, and to 
a large extent has done so ; then you must see why the foreigner 
is taking the front of the stage in this conflict. When the large 
corporations put these foreigners in they thought they had a 
class of men who wouldn't strike. Now they want to get rid 
of some of them. 



During the war a number of able patriotic American citi- 
zens, lawyers, etc., as officers in the army or as Federal of- 
ficials under the Department of Justice, became acquainted 
with this widespread intimate connection between " under- 
cover " systems and Federal authorities and became seriously 
disquieted, partly because of the possibility that, in such a 
system, governmental power might be put at the mercy of 
mercenary and interested men, or might lead to the flagrant 
misuse of such influence in behalf of private ends. Since 
the armistice several of these ex-officials have publicly criti- 
cized the whole system, without visible reform resulting. 
During the steel strike the same system, a year after the 
armistice, was worked hard. The undoubted existence of 
a fractional percentage of " alien radicals " was capitalized, 
with Government assistance, in order to disorganize bodies 
of strikers whose loyalty was of unquestionable legal stand- 
ing. 

Before considering the data on this phase of the inquiry, 
reference should be made to the character of the under-cover 
organizations. 

Two extensive labor-detective strike-breaking corporations, 
with offices in a dozen cities, had a hand in fighting the steel 
strike. Documents and reports from one of the concerns 
filled half the Monessen " labor file." Affidavits and docu- 
ments were obtained from the other, which operated chiefly 
in the Chicago District Also in the Monessen " labor file " 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 227 

were the reports furnished by two other " detective " agencies. 
In the file were the forms of contracts under which these 
concerns were hired and operate. Their " operatives " re- 
ports run from the illiterate scribblings of professional para- 
sites to the most accurate transcriptions of union locals' secret 
meetings. Interviews with the officers of these strike-break- 
ing concerns gave further insight into the range of their 
" work " in the steel strike. A sub-report furnishes the ma- 
terial for building up a day by day story of the strike in 
Monessen. The other documents and the interviews show 
the extent. It is all of a piece and it is the least noble 
side of the war waged for the " open shop " in steel. 

The manager of the detective strike-breaking corporation 
whose reports and contracts appeared in the Monessen " labor 
file/' when interviewed spoke fairly freely of his concern's 
views and activities. He had over Rve hundred " operatives " 
at work in the steel strike. Some of his operatives had been 
injected into the steel plants a year before. Many of his 
operatives had become officers of labor unions. He said that 
there was on the National Strike Committee a labor leader 
who took his money. He denied that his concern was a mere 
detective or strike-breaking concern. 

He used the same arguments as Mr. Gary in explaining 
why he supported Mr. Gary. He said workmen had a right 
to organize but the " open shop " must be preserved. He said 
that labor unions had rights but that the unions had fallen 
into the hands of radical leaders. 

Like Mr. Gary he denied that he wanted to crush unions. 
He denied that his operatives were really strike breakers; 
though the " labor file " contained full details of his opera- 
tives' strike breaking activities and the following letter : 



228 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

New York Office, 680 Hudson Terminal. 
Chicago Office, 1051 Peoples' Gas Bldg. 
Cleveland Office, 1835 Euclid Ave. 
Pittsburgh Office, Wabash Bldg. 
St. Louis Office, Chemical Bldg. 
Cincinnati Office, Union Trust Bldg. 
Detroit Office, Book Bldg. 



The Corporations Auxiliary Company 

Wabash Building, 

Pittsburgh, Pa. 

J. H. Smith, Pres. & Treas. 

John Weber, Secy. 

D. G. Ross, Gen. Mgr. 

H. C. Breton, Res. Mgr. 

, Gen'l Mgr., 1 October 11th, 1919. 

Co., 

Pittsburgh, Pa. 
Dear Sir : 

Confirming conversation between your Mr. x 

and the writer on yesterday, we will furnish you as quickly as 
possible with two Slavish speaking operatives to work along the 
lines as agreed between the writer and Mr. on yesterday. 

This is as per the terms of our regular $225 monthly contract 
with the usual wage credits of $3.00 per day allowed as per 
the copy of attached contract, with the exception that it is under- 
stood that this service will terminate at the end of 30 days from 
commencement of same unless otherwise extended. 

We wish to thank you very much for this business and will 
endeavor to make same as valuable to you as possible and trust 
that it will be instrumental in having the morale of your foreign 
strikers broken. 

We will thank you very much for your cooperation in the 



1 Deleted names are in original letter j copy in possession of Com- 
mission. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 229 

handling of this service and will appreciate your calling upon 
us at any time we can be of special service to you. 
Yours very truly, 
The Corporations Auxiliary Company, 

By (Signed) S. Dewson, 
Eesident Manager. 
B-W: P-ll 



No other country in the world has such large widespread, 
well-financed, strike-breaking corporations, making money 
out of " labor trouble " as America. Their existence is an 
integral part of the industrial corporations' policy of " not 
dealing with labor unions." The steel strike was harvest- 
home for them. Outside the plants and inside, outside the 
strikers and inside the labor unions, their " operatives " 
spied, secretly denounced, engineered raids and arrests, and 
incited to riot. The concerns' managers spoke the same argu- 
ments as Mr. Gary in justification of their activities. The 
companies concealed but were not ashamed of hiring " opera- 
tives " ; it was a customary inevitable part of the anti-union 
alternative. 

Nor was it the custom of certain strike-breaking concerns 
to wait for u labor trouble." When business was slack they 
made "trouble." The sub-report details, from affidavits of 
former operatives, how certain concerns provoked strikes in 
peaceful shops in the past to create " business," set union to 
fighting union, organized unions in order to be called in to 
break the unions. They bled both sides; and the Federal 
Government files contained their patriotic reports. 

In the Chicago-Gary District one such great strike-break- 
ing concern became so active in the steel strike that its offices 
were raided and one of its officers was indicted for " intent 
to create riots " and for intent to " kill and murder divers 
large numbers of persons." This officer after five months had 



230 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

still not been brought to trial. A sample of the riot-inciting 
instructions given to this concern's operatives in the South 
Chicago steel mills follows : 

A 563-D October 2, 1919. 

Eep. 

Dear Sir: 

We have talked to you and instructed you. We want you 
to stir up as much bad feeling as you possibly can between 
the Serbians and Italians. Spread data among the Serbians that 
the Italians are going back to work. Call up every question you 
can in reference to racial hatred between these two nationalities ; 
make them realize to the fullest extent that far better results 
would be accomplished if they will go back to work. Urge them 
to go back to work or the Italians will get their jobs. 
Daily Maxim — Send to every representative today: 
Conserve your forces on a set point — begin before the other 
fellow starts. 

Eemail. 

This operative's duties, according to The New Majority 
(November 11, 1919), were as follows: 

He was assigned to the client whose code was A 536 D, the 
number appearing at the top of the Italian-Serbian letter. This 
code means the South Chicago plant of the Illinois Steel Com- 
pany. 

Then he received the regular course of instruction given 
"representatives." He was told to move around among the 
strikers and get them to go back to work. He was told to go 
to Indiana Harbor, Ind., and get strikers from the Inland Steel 
Company plant there to go to South Chicago and go to work as 
strike breakers for the Illinois Steel Company. He was told 
to go to the vicinity of employment agencies and get strike 
breakers and to take them into the plant by automobile or 
otherwise, at night. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 231 

He was also instructed to move around among the strikers 
for the purpose of reporting what conversations he heard, as 
well as urging them to go to work. He was given a union 
card in a local of one of the international unions affiliated with 
the American Federation of Labor, and told to use it to pass 
himself off as a union man. 

The Illinois Steel Company is the Steel Corporation's big- 
gest western subsidiary. Its president, Mr. Burlington, de- 
clared to the Commission of Inquiry that the first he had 
heard of the matter was when he saw it in the Chicago 
papers; that the Illinois Steel Co. did not hire this strike- 
breaking concern ; that he was " confident that at the trial 
no evidence involving the Illinois Steel Co. would be brought 
out." 

The manager of the strike-breaking concern, with offices 
in the same building as Mr. Burlington, declared to Com- 
mission investigators that their operatives were hired by the 
Illinois Steel Co. 

Meanwhile the raided concern was defending itself in page 
advertisements in papers in many cities as follows : 

WHY IS SHERMAN SERVICE BEING ATTACKED? 

Sherman Service is a national institution composed of men 
and women who have made Industrial Eelationship their life 
work . 

They cause the employer (their client) to recognize and prac- 
tice the basic principles of " square dealing " in his relations 
with his employees. A spirit of sympathetic understanding 
follows — the result is harmony, cooperation, maximum produc- 
tion, high quality and lessened waste. 

The community, which comprises both employee and employer 
and invested capital, is able, through such harmonious and pro- 
ductive relationship, to provide the greatest opportunities af- 
forded under our free form of government, to the advantage of 



232 KEPOBT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

all agreeably concerned. Americanization, in its fullest sense, 
is made possible and does follow; our national structure is pre- 
served and enforced, and we are all better off for it. 

SHERMAN SERVICE, INC. 

John Francis Sherman, Chairman Executive Board New York 
City Boston St. Louis Chicago Philadelphia Cleveland New 
Haven Providence Detroit Toronto. 

Postscript: Sherman Service is not a detective agency. It 
renders no detective service of any description whatsoever. 

Concerning the last line, investigators noted that the Sher- 
man Service Co. was elsewhere carrying on suit in court to 
protect its " rights as a detective agency." According to the 
private " house organ " of this concern it also serves the gov- 
ernment ; for this purpose its operatives become " apparent 
reds." 

"Wherever such organizations exist in the community and 
try to influence the workers it becomes the duty of the Sherman 
representatives to pretend sympathy and join so as to learn who 
the leaders are. Such information is then supplied to the 
government." 

Some steel companies placed implicit confidence in the 
reports and advice of these strike-breaking spy-corporations. 
Other companies were skeptical and dissatisfied but puzzled 
as to what else to do. But no managers doubted what they 
wanted the detective agencies to accomplish — to keep work- 
men from organizing and if they organized to break up or 
nullify the organizations. The attitude of steel company 
managers was the same ; it was illustrated by the reply of a 
general superintendent in Monessen to an investigator's re- 
quest to be allowed to talk with the men in the plant (during 
the strike). He said: " We've got about 300 men in there 
mow ; generally we have 3,000. And those 300 men have cost 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 233 

us just about $500 apiece to get. Now if you go in there and 
ask them questions they may all get nervous and walk out 
again." 

Just as in this plant in Monessen where, as the superin- 
tendent and the investigator knew, two " detective agencies " 
had propagandist-spies mixed with the real workers, so 
throughout the domain of steel, watchers — from subsidized 
workers to hired detectives — peek and glower at the labor 
force and try to guess, by the way men walk or look or talk 
or stay silent or spit, what they are thinking. 

The reach of the industrial spy system and the reliance 
placed on it were brought home to the Commission of Inquiry 
by the spy report on the Commission which was sent to Mr. 
Gary. It has been referred to before; the Commission in 
November read the report, knew that it was being distributed 
in the territory of the Steel Corporation's plants, and dis- 
regarded so amusingly false a document; in December when 
the Commission made its effort to settle the strike, Mr. Gary 
exhibited it and cross-examined the Commissioners on its 
charges. Someone had set a spy on the Commission 
and on the Interchurch World Movement. The anonymous 
"special report" was dated November 12. The Commis- 
sion's first interview with Mr. Gary had been on November 
10. 

The " special report " names (misspelling the names) some 
of the Commission's investigators, names others as investi- 
gators who were not, and calls all named " radicals," " mem- 
bers of the I.W.W.," " Beds " and " active in the organiza- 
tion known as the People's Print . . . formerly known as 
the People's Peace Council, better known as the National 
Civil Liberties League." No statement made about the in- 
vestigators was true. The capacity of the spy and the pur- 
poses of the persons who hired him are indicated in the 
following excerpt: 



234 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

In fact none of these people that are now here in Pittsburgh 
investigating for this Church movement should be told anything 
at all, nor should they be allowed to get any information from 
the Mills in any manner. 

After paying a visit to their offices in New York and talking 
to a large number of the officials there I find that this organiza- 
tion could be used to a very good advantage if handled by the 
right parties. This organization could become a power in both 
the Industrial Field and the Church Field. 

There are a large number of the men and women connected 
with this organization that are know as Pink Tea Socialists 
and Parlor Reds, and are not considered dangerous. I would 
suggest that these kind of people be weeded out of the organiza- 
tion. These are the worst kind of Reds to be connected with 
as they are to a certain extent high up in circles that are hard 
to reach and they can spread propaganda that hurts the work 
of others. 

I found that this Organization is now making a canvass for 
money among the rich and the Corporation in the East, and 
that they have already had a Committee see Judge Gary, asking 
for money to carry on their work with. 

A Mr. Blacenhorn will arrive in Pittsburgh on Thursday 
morning to assist the ones that are already here on the Steel 
Strike investigation. 

No money should be given or any assistance granted this 
organization until they recall all of the ones that they have in 
the Pittsburgh District, and furthermore if there is any way 
at all of forcing them to get rid of the ones that I have mentioned 
they should be let go. 

The literary qualities of this report can be profitably studied 
hj comparison with the reports in the Monessen " labor file." 
The maintenance of the non-unionism alternative, there- 
fore, entailed for the steel companies activities running from 
spies in church offices in New York to sealed carloads of 
negroes shipped into Pittsburgh plant yards at night. For 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 235 

communities and for states the alternative entailed activities 
of greater import and greater menace. These affected civil 
liberties in whole communities, local legislative bodies, police 
authorities, judges, state police troops, Federal government 
departments and the U. S. Army. 

The consequences (which are studied in sub-reports) are 
perhaps most important in regard to the abrogation of civil 
liberties. War-experiences especially have accustomed the 
American people to the thought that the right of assembly, 
the right of free speech, and traditional personal rights can 
be abrogated when the cause is deemed sufficiently great. 
The practise of western Pennsylvania proved that these rights 
were abrogated for the purpose of preventing the organiza- 
tion of trade unions among steel workers, or of defeating 
organized unions. The abrogations largely persist four 
months after the strike. 

The salient fact is as follows : 
Denial of the rights of assemblage and free speech did not 
primarily grow out of the strike but was a precedent 
fact, directly related to the policies of preventing labor 
organization maintained by the Steel Corporation and 
certain " independents." It was for years the rule in 
towns about Pittsburgh that labor organizers could not 
hold meetings. 

To quote from the sub-report : 1 

Local public officials assert that it was necessary to prohibit 
meetings in order to prevent violence. This statement is open 
to question, but if it is accepted, still the connection between 
labor policy and absence of civil liberty remains. Whatever 
danger of violence there was, arose from the industrial conflict. 
On account of the long-continued refusal of the employers to deal 
with organized labor, industrial conflict became inevitable the 

1 From " Civil Liberties," in Western Pennsylvania, by George Soule. 



236 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

moment workmen began to assemble for the purpose of forming 
unions. If, therefore, the right to assemble led to the forming 
and strengthening of unions, and unions led to industrial conflict, 
and industrial conflict led to breaches of the peace, the only way 
to prevent violence was, in the minds of the local officials, to 
prevent meetings. In other words, if the officials were right, 
the industrial situation was such that civil peace could be pre- 
served only by interference with the exercise of ordinary civil 
liberties on the part of a large proportion of the population. 

To maintain steel companies' non-union policies, communi- 
ties lost their rights of assembly so completely that in some 
towns government agents, sent to give patriotic lectures, were 
denied the right to hold meetings ; one such was arrested. 

The extent to which rights were abrogated depended largely 
upon the extent to which non-unionism was endangered. If 
labor organizers were aggressive and local restrictive ordi- 
nances were insufficient the most arbitrary executive acts were 
resorted to. During the strike the repression was complete. 
Legally the Interchurch Commission of Inquiry being com- 
posed of " three or more persons " broke the Sheriff's orders 
by the simple act of assembling and " loitering " in the streets 
of Pittsburgh. A Commissioner conversed with strikers in 
the office used as their headquarters in Braddock; five min- 
utes after his departure State troopers broke into the place 
demanding " that speaker " and started to close down the 
office because " a meeting " had been held. 

Concerning the " violence " justification for such abroga- 
tions the following facts were noted : 

The argument that the right of assembly would lead to violence 
met this contradiction in McKeesport ; a riot there, the only one, 
resulted from the authorities' cancellation of a meeting for which 
a permit had been granted. 

In Johnstown no restriction was ever laid on meetings and no 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 237 

violence ever resulted; the only attempt at violence was the 
action of a Citizens' Committee, led by a Y. M. C. A. secretary, 
which drove labor organizers out of town. 

In Sharon and Farrell the workers, prohibited from assembly 
marched weekly across the state line into Ohio where they held 
great mass meetings without a sign of violence. 

Comparison of the Pittsburgh District with Wheeling, West 
Va., and Ohio districts proves that the reasons given by the 
Pennsylvania authorities were without basis in fact. 

The progressive nature of the restrictions imposed was illus- 
trated in the South Side of Pittsburgh where labor organizers 
obtained a hall after every pressure had been put on the owner 
to cancel the lease. Thereupon the Mayor of Pittsburgh forbade 
outright all meetings on the South Side. 

The whole case for the abrogations is epitomized in the 
preamble to the Sheriff's proclamation issued September 20 
(two days before the strike) : 

Whereas I, William S. Haddock, sheriff of Allegheny County, 
have been formally notified by many citizens, industrial cor- 
porations, and employers that printed inflammatory circulars and 
other information have been distributed and disseminated among 
the people calling a general strike of all employees of various 
industrial manufactories throughout Allegheny County, with the 
request that they cease work and leave their places of employment 
and by reason thereof there now exists among the people great 
unrest, uncertainty, and doubt as to the safety of life, liberty, 
and property: Therefore . . . 

Now Sheriff Haddock has admitted that he never saw the 
" printed inflammatory circulars " alleged to have been dis- 
tributed ; neither did any " citizens, industrial corporations 
and employers " produce any such circulars issued by the 
strike leadership in the period immediately preceding Sep- 
tember 20. 



238 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

These abrogations, before, during and after the strike, 
must be considered with this fact : 

" Free elections " were customarily impossible in steel towns 
in Western Pennsylvania due to clearly understood manipulations 
by steel company officials or by steel company officials who were 
also public officials. 

That is, democratic practises as well as constitutional rights 
are decisively modified by the steel companies in western 
Pennsylvania and the " modifications " are for the purpose of 
defeating labor organization. 

During the strike violations of personal rights and personal 
liberty were wholesale ; men were arrested without warrants, 
imprisoned without charges, their homes invaded without 
legal process, magistrates' verdicts were rendered frankly on 
the basis of whether the striker would go back to work or 
not. But even these things would seem to be less a concern 
to the nation at large than the degradation, persistent and 
approved by " public opinion," of civil liberties in behalf of 
private concerns' industrial practices. 

To the steel workers the import of the violations of civil 
and personal rights resulted as follows : 

Great numbers of workers came to believe — 

that local mayors, magistrates and police officials try to 
break strikes; 

that state and Federal officials, particularly the Federal 
Department of Justice, help to break strikes, and that 
armed forces are used for this purpose ; 
that most newspapers actively and promptly exert a strike- 
breaking influence ; most churches passively. 

Workers generally attributed such strike breaking to the 
men filling the offices rather than to the Governmental and 
social institutions per se. 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 239 

The above beliefs were undoubtedly widespread among 
steel workers ; many expressed the beliefs with ferocity; many 
more in a dumb, deep-seated suspiciousness of everything and 
everybody connected with public executives, courts, Federal 
agents, army officers, reporters or clergy. The steel strike 
made tens of thousands of citizen^ helieve that our American 
institutions are not democratic or not democratically admin- 
istered. 

The basis of such beliefs (detailed in sub-reports) will 
be hastily summarized here. The data concern chiefly west- 
ern Pennsylvania, secondarily Indiana and Illinois. 

Local magistrates, police authorities, etc., around Pitts- 
burgh were very frequently steel mill officials or relations 
of mill officials. In other cases steel mill officials exercised 
police authority without the excuse of having been previously 
elected to public office. Por example, besides Sheriff Had- 
dock of Allegheny County whose brother was superintendent 
of an American Sheet & Tin Plate plant (Corporation sub- 
sidiary), Mayor Crawford of Duquesne was the brother of 
the President of the McKeesport Tin Plate Co.; President 
Moon of the Borough Council of Homestead was chief of the 
mechanical department of the Homestead mill ; Burgess Lin- 
coln of Munhall was a department superintendent in the same 
mill. The Burgess of Clairton was a mill official; etc., etc. 
When a striker was taken before mill-official public-officials 
he was likely to suspect connections between his fate and the 
steel company's desires. In many other cases officials of 
mills only, personally, gave the orders for arrests, and the 
decisions as to whether the arrested should be jailed or not, 
generally after learning whether the striker would return to 
work or not. 

The charges on which strikers were arraigned before local 
magistrates, then imprisoned or fined, were often never 
recorded and never learned by the prisoners. Recorded 



240 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

formal specifications included " stopping men from going to 
work/' " cursing" (the state police or deputies), " abusing/' 
" refusing to obey orders " (to move on, etc.), " going out of 
his house before daylight," " laughing at the police," " throw- 
ing strike cards out on the street," *" smiling at the state 
police." Eines ran from $10 to $50 or $60. Imprisonment 
terms ran up to months. Arrested men were frequently 
taken, not to jail, but inside the steel mill and held there. 
The charges of beatings, clubbings, often substantiated by 
doctors' and eye-witnesses' affidavits, were endless and 
monotonous; in most communities the only public official to 
appeal to turned out to be another mill official. 

Federal officials' active intervention concerned chiefly (1) 
the Department of Justice, whose connections with steel com- 
pany " under-cover men " were referred to earlier, and whose 
public activities dealt with raids in search of " reds " and 
Attorney General Palmer's statements about " reds " in the 
steel strike; and (2) the U. S. Army. Both cases contrib- 
uted to steel workers' beliefs about strike-breaking activities. 
The Administration left the field to the Department of Justice 
and the Army, so far as the steel workers could see. Con- 
gressional intervention in the shape of the investigation and 
report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Education filled 
the strikers with a bitterness only to be understood by de- 
tailed comparison of the Committee's report and the facts. 

The principal use of armed forces outside of Pennsylvania 
was at Gary, Ind., occupied first by the State militia, then by 
the U. S. Army under General Leonard Wood. Previous to 
these occupations newspapers throughout the country printed 
stories of " bloody riots " in Gary and that the city was a 
" hotbed of reds." The facts were as follows : 

The walkout on September 22 at Gary was almost com- 
plete. Agreements, subject to various disputes over interpre- 
tation, were reached with the city authorities concerning 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 241 

picket line rules. Huge mass-meetings were held in the open 
air. The strikers made frequent complaints of violent raids 
carried out by bands of citizens calling themselves " Loyal 
American Leaguers " who were charged with clubbing groups 
of strikers on street corners at nights. A crowd of strikers 
leaving a mass-meeting tried to pull a negro strike breaker off 
a street car : the negro was slightly injured and a number of 
strikers were clubbed. On this case of " mob violence/' the 
only one alleged, Indiana state guards were sent in. Parades 
were forbidden. Ex-service men among the strikers, inde- 
pendently of the strike leadership, put on their old army 
uniforms and started a march to exhibit the uniforms to the 
guardsmen. There were about two hundred of these ex- 
soldiers and about ten thousand strikers in the streets fell 
in behind the procession which wound through the town in 
disregard of the guardsmen and quietly disbanded in the 
park where meetings were held. On this second case of 
" mob violence," known as the " outlaw parade," the U. S. 
regulars occupied Gary, with General Wood in personal 
charge, proclaiming martial law. The regulars were 
equipped with bayonets and steel helmets and the force in- 
cluded many trucks mounting machine guns and bringing 
field artillery. 

General Wood declared that "the army would be neutral." 
He established rules in regard to picketing. These rules 
were so interpreted and carried out as to result in breaking up 
the picket line. One picket, for example, would be permitted 
at a certain spot ; if the striker who came up to relieve the 
picket stopped to converse with him and to receive reports 
and instructions, both strikers would be arrested. Delays and 
difficulties would attend the release of these men from jail 
or " bull pen." The picket line thus dwindled and its dis- 
appearance signalled to the Gary workers that the strike was 
breaking. Army officers sent soldiers to arrest union officers 



242 EEPOKT ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

in other trades, for example, for threatening to call a strike 
on a local building operation. Workers throughout the city 
believed that the Federal Government opposed them and that 
the regulars would stay as long as the steel workers remained 
on strike. The army was not withdrawn until the strike was 
declared off. 

The maintenance of the Steel Corporation's non-union 
policy in Gary, therefore, entailed the use of the Federal 
army and the expenditure of public money with results which 
helped to break the strike. 

The feeling of the steel workers, then, might be summed up 
thus: that local and national government not only was not 
their government (i.e. in their behalf) but was government in 
behalf of interests opposing theirs ; that in strike times govern- 
ment activities tended to break strikes. So far the steel 
workers' suspicions concern the administrators, rather than 
the institutions, of government. 

Finally the press in most communities, and particularly 
in Pittsburgh, led the workers there to the belief that the 
press lends itself instantly and persistently to strike breaking. 
They believed that the press immediately took sides, printed 
only the news favoring that side, suppressed or colored its 
records, printed advertisements and editorials urging the 
strikers to go back, denounced the strikers and incessantly 
misrepresented the facts. All this was found to be true in 
the case of the Pittsburgh papers (as analyzed in a sub- 
report). Foreign language papers largely followed the lead 
of the English papers. The average American-born discrimi- 
nating citizen of Pittsburgh could not have obtained from his 
papers sufficient information to get a true conception of the 
strike ; basic information was not in those papers. The steel 
worker-reader, moreover, gave attention not only to the omis- 
sions of the press but to commissions plainly directed against 
the strike. In the minds of workingmen outside steel areas 



SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 243 

the newspapers' handling of the steel strike added weight to 
the conviction that the press of the country is not the work- 
ingmen's press. 

The pulpit as carefully analyzed in the Pittsburgh district 
proved itself largely dependent on the press. The sub-report 
finds that a fair and comprehensive history of the strike 
would not require mention of either the Protestant Church or 
Catholic Church as organizations in Allegheny County. In 
one or two communities individual clergymen were the 
heart of either the support of the strike or of the opposition 
to it. Research among clergymen revealed a large minority 
deeply suspicious of the newspaper version of the strike but 
ineffective for organizing concerted action, even for purposes 
of self-information. The workers' attitude to the church 
followed mainly these few individuals, deeming the church 
another strike breaker where some clergyman preached or 
wrote against the strike or where another gift to a local 
church by a steel company became public, or deeming it a 
comfort at least, where some clergyman worked for the 
strike. The great mass of steel workers paid no heed to the 
church as a social organization. 

This difference in workers' attitudes to press and to pulpit 
was noted: after the strike workers generally were making 
no effort to make the church their church; but workers in 
many sections of the nation, in steel towns and out, redoubled 
efforts to set up their own press and inaugurated their own 
federated news service. 

To sum up the social consequences of a non-union labor 
policy, especially that of the Steel Corporation, is plainly 
difficult; the manifestations were so wide and so various. 
The Corporation's policy dominated the industry. The in- 
dustry's practise entailed discharge for unionism, coercion, 
espionage, the use of under-cover men and strike-breaking 
detective agencies. Maintenance of the industry's practise 



2U EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

changed the complexion of governmental and social institu- 
tions. In the eyes of the strikers and a host of their fellow- 
workingmen these changed governmental and social institu- 
tions tended, in greater or less degree, more or less promptly, 
to strike breaking. In the eyes of less interested observers 
the facts at least raised the questions : 

Whether there is any influence at present more powerful in 
American civilization than the influence of great industrial cor- 
porations or trusts? 

Whether any single influence works more effectively on our 
national life than the non-union policy of our greatest Cor- 
poration for vicious or beneficial results ? 

For the great part of the country's beaten steel strikers the 
answer was over-simplified. The steel worker went back to 
the twelve-hour day, earnings under a living wage, ruthlessly 
arbitrary anti-organization control. For escape he had 
turned to the A. F. of L. and in 1920 the A. F. of L. was 
not succeeding in freeing him. He hesitated to turn to the 
I.W.W., for the I.W.W. was "outlawed." He could not 
turn to the Steel Corporation or the other great companies for 
they were standing pat. He did not turn to the press. 
Among American democratic institutions he found none to 
fit his need, no Federal body or machinery for acting on his 
case nor even any governmental institution of inquiry, which 
in 1920 was reaching out to learn his grievances. 

The beaten steel worker displayed little interest in govern- 
mental institutions ; instead he had acquired a rather active 
distrust of them. While many of the " foreigners " began 
piling up money to get themselves out of America the great 
majority began waiting for " the next strike." That was the 
only resource thoughtfully provided for them among the 
democratic American institutions. 



CONCLUDING 

The Summarized Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Report have been transferred for convenience to pages 11-19 
in Chapter I (Introduction) from the end of the book, where 
they belong naturally, inasmuch as they were formulated 
after all the foregoing analyses and discussion had been 
drafted. 

The gist of the Conclusions is that conditions in the steel 
industry "gave the workers just cause for complaint and 
for action " and that " these unredressed grievances still 
exist." 

The gist of the Eecommendations is that the Federal Gov- 
ernment set up a commission for the industry, in order to 
initiate free, open conference between those who must always 
be chiefly responsible for settlement of the industry's prob- 
lems: — its owners and its workers. To this is added recom- 
mendation for persistent investigation and publicity. 

In pursuit of its recommendations and in concluding its 
immediate task, the Commission put this report before the 
American people and the American people's government, in 
the person of President Wilson. The action of the Commis- 
sion virtually raised this question of fundamental impor- 
tance : 

Is the nation helpless before conditions in a basic industry 
which promise a future crisis ? Can our democratic society 
be moved to do industrial justice without the pressure of 
crisis itself? 

As a part of the task of publishing the facts and as a 
means of expressing their judgment as Christians, the Com- 
missioners requested a committee to draw up, for separate 
free distribution, if possible, a compact form of General 

245 



246 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

Findings based on the Conclusions of the Eeport. Necessar- 
ily they are in part repetitious, but they were designed to in- 
clude expressions of moral judgment, such as were not the 
first concern of the Eeport. A sub-committee, of which Dr. 
Alva W. Taylor was chairman, drafted these findings, which 
were presented to the Executive Committee of the Inter- 
church Movement with the Eeport on May 10, 1920, as 
adopted by the Commission. 



,, 



FINDINGS 



The fundamental grievances were found to be: 

(a) Excessive hours. 

(b) The " boss system." 

(c) No right to organize or to representation. 

2. The remedies desired were: 

(a) Shorter day and week with a living wage. 

(b) Represent ation and conference^ and an end to the 
"boss system " which so often subjects common 
labor to petty tyrannies. 

(c) Right to unionize and a substitution of industrial 
democracy for industrial autocracy. 

3. These grievances were of long standings but had found no 
expression because: 

(a) They were limited largely to foreigners of many 
races and languages without industrial tradition, 
education or leadership to organize. 

(b) Race prejudice effectually kept the more skilled, 
more intelligent and better paid American workmen 
from taking up the cause of the foreign-speaking 
workmen. 

(c) Labor unions have been accustomed to look upon the 
foreigner as an actual or potential strike breaker. 

'(d) The steel companies have most effectually deterred 
men from joining labor organizations. 

4. These long-standing grievances were brought to expres- 
sion by: 



CONCLUDING 247 

(a) The part these workingrnen played in the war and 
the treatment afforded them for the sake of war 
production which gave them a new sense of worth 
and independence. 

(b) The fight for democracy and news of a larger work- 
ingmen's freedom in their native lands together with 
a growing sense of real Americanism, which brought 
a spirit of democracy to their ranks. 

(c) The decision of the American Federation of Labor 
to organize them and its actual work of organizing 
them into Craft Unions. 

We found: 

(a) That the strike was regularly conducted in orthodox 
fashion according to the A. F. of L. rules and 
principles. 

(b) That while radicals sympathized with the strikers, 
as was natural, they were effectually debarred by 
the strike leaders and that far from having influence 
in it, they often denounced and opposed those who 
conducted the strike. 

We find the grievances to have been real : 

(a) The average week of 68.7 hours, the twelve-hour 
day, whether on a straight twelve-hour shift or on 
a broken division of 11-13 or 10-14 hours, the un- 
broken 24-hour work period at the turn of a shift 
and the underpayment of unskilled labor, are all 
inhuman. 

(b) It is entirely practicable to put all processes requir- 
ing continuous operation on a straight eight-hour 
basis as is illustrated by the Colorado Fuel and Iron 
Company. These processes require the services of 
only a fraction of the workers. 

(c) The "boss system" is bad, the plant organization 
is military and the control autocratic. The com- 
panies' claims, that they accord the right to join 
unions and the opportunity of conference, are 
theoretical; neither is allowed in practice. 

(d) The use of " under-cover " men is severely con- 
demned. It breeds distrust, breaks down morals and 



248 EEPOET ON THE STEEL STEIKE 

stimulates ill-will; it is undemocratic and un- 
American. 
(e) The refusal of the United States Steel Corporation 
to confer, to accept mediation and its attitude of 
hauteur as shown by its refusal to follow the recom- 
mendations of the War Labor Board incited labor 
strife and because of the strength and influence of 
this Corporation, forms one of the greatest obstacles 
to a just settlement of industrial grievances and 
unrest at this time. 

7. The Strike was defeated by : 

(a) The strike-breaking methods of the steel companies 
and their effective mobilization of public opinion 
against the strikers through the charges of radical- 
ism, bolshevism, and the closed shop, none of which 
were justified by the facts; and by the suppression 
of civil rights. 

(b) The hostility of the press giving biased and colored 
news and the silence of both press and pulpit on the 
actual question of justice involved; which attitudes 
of press and pulpit helped to break the strikers' 
morale. 

(c) Public fear of a general labor war, to the coincidence 
of the coal strike and threat of the railroad strike, 
together with labor's failure to formulate and ex- 
plain its purposes with regard to public service. 

(d) The prevailing prejudice in the steel towns and in 
the general public mind and among the English- 
speaking workingmen against the foreigners who 
constituted the overwhelming number of the strikers. 

(e) The ineffective support given the strike by most of 
the twenty-four affiliated Craft Unions through 
which it was organized, and by the A. F. of L. 

8. Eecommendations : 

1. The adoption of the eight-hour shift on all contin- 
uous processes. 

2. Limiting of the day to not more than ten hours on 
duty, with not more than a six-day and a fifty-four 
hour week, with at least a minimum comfort wage. 



CONCLUDING 249 

3. Kecognition of right to join regular Craft Unions 
or any other freely chosen form of labor organiza- 
tion; recognition of right to open conference, either 
through shop committees or union representatives; 
recognition of right of collective bargaining. 

4. A vast extension of house building — by the com- 
munities where possible; by the steel companies 
where community building is inadequate or im- 
possible. 

5. That organized labor: 

(a) Democratize and control the unions, es- 
pecially in regard to the calling, conduct 
and settlement of strikes. 

(b) Eeorganize unions with a view of sharing in 
responsibility for production and in control 
of production processes ; to this end : 

1. Eepudiating restriction of production 
as a doctrine. 

2. Formulating contracts which can be 
lived up to. 

3. Finding a substitute for the closed 
shop wherever it is a union practice. 

'(c) Scrupulously avoid all advocates of violence, 
(d) Accept all possible proffers of publicity and 

conciliation. 
'(e) Promote Americanization in all possible 

ways and insist upon an American standard 

of living for all workingmen. 

(f) Prepare more adequate technical informa- 
tion for the public in regard to all condi- 
tions bearing upon the calling and the con- 
duct of a strike. 

(g) Seek alliance and council from the salaried 
class known as brain workers. 

6. That the President's Industrial Conference's plan 
for standing tribunals of conciliation and publicity 
be given a fair trial. We believe that the most ef- 
fective step to be taken for the obtaining of justice 
in a strike situation is through publicity, concilia^ 
tion and a voluntary system of arbitration; and as 
a beginning we recommend the fullest publication 



250 REPORT ON THE STEEL STRIKE 

of these findings and of our more complete reports. 

7. That minimum wage commissions be established 
and laws enacted providing for an American stan- 
dard of living through the labor of the natural 
bread-winner permitting the mother to keep up a 
good home and the children to obtain at least a 
high school education. 

8. That the Federal Government investigate the re- 
lations of Federal authorities to ^private corpora- 
tions' " under-cover " men and to "labor detective 
agencies." 

9. That the eight-hour day be accepted by labor, capi- 
tal and the public as the immediate goal for the 
working day and that government provide by law 
against working days that bring over-fatigue and de- 
prive the individual, his home and his community of 
that minimum of time which gives him an oppor- 
tunity to discharge all his obligations as a social 
being in a democratic society. 



We recommend to the press that it free itself of the all too 
well founded charge of bias, favoring capital as against labor 
and redeem its power as a promoter of truth and a formulator of 
public opinion by searching out all the facts in regard to indus- 
trial questions and publishing them without fear or favor. 

We plead with the pulpit that it be diligent to discharge its 
legitimate prophetic role as an advocate of justice, righteousness 
and humanity in all such conflicts of human interest as those 
involved in industrial strife. 

We condemn unsparingly those authorities who suspended the 
right of free speech and peaceful assemblage before, during and 
after the steel strike. 

We recommend that the Industrial Department of the Inter- 
church World Movement and the Social Service Commission of 
the Federal Council of Churches continue this type of impartial 
investigation of industrial strife and unrest and extend it to 
studies of general conditions in industry affecting the life, peace, 
and welfare of all concerned and that their findings be published 



CONCLUDING 251 

as a means of enlightening public opinion, begetting impartial 
judgment, and promoting industrial justice and peace. 

Conclusion. 

All the conditions that caused the steel strike continue to 
exist. We feel that unless changes are made approximating in 
some degree the findings here presented, further unrest is in- 
evitable and another strike must come. In the measure that 
workingmen become intelligent and Americanized, will they 
Tefuse to labor under such conditions. 



APPENDICES 



Appendix A 

MINIMUM OF SUBSISTENCE AND 
MINIMUM COMFORT BUDGET 

From report made for this Inquiry by the Bureau of Applied 
Economics, Washington, D. C. (November, 1919.) 

Various students of the subject have endeavored to establish 
the amount of income necessary to support a family in health and 
decency. In doing so several budget levels of living have been 
analyzed. The two most clearly distinguished are : 

1. The Minimum of Subsistence Level. This level is based 
essentially on animal well being with little or no attention to 
the comforts or social demands of human beings. 

2. The Minimum of Comfort Level. This represents a level 
somewhat above that of mere animal subsistence and provides in 
some measure for comfortable clothing, insurance, a modest 
amount of recreation, etc. This level provides for health and 
decency but for very few comforts, and is probably much below 
the idea had in mind in the frequent but indefinite expression 
"The American Standard of Living." 

All of the studies have taken as a basis a family of five — 
husband, wife and three children. This is done (1) because 
the average American family is of this size and (2) because it 
is necessary that marriage should be practically universal and 
result in a minimum of three children of the race is to perpetuate 
itself. 

The results of the various studies are closely similar and 
indicate that the annual cost of maintaining a family of five at 
a minimum of subsistence level at prices prevailing in the latter 
part of 1919 was approximately $1,575. This would be equiv- 
alent in purchasing power to approximately $885 in 1914. 

The cost of maintaining the minimum of comfort level has 
not been so thoroughly studied. Prof. Ogburn's estimate as of 

255 



256 APPENDICES 

June, 1918, was $1,760. With an increase of 15 per cent, in 
living costs since that time the cost of this budget would now be 
approximately $2,000. This sum would be equivalent in pur- 
chasing power to approximately $1,125 in 1914. Prof. Ogburn's 
conclusions may be taken as a conservative minimum, as it is 
much below the estimate recently put forth by the U. S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics as to the cost of maintaining a government 
employee's family in Washington at a level of health and decency. 
This budget, at August, 1919, prices, cost $2,262. 

All of the studies referred to dealt with larger Eastern cities, 
chiefly New York. The costs would, therefore, not be strictly 
applicable to all cities and towns of the country. The differences, 
however, except in a few exceptional cases, would not be very 
great. 

A more detailed analysis of these studies is made in the fol- 
lowing paragraphs: 



1. THE COST OF A MINIMUM OF SUBSISTENCE BUDGET. 

Professor W. F. Ogburn, of Columbia University, and one of 
the best known authorities on cost of living, in a recently pub- 
lished article made a very careful analysis of all preceding 
studies of minimum of subsistence levels and also submits a 
carefully prepared budget of his own. 1 Professor Ogburn's 
calculations are all based on prices prevailing in June, 1918. 
Prices between that time and the Autumn of 1919 have advanced 
about 15 per cent., and these changes, of course, would have to 
be taken into consideration in arriving at the cost of the budgets 
at the present time. In order, however, to make the reasoning 
entirely clear the details of the various studies are first sum- 
marized from Professor Ogburn's article. 

1 Published in " Standards of Living," Bureau of Applied Economies, 
Washington, 1919. 



APPENDICES 257 

(a) Professor Ogbum's Budget 

Food $615 

Clothing : 

Man 76 

Woman 55 

11 to 14 years 40 

7 to 10 years 33 

4 to 6 years 30 

Rent 180 

Fuel and light 62 

Insurance 40 

Organizations 12 

Eeligion 7 

Street-car fare 40 

Paper, books, etc 9 

Amusements, drinks, and tobacco 50 

Sickness 60 

Dentist, occulist, glasses, etc 3 

Furnishings 35 

Laundry 4 

Cleaning supplies 15 

Miscellaneous 20 

Total $1,386 

This budget is for a large eastern city and is the result of 
studies of 600 actual budgets of shipyard workers in the New 
York shipbuilding district. 

(b) Professor Chapin's Budget Brought Up to Date 

Another way of estimating a minimum budget for the Amer- 
ican subsistence level in 1918 is to take minimum budgets of 
past years that have been accepted as standard and apply the 
increases from the date of the budget to the present time in 
the prices of the various items of the budget, thus bringing them 
up to date. This method assumes no change in minimum 
standards. It is of course subject to possible inaccuracies in 
measuring the rising cost of living between specific dates for 
specific places. This inaccuracy is thought to be slight, however. 

For instance, one of the most famous and perhaps most gen- 
erally accepted budget estimates is that of Prof. Chapin, who 
made a study lasting several years of New York families, pub- 
lishing his result in 1907. He said, "An income under $800 
is not enough to permit the maintenance of a normal standard. 
An income of $900 or over probably permits the maintenance 



258 APPENDICES 

of a normal standard at least as far as the physical man is 
concerned." If we take the increase in the cost of living from 
1907 to June, 1918, to be 55 per cent., then Chapin's $900 be- 
comes $1,395. If we take the increase to be 60 per cent, then 
Chapin's $900 becomes $1,440. Probably the best estimates of 
increasing cost of living place the increase from January 1, 1915, 
to June 1, 1918, as 55 per cent. 

(c) Minimum Budget of New YorJc Factory Commission 
Brought Up to Date 

In 1915 the New York State Factory Investigation Com- 
mission set a minimum budget for 1914 in New York City 
at the figure $876. Applying increases in items of the budget 
by classes from January 1, 1915, to June 1, 1918, we get, as 
seen from the following table, a budget of $1,356. 

Budget Increase in cost New York Factory 

New York Factory of living to Budget Brought 

Commission 1914 June 1, 1918 Up to Date 
Per cent. 

Food $325 65 $536 

Rent 200 29 258 

Fuel and light 20 44 28 

Clothing 140 76 246 

Sundries 191 51 288 



$1,356 



MINIMUM BUDGET OF THE NEW YORK FACTORY INVESTI- 
GATING COMMISSION, 1915 

Estimate of Cost of Living of Normal Family of Five in New York City 

Food $325.00 

Rent 200.00 

Fuel and light 20.00 

Clothing 140.00 

Car fare 31.20 

Insurance : 

Man 20.00 

Family 15.60 

Health 22.00 

Furnishings 7.00 

Education, newspaper 5.63 

Recreation and amusement 50.00 

Miscellaneous 40.00 



Total $876.43 



APPENDICES 259 

(d)' Minimum Budget of New York Board of Estimate 
Brought Up to Date 

In February, 1915, the Bureau of Personal Service of the 
Board of Estimate and Apportionment of New York City made a 
minimum budget estimate for an unskilled laborer's family in 
New York City of $845. Applying increases in items of the 
budget by classes from January 1, 1915, to June 1, 1918, we 
get, as seen from the following table, a budget of $1,317. 

Budget Increase in New York Board 

New York Board cost of living to of Estimate Budget 

of Estimate, 1915 June 1, 1918 Brought Up to Date 
Per cent. 

Food $384 65 $634 

Rent 168 29 217 

Fuel and light .... 43 44 62 

Clothing 104 76 183 

Sundries 146 51 221 



Total $845 $1,317 

It is possible to criticize this budget as being too low in 
allowances for health, furniture, and education, and very low 
indeed in other sundries. 

BUDGET OF NEW YORK BOARD OF ESTIMATE FOR 1915 

Housing $168.00 

Car fare 30.30 

Food 383.81 

Clothing 104.20 

Fuel and light 42.75 

Health 20.00 

Insurance 22.88 

Papers and other reading matter 5.00 

Recreation 40.00 

Furniture, utensils, fixtures, moving expenses, etc 18.00 

Church dues 5.00 

Incidentals — soap, washing material, stamps, etc 5.00 



Total $844.94 

(e) Estimating the Budget from Food Expenditure 

It is generally accepted that a man at moderate physical labor 
needs 3,500 calories a day and Atwater has estimated the needs 
of the individual members of his family in per cents of his needs. 
Thus his wife consumes 0.8 as much; a boy of 16 years of 



260 APPENDICES 

age, 0.9 as much; a girl 15 to 16, 0.8; a child from 6 to 9 
years, 0.5; and so on. We thus express a family in terms of 
adult males. We say that a family of five — man, wife, and three 
children — will equal 3.3 adult males when the children are at 
a certain age. 

The average food budget of 600 families of shipyard workers 
in the New York district collected by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics was found to cost $607 for 3.6 equivalent adult males. 
This was submitted to calory analysis and yielded 3,115 calories 
of energy for man per day, not including any waste. This 
means that $607 did not furnish enough food for the New York 
families. A food expert might have bought the necessary 
amount, but the families in actual practice did not. 

Dietaries should be well balanced also, but this analysis was 
not undertaken. So the important conclusion results that in 
the New York shipbuilding area $607 is not enough of an 
allowance for food. 

Prof. Chapin's study shows that at the point where the 
families cease to be undernourished, food is 44 per cent, of 
the total budget. Now, if the low figure of $615 is taken as 
the food allowance for a family of 3.3 or 3.4 equivalent adult 
males and estimated at 44 per cent, of the budget, we get a 
minimum budget of $1,396. 

Summary of Estimates on Minimum Budgets for American 
Subsistence Level in 1918 

From three angles, therefore, an estimate may be formed of 
a minimum budget: (1) from study of actual budgets, (2) 
from applying increased costs of living to recognized standard 
budgets, (3) from estimates of adequate food allowance and its 
percentage of expenditures. 

These estimates for New York district in 1918 are as follows : 

1. Prof. Ogburn's detailed budget from family studies $1,386 

2. Chapin's budget brought to date . . _ 1,395 

New York Factory Investigation Commissions' Budget 

brought to date 1,356 

New York Board of Estimate budget brought to date 1,317 

3. From food allowance 1,396 



APPENDICES 261 

The Above Studies Brought Up to 1919 

The above estimates were all made as of June, 1918, or, if 
made at an earlier date, were brought up only to that date in 
Professor Ogburn's analysis. Between June, 1918, and the 
present time (i.e. the latter part of 1919) figures compiled by 
the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show an increase of 
about 15 per cent, in general cost of living. Applying this 
percentage increase to the figures compiled by Professor 
Ogburn in the preceding table, the following results are ob- 
tained : 

VARIOUS AUTHORITATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE ANNUAL COST 
OF MAINTAINING A FAMILY AT A MINIMUM OF SUB- 
SISTENCE LEVEL, BROUGHT UP TO AUGUST, 1919 

June August 
1918 1919 

Ogburn's Budget $1,386 $1,594 

Chapin's Budget 1,395 1,604 

New York Factory Investigation Commission 1,356 1,559 

New York Board of Estimate Budget 1,317 1,515 

Budget compiled from food allowance 1,396 1,605 

Average of all five estimate $1,370 $1,575 

Inasmuch as these various estimates are so closely similar, the 
average of the five — namely $1,575 — may be taken as the ap- 
proximate amount necessary to maintain a family of five at a 
minimum of subsistence level at prices prevailing in the latter 
part of 1919. 

2. THE COST OF A MINIMUM OF COMFORT BUDGET 

(a) Professor Ogburn's Budget 

Professor W. F. Ogburn prepared in 1918, for the consid- 
eration of the National War Labor Board and of Judge Samuel 
Alschuler, arbitrator in the Chicago Packing house industries, 
a budget for an average workingman's family of five which 
would include not only subsistence requirements but a minimum 
of comfort and recreation. The cost of this budget was placed 
at $1,760. This was at prices prevailing in June, 1918. Since 



262 APPENDICES 

that date the cost of living, as ahove noted, has increased 15 
per cent. This would make the present cost of the budget 
$2,024. By major items, this budget was distributed as fol- 
lows: 

Cost June Cost August 
1918 1919 

Food $625.00 

Clothing 313.50 

Rent, fuel and light 295.00 

Sundries 527.00 

Total $1,760.50 $2,024.00 

(b) U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Budget for 
Government Employee's Family 

The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has just published, 
after very considerable investigation, a quantity and cost budget 
for a Government employee's family in Washington, D. C. 
The budget level aimed at is one of health and decency — that 
is to say — a level at which the family will have just enough 
to maintain itself in health and decency, but with none of the 
"trimmings" and very few of the comforts of life. This 
budget had in mind primarily the clerical employee, but except 
possibly in the matter of clothes there seems no reason why the 
level of a clerical worker should be more costly than that of a 
mechanic or laborer. On the other hand, Washington prices 
were undoubtedly above the average for the country as a whole. 

This budget, at August, 1919, prices, cost $2,262. The dis- 
tribution of its principal items is shown in the following table : 

SUMMARY OF BUDGET 

Cost of Quantity Budget at Market Prices 

I. Food $773.93 

II. Clothing: 

Husband $121.16 

Wife 166.46 

Boy ( 11 years) 96.60 

Girl (5 years) 82.50 

Boy (2 years) 47.00 513.72 

III. Housing, fuel and light 428.00 

IV. Miscellaneous 546.82 

Total budget at market prices $2,262.47, 



APPENDICES 263 

Possible saving upon market cost by a family of extreme 
thrift, of high intelligence, great industry in shopping, 
good fortune in purchasing at lowest prices, and in which 
the wife is able to do a maximum amount of home work. 

I. Food (7l/ 2 per cent.) $58.04 

II. Clothing ( 10 per cent. ) 51.37 

III. Housing 30.00 

IV. Miscellaneous 97.50 

Total economies 236.91 

Total budget minus economies $2,025.56 

Savings. — No provision is made in this budget for savings, 
other than the original cost of household furniture and equip- 
ment, which would^ average about $1,000 in value. No definite 
estimate, of course, can be made as to the amount which a low- 
salaried Government employee should be expected to save. But 
an average saving of 12% per cent, of yearly salary during an 
employee's single and early married life would seem to be the 
maximum which could be expected. Over a period of, say, 15 
years this would result in a total accumulation of about $2,000. 
Assuming $1,000 of this to be invested in household equipment, 
there would be a net sum of $1,000 available for investment 
in a home or in other direct income-producing form. In any 
case, it would represent an annual income of approximately $50 
per year. 

Recognizing the high prices prevailing in Washington, and 
recognizing also that the Government employee's family may 
have certain necessary expenses not falling upon the working- 
mian's family, it would seem that the fact that this budget cost 
$2,662 would tend to confirm the $2,000 minimum comfort 
budget of Professor Ogburn as conservative for workingmen's 
families generally in the country as a whole. 



Appendix B 

iWAGES IN IRON AND STEEL AND OTHER 
INDUSTRIES 

From report made for this inquiry by the Bureau of Applied 

Economics, Washington, D. C. 
I 

Information regarding hourly earnings and full time hours 

per week in the iron and steel industry is presented in consid- 
erable detail in an article in the Monthly Labor Review of the 
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for October, 1919. Similar 
information of recent date is not available for many other in- 
dustries, but there is sufficient to make possible a valuable com- 
parison of earnings and hours of labor in the steel industry 
with conditions in other lines of employment. 

The data presented below are divided into four groups: 

1. WAGES AND HOURS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY COMPARED WITH 
OTHER INDUSTRIES, EOR THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE 

The following table gives the hourly earnings, full time hours 
per week and full time earnings per week, for specified classes 
of labor in the steel industry and in all other important indus- 
tries for which information in comparable form is available. 
All figures are for 1919, and, with few exceptions, for the latter 
part of 1919. The sources of the information are given on a 
later page. 

The full time hours per week, it is important to note, are 
the regular weekly working hours for the occupation. The 
actual hours worked by individuals and, in consequence, their 
weekly earnings may be considerably less. 

264 



APPENDICES 



265 



AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS AND HOURS PER FULL TIME 
WEEK IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIES 

Average Full Time Earnings 

Hourly Hours per Full 

Rate per Week Week 
IRON AND STEEL 

All employees 68.1 68.7 $46.78 

Common labor 46.2 74.0 34.19 

Other labor (including skilled and 

semi-skilled ) 78.4 66.0 51.74 

MINING 

1. Anthracite: 

Company miners 58.1 51.6 29.98 

Contract miners 84.2 51.6 43.45 

Company miners' laborers 52.6 51.6 27.14 

Contract miners' laborers 63.9 51.6 32.97 

Laborers 51.9 52.2 26.90 

Average for all inside occupations . . 67.3 52.0 35.00 

2. Bituminous : 

Miners, hand 78.4 47.3 37.08 

Miners, machine 94.7 48.1 45.55 

Loaders 80.2 47.4 38.01 

Laborers 57.5 52.0 29.90 

Average for all inside occupations . . 74.4 51.9 38.42 

UNITED STATES ARSENALS: 

Common labor 46.0 4.80 22.08 

All other employees, average 76.1 48.0 36.53 

BUILDING TRADES: 

Average for all building trades .... 85.4 44.0 37.58 

Common labor 52.0 44.0 22.88 

Bricklayers 89.3 44.2 39.47 

Carpenters 78.2 44.2 34.56 

Cement workers and finishers 80.8 44.9 36.28 

Wiremen, inside 79.9 44.3 35.40 

Painters 76.2 42.8 32.61 

Plasterers 89.5 43.6 39.02 

Plumbers , 92.4 44.0 40.66 

Sheet-metal workers 80.9 44.0 35.60 

Steam fitters 92.8 44.0 40.83 

Structural iron workers 94.2 44.0 41.45 

New York, N. Y. 

Average for all building trades 83.5 44.0 36.74 

NAVY YARDS: 

Laborers, common 44.5 48.0 21.36 

All other occupations 79.9 48.0 38.35 

Boilermakers > 80.0 48.0 38.40 

Coppersmiths 86.0 48 41.28 

Electricians 80.0 48.0 38.40 

Machinists 80.0 48.0 38.40 

Machinists, electrical 80.0 48.0 38.40 

Mulders 80.0 48.0 38.40 

Patternmakers 86.6 48.0 41.57 

Pipefitters 80.0 48.0 38.40 



266 



APPENDICES 



Average 
Hourly 

NAVY YARDS {cont.) : Rate 

Plumbers 80.0 

Riveters 80.0 

Shipfitters 80.0 

Shipsmiths 80.0 

Toolmakers 86.0 

Holders-on 60.6 

PRINTERS: Various Cities. 
Linotype Operators 

Newspapers, day - 

Book and job 

Compositors 

Newspapers, day 

Book and job .._.., 

RAILROAD EMPLOYEES: 

Shopmen 

Machinists 72.0 

Blacksmiths 72.0 

Boilermakers 72.0 

Road freight 

Engineers and motormen 82.5 

Firemen 60.0 

Conductors 69.2 

Road passenger 

Engineers and motormen 98.7 

Firemen 88.0 

Conductors 83.3 

Yard Service 

Firemen 52.0 

Hostlers 53.1 

Laborers 

Mechanics' helpers and apprentices 47.1 

Section men 37.2 

Levermen 49.6 

Yard switch tenders 34.7 

Other yard employees 37.4 

Enginehouse men 42.3 

Other unskilled laborers 41.3 

SHIPYARDS: 

Pacific Coast District 

Laborers 52.0 

Other occupations 75.8 

Atlantic Coast District 

Laborers 36.0 

All occupations (including laborers) 72.7 

STREET RAILWAY EMPLOYEES: 
Average for various cities 

North Atlantic 49.8 

South Atlantic 39.8 

North Central 49.6 

Western 49.4 

* 5 hours per day. 



Full Time Earnings 
Hours per Full 
per Week Week 



48.0 
48.0 
48.0 
48.0 
48.0 
48.0 



48.0 
48.0 
48.0 



48.0 



30.0 



48.0 
48.0 



38.40 
38.40 
38.40 
38.40 
41.28 
29.09 



35.72 
30.50 

35.59 
26.28 



34.56 
34.56 
34.56 



28.80 



26.40 



24.96 
25.49 



48.0 
48.0 


24.96 
36.38 


48.0 
48.0 


17.28 

34.90 


56.4 
56.4 
56.4 
56.4 


28.09 
22.45 

27.97 
27.86 



APPENDICES 267 



2. PITTSBURGH DISTRICT. WAGES AND HOURS OF LABOR IN THE 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY COMPARED WITH WAGES IN 
OTHER INDUSTRIES IN THE PITTSBURGH DISTRICT. 

The next table compares hourly earnings, full time hours per 
week, and full time weekly earnings in the iron and steel in- 
dustry with other industries in the Pittsburgh District for 
which information was available. As available information is 
not very extensive the comparison was necessarily limited, but 
is believed to be sufficient to indicate how wage rates and hours 
of employees in the steel industry compare with other lines of 
employment. 

Inasmuch as the primary comparison desired is one which will 
bring out the extent to which the relatively high full time weekly 
earnings in the steel industry may be due to long hours, there 
is added to a table a column showing how much would be 
earned by each group for 44 hours per week, at the prevailing 
hourly rates. In doing so, 44 hours is used as a base simply 
because a number of trades in the table were already working 
44 hours per week. For the purpose of the comparison, of 
course, it would make no difference what base were chosen. 

Again, it is important to emphasize that the weekly hours 
here presented are the regular full time hours per week of the 
occupation, not the actual hours worked by individuals. 



COMPARISON OF EARNINGS PER HOUR, REGULAR FULL TIME 
HOURS PER WEEK, AND EARNINGS PER FULL TIME WEEK 
IN VARIOUS INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS IN THE 
PITTSBURGH (PA.) DISTRICT 

Average Regular Earnings Earn- 
Hourly Hours per per Full ings for 
Rate Week Week 44 Hours 

per Week 
IRON AND STEEL: 

All employees , 72.8 74.2 54.02 32.03 

Common labor 48.0 77.8 37.34 21.12 

Other labor (including skilled 

and semi-skilled) 87.1 72.1 62.80 38.32 



268 



APPENDICES 



Average Eegular Earnings Earn- 
Hourly Hours per per Full ings for 
Eate Week Week 44 Hours 

per Week 
BITUMINOUS COAL MINING: 

Miners, hand 78.4 47.3 37.08 34.50 

Miners, machine 94.7 48.1 45.55 41.67 

Loaders 80.2 47.4 38.01 35.29 

Laborers 57.5 52.0 29.90 25.30 

Average for all inside occupa- 
tions 74.4 51.9 38.61 32.74 

METAL TEADES: 

Blacksmiths 70.0 48.0 33.60 30.80 

Boilermakers 66.0 50.0 33.00 29.04 

Molders, iron 75.0 48.0 36.00 33.00 

EAILEOAD EMPLOYEES: 

Shopmen 

Machinists . 72.0 48.0 34.56 31.68 

Blacksmiths 72.0 48.0 34.56 31.68 

Boilermakers 72.0 48.0 34.56 31.68 

Eoad freight 

Firemen 60.0 48.0 28.80 26.40 

BUILDING TEADES: 
Laborers 

Building laborers 50.0 

Hod carriers 70.0 

Plasterers' laborers 70.0 

Average for laborers 63.3 

Bricklayers 112.5 

Carpenters 90.0 

Cement finishers 82.5 

Granite cutters, inside 84.4 

Wiremen, inside 90.0 

Painters . . . * 87.5 

Plasterers 97.5 

Plumbers 93.8 

Sheet-metal workers 90.0 

Structural iron workers 100.0 

STEEET EAILWAY EMPLOYEES: 

Motormen and conductors 54.0 56.4 30.46 23.76 

PEINTEES: 

Linotype operators 

Newspapers, day 87.5 48.0 42.00 38.50 

Book and job 68.8 48.0 33.02 30.27 

Compositors . . 

Newspapers, day 77.0 48.0 36.96 33.88 

Book and job 60.4 48.0 28.99 26.58 



48.0 


24.00 


22.00 


44.0 


30.80 


30.80 


44.0 


30.80 


30.80 


45.3 


28.67 


27.85 


44.0 


49.50 


49.50 


44.0 


39.60 


39.60 


44.0 


36.30 


36.30 


44.0 


37.14 


37.14 


44.0 


39.60 


39.60 


44.0 


38.50 


38.50 


44.0 


42.90 


42.90 


44.0 


41.27 


41.27 


44.0 


39.60 


39.60 


44.0 


44.00 


44.00 



APPENDICES 



2G9 



SOURCES OF DATA USED IN COMPILING DATA ON WAGES 
AND HOURS USED IN THIS STUDY 



Iron and Steel: 
Mining: 

United States 
Arsenal : 
Building Trades 



Navy Yards: 
Printers : 



Railroad 
Employees : 
Shipyards : 



Street Railway 
Employees : 



Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1919. 
Press Report of U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
entitled "Hours and Earnings of Employees in the 
Coal Mining Industry," dated Nov. 2, 1919. 
Monthly Labor Review, U. S. Department of Labor 
Statistics, October, 1910. 
; (1) Union wages for various trades for most of the 
larger cities of the country, as compiled by the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics and supplemented 
by data furnished by union officials; 

(2) Wage rates of building laborers under the scales 
of the Hod Carriers' and Building Laborers' Union, and 

(3) Prevailing wages in the building trades of New 
York as published by the Building Trades Council of 
that city. 

Data supplied by United States Navy Department. 
The data presented were obtained from the wage scales 
and advances as published in the journals and Bul- 
letins of the Typographical Union and from computa- 
tions made by the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 

From a Statement prepared by the U. S. Railroad 
Administration under date of April 8, 1919. 
From the award of the Shipbuilding Labor Adjust- 
ment Board in October, 1918, still in effect. This 
award provided for two general scales of shipyard 
wages — one for the Atlantic Coast and one for the 
Pacific Coast. 

The compilation gives the hourly maximum rates of 
motormen and conductors in representative cities. 
The information was compiled from trade and labor 
publications and is believed to be closely accurate. 
The data for full time hours per week is based on an 
estimate made by Arthur Sturgis in his "Analysis 
of Electric Railway Operating Costs and the Cost of 
Living as Related to Wages of Conductors, Motormen, 
and Other Trainmen" and presented to the Electric 
Railway Commission, Washington, D. C, in October, 
1919. 



APPENDIX C 

CLASSIFICATION- ACCORDING TO SKILL 

The classification of unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled fol- 
lowed in this report is that used by the government survey in 
1910 (Senate Document 110, 4 vols.), and is based primarily on 
wage rates. That division made all earnings under 18 cents 
an hour, unskilled; all 25 cents an hour or over, skilled; and 
those between, semi-skilled. The percentages of the three classes 
for the industry were derived from the table for a typical estab- 
lishment. (S. D. 110, vol. Ill, p. 80.) 

These percentages were, in Section IV of this report, applied 
to the exhaustive tables of full time earnings (S. D. 110, vol. 
Ill, pp. 550-551) in order to discover the corresponding per- 
centages of total payrolls. The percentages thus applied and 
carried over to the column of weekly earnings made all below 
$12 weekly, unskilled (median wage $10.25) ; all over $15.50 
weekly, skilled (median wage $19.10) ; all between, semi-skilled 
(median wage $13.50). 

It is perfectly understood that this three-fold classification, 
with dividing lines drawn at percentages in decimal points, rep- 
resents no corresponding precision of classification in the in- 
dustry itself, either as organized or as possible. The gradations 
according to pay were used by the government (and by this 
report) solely because they formed the only accurate measure- 
ment existent of relative skill, a measurement which is very 
exact in the industry, meaning a hundred gradations in typical 
departmental payrolls. The usefulness of any precise classifica- 
tion is obvious ; the use of the threefold classification is a make- 
shift, partly to conform to industry nomenclature, partly to dis- 
tinguish the three chief differing types of worker, who may be 
described as being found clearly recognizable in the middle of 
each class. At the two edges of the semi-skilled class there is 
no definable dividing line in points of observable skill. These 

270 



APPENDICES 271 

three clear t}^pes are (a) common labor, learning in a day how 
to do something; (b) skilled labor, unreplaceable by men who 
have not had many years of training; (c) semi-skilled labor, 
men of months or years of training, potentially able to do skilled 
work, but never having had opportunity actually to do it. 

It is an indication of the backwardness of steel as an industry 
that no exact classifications of jobs have been generally worked 
out in it. Observation indicates that a classification much closer 
to facts would be five-fold, as follows: 

(a) common labor; — shif table, replaced by "anybody/' learning the 

"know bow" in from 1 day to 2 months. 

(b) low-skilled; — common labor, but assigned steadily to set jobs re- 

quiring considerable " knack " and some responsibility. 

(c) semi-skilled; — trained men, potentially able to take over a job, or 

occasionally doing it; of the next higher class (d). 

(d) skilled; — men not only of many years' training but long experience 

on set jobs involving adeptness, judgment and responsibility. 

(e) high-skilled; — long-experienced men, characterized by judgment 

amounting to " genius," and by executive ability. 

That is a gamut of (a) yard labor; (b) "skip" operators; (c) 
melters' third helpers; (d) melters' first helpers; (e) rollers, 
blowers, etc. 



INDEX 



Absenteeism, 148 

Accidents in steel industry, 66-67 

A. F. of L., 157; steel department 
wanted, 176; strike support, 
180; strikers' attitude towards, 
244; unions involved, 145 

Agents — provocateurs, 230, 232 

Agitators, 43, 210, 212 

"Anonymous report" on Commis- 
sion of Inquiry, 28, 233, 234 

Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel and Tin Workers, 164, 169, 

175, 179, 181 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 

176, 182 
Americanization, 12, 82, 179, 249 
Americans, distrust foreigners, 30, 

ers; distrust foreigners, 30, 
179; as trade unionists, 162-164 

Arbitration and conciliation rec- 
ommended, 249 

Armour, Mr., Conference with 
John Fitzpatrick, 165-167 

Blacklists, 15, 27, 74, 121, 198, 
209, 219-221 

Blast furnace, hours of labor, 52; 
continuous operation, 57; job 
description, 62-63 ; seven-day 
week, 69 

Bolshevism, 15, 20-42 

" Boring from within," 156, 158, 
159 

Braddock, Pa., 104 

British experience, 41, 56, 57, 187 

Brown, Jay G., 194 

Budgets, see Family Budgets 

Buffington, E. J., 210; on Bol- 
shevism of strikers, 33; on 
John Fitzpatrick, 165; on labor 
detectives, 231; on twelve-hour 
day, 59 

Bureau of Applied Economics, 6;" 
study of family budgets, 255- 
263; study of hours of labor, 
55-56, 264-268 

Bureau of Industrial Research, 6 

Burnett, H. D., 211 



Carnegie Steel Co., 32, 49, 60, 64, 
76 

Chapin, Prof., family budget, 257- 
258 

Churches, see Pulpit 

Civil liberties, denied, 15, 235, 
238, 239, 240, 248; inquiry rec- 
ommended, 17-18, 250; sub-re- 
port cited, 198 

Classification of steel workers, 
270-271 

Clergy, see Pulpit 

Close, Charles L., 22-23 

Collective bargaining, in packing 
industry, 165-167; U. S. War 
Labor Board policy, 149 

Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, 
shop committees, 10-11; eight- 
hour day, 49, 57, 247 

Communism, 31, 36, 38, 151 

Company houses, 103-104 

Company unions, 10, 19 

Corporations Auxiliary Company, 
228-229 

Cost of living, see Family bud- 
gets, Standard of living 

Debs, Eugene V., criticises steel 
strike, 36 

Detectives and spies, 15; co-opera- 
tion with Department of Justice, 
221, 225-226; investigation rec- 
ommended, 18, 250; used by 
Corporation, 26 

Dickson, W. B., on twelve-hour 
day, 46 

Discharge for unionism, 171, 205, 
209-218 

Dorchester laborers' case, 41-42 

Eight-hour day, see Hours of labor 
Employment management, 22, 120, 

121 
Employment managers, 137 
Espionage, see Detectives and spies 

Family budgets, 86, 100, 101, 105- 
118; Chapin's budget, 257; mini- 



274 



INDEX 



mum comfort level, 261-263; 
minimum subsistence level, 256- 
261; Ogburn's budget, 256, 257, 
262; N. Y. Board of Estimate, 
259-260; U. S. Bureau of Labor 
^Statistics, 262-263; N. Y. Fac- 
tory Commission, 258 

Family life, effect of twelve-hour 
day, 65-66 

Farrell, James A., 24, 25 

Fatigue, 65, 82, 147. See also 
Hours 

Federal Council of Churches, 250 

Federal government, see United 
States 

Financial control of Corporation 
labor policy, 11, 125, 201-206 

Findings, Christian, 246 

Finns, socialism of, 150 

Fitzpatrick, John, 145, 147; or- 
ganizes packing workers, 157, 
165-168 

Foreigners, see Immigrants 

Foremen, handle grievances, 24, 
26; power of discharge, 210 

Foster, William Z., 145, 169; and 
Bolshevism, 33; boring from 
within policy, 156-159; Elbert 
H. Gary on, 33, 165; on immi- 
grants as trade unionists, 161- 
164; on strike causes, 147-148; 
on strike support, 180 

Freedom of speech, 173, 235 

Gary, Elbert H., Bolshevism of 
strikers, 33; conferences with 
employees, 122; handles griev- 
ances, 23-26; Interchurch Com- 
mission interview, 28-29; job of 
steel worker, 63-64; John Fitz- 
patrick, 33; no-conference pol- 
icy, 23-26; quotes spy reports, 
233-234; right to organize, 210; 
seven-day week, 68-69, 74, 75; 
spokesman of steel industry, 8-9, 
47; testimony, 23-25, 43, 46-49, 
78, 79, 87, 88, 123-124, 206-210; 
twelve-hour day, 47-51, 55, 56, 
58, 59, 75, 76; wages, 86; Will- 
iam Z. Foster, 33, 165 

Gary, Indiana, 38, 170, 240, 241, 
242 

General strike, 31 

Gompers, Samuel, 156, 160, 161, 
164; asks strike postponement, 



174-175; defends strike at in- 
dustrial conference, 180; organ- 
ization policy, 160 
Great Britain, see British experi- 
ence 

Haddock, William S., sheriff's 
proclamation, 237, 239 

Herd-psychology, 154 

Homestead, Pa., 49, 50, 60, 133, 
148 

Hours of labor, blast furnaces, 72; 
building trades, 268; coal min- 
ers, 268; continuous industries, 
55; eight-hour day, 45, 57, 76, 
79, 80, 81, 83; Elbert H. Gary 
on, 58; independent steel com- 
panies, 49; open -hearth fur- 
naces, 72; printers, 268; rail- 
road workers, 268; shipyard 
workers, 268; sources of data, 
269; steel industry, Great Brit- 
ain, 56; steel workers compared 
with others, 264-268; twelve- 
hour day, 5, 12, 44, 47, 55, 57, 
59-63, 71, 72, 78, 81, 84; eight- 
hour day recommended, 248 
Housing of steel workers, 14, 103- 
107, 249 

Illinois Steel Co., 28, 33; use of 
labor detectives, 231 

Immigrants, 246; as trade union- 
ists, 161-164; Bolshevism of, 
150-155, 161-164; favored indus- 
trial unionism, 160; housing, 
104-118; job discrimination, 14, 
136-143; nationality of steel 
workers, 132-133 ; segregation, 
30; twelve-hour day wanted by 
some, 78-79, 99 

Independent steel companies, hours 
of labor, 49, 65; labor repre- 
sentation, 198 

Industrial conference, Washington, 
165, 180, 249 

Industrial unionism, 37, 158, 159- 
161, 182; favored by immi- 
grants, 161-164; of immigrants, 
16; opposed by Wm. Z. Foster, 
35 

Interchurch World Movement, 
Commission of Inquiry, 6-11, 28, 
29, 236; industrial relations de- 
partment, 250 



INDEX 



275 



International Harvester Co., in- 
dustrial councils, 11 

International unions in steel in- 
dustry, 145, 146, 168, 172, 174, 
175 

Intimidation, 43, 154, 178 

I. W. W., 36, 155, 156, 158, 161; 
strikers' attitude towards, 244 

Johnstown, Pa., 65, 164, 213, 236 

Kazinci, Father A., on Sunday- 
work, 70-71, 83, 84 

Labor autocracy, 167 

Labor contracts, 179-180 

Labor file, 27-28, 222-229; black- 
lists in, 219-221 

Labor press, 37, 151, 152 

Labor representation, 10, 19; in 
independent steel mills, 198 

Labor shortage, 76 

Labor turnover, 148 

Lackawanna Steel Co., on seven- 
day week, 75 

Mediation, 7-8, 28 
Midvale-Cambria Co., 10, 46, 198 
Ministers, see Pulpit 
Molnar, (Rev.) Charles V., on 

Sunday work, 70 
Monotony, 134 

National Association of Corpora- 
tion Schools, 82 

National Civil Liberties Bureau, 
233 

National Committee for Organiz- 
ing Iron and Steel Workers, 36, 
153, 159, 169, 170, 174, 175, 
176; affiliated unions, 145-146; 
strike report, 188-196 

National Red Cross Association, 
100 

Negroes, as strike breakers, 177, 
178 

New Majority, quoted on labor- 
detectives, 230-231 

Newspapers, see Press 

N. Y. Board of Estimate family 
budget, 259-260 

N. Y. Factory Commission family 
budget, 258 

New York Sun, 88-89 

New York Times, 31 

Night schools, 82 



Ogburn, W. F., on standards of 
living, 93, 255-263 

One Big Union, 36, 160-161 

Open-hearth furnaces, hours of la- 
bor, 52; job description, 61-62; 
wages of gang, 98 

Organize, right to, see Right to 
organize 

Oursler, Sup't, 48 

Overtime, 98 

Packing industry, 157, 165-167 

Palmer, Mitchell, 149; on agi- 
tators, 43 

Parker, Carleton H., 95, 96, 
125 

Picketing, 240-241 

Pittsburgh Survey, housing, 104 

Polakov, W. N., on inefficient 
management of steel industry, 
77-78 

Postponement of strike, 171, 174, 
175, 180 

Press, see also Labor press, 182, 
183, 199; as strike breaker, 
242; ignorance concerning in- 
dustrial relations, 29, 30, 31; 
recommendations to, 250; sub- 
report cited, 199 

Prices, effect on public opinion, 
185-186 

Production, 57, 77, 177; trade 
union responsibility for, 168, 
185, 186, 249 

Profits, 13, 14 

Promotion, favoritism, 136; skilled 
workers, 129 ; semi-skilled 
workers, 132; unskilled workers, 
136 

Psychology of strikers, "bound to 
fail " idea, 155 ; effect of charge 
of Bolshevism, 39-40; fear of 
discharge, 163; fear of strike 
breakers, 178; sense of labor's 
importance, 148-149 ; " some- 
thing doing" idea, 154; William 
Z. Foster on, 161-164 

Public opinion, 206; ignorance 
concerning industrial relations, 
20-21; ignored by trade unions, 
182-184, 187 ; influenced by high 
prices, 185-186; influence of U. 
S. Steel Corporation, 184-185; 
might aid collective bargaining, 
183; on collective bargaining, 



276 



INDEX 



167-168; and hours of labor, 46; 
roused by atrocities, 187 
Pulpit, 243; sub-report cited, 199; 
recommendations, 250 

Radicalism, see Bolshevism 
Eail mills, hours of labor, 53 
Railroad Brotherhoods, 162 
Rank and file, 170, 172, 174 
Red Cross, see National Red Cross 

Association 
Red book (Foster's), 34 
Right to organize, 249; denied by 
Corporation, 10, 29, 122, 123; 
Elbert H. Gary on, 210; on rail- 
roads, 163; recognized in Great 
Britain, 41; U. S. War Labor 
Board policy, 149; see also dis- 
charge for unionism 
Russia, 150, 152 

Safety devices and measures, 66 

Schiller, W. B., on twelve-hour 
day, 59, 68 

Secret service men, see Detectives 
and spies 

Semi-skilled workers, classifica- 
tion, 270-271; distrust skilled, 
179; housing, 104-118; increas- 
ing in steel industry, 134; pro- 
motion, 132; wages compared 
with family budget, 93-101 

Seven-day week, 11-12, 68-75 

Sherman Service, 230-232 

Shop committees, 19, 198 

Skilled workers, classification, 
270-271; distrust semi-skilled, 
179; favored by Corporation, 
128; grievances, 129-132; wages, 
13, 85, 91-92 

Spies, see Detectives and spies 

Standard of living, 12, 13, 256; 
definition, 93; minimum com- 
fort level, 85; minimum sub- 
sistence level, 85; steel workers, 
45, 79, 93-101; see also Family 
budgets 

State police, 240 

Steel Workers' Council, 170, 176 

Stewart, Ethelbert, Civil liberties 
report, 18 

Strike-ballot, 154 

Strike breakers, 197, 248; detec- 
tives, 29, 209, 226, 235; federal 
officials, 240-242; local magis- 



trates, 239; negroes, 177; press, 
242; pulpit, 243; state police, 
240; U. S. army, 241-242; 
U. S. department of justice, 240 ; 
U. S. Steel Corporation, 177; 
strike bulletin, 179 
Sunday work, see Seven-day week 



Times, London, on steel strike, 41, 
42 

Trade unions, democratization, 
249 ; Elbert H. Gary on, 208 ; ig- 
nore public opinion, 182-184, 
187; in U. S. weak, 198; oppose 
twelve-hour day, 57; responsi- 
bility for production, 19, 168, 
185-186, 249; see also American 
Federation of Labor, Company 
unions, Industrial unionism 



Under-cover men, 26, 27, 29, 38, 
228; see also Detectives and 
spies 

Unemployment, 46 

Union button, 171 

Union fee, 170, 189, 194 

U. S. Army, 240-242 

U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
family budget, 262-263 

U. S. Department of Justice, 18, 
149; co-operation with indus- 
trial spies, 27, 221, 225, 226; as 
strike breaker, 240-242 

U. S. government, civil rights in- 
quiry recommended, 17-18; steel 
commission recommended, 17; 
investigation of detective agen- 
cies recommended, 18 

U. S. Senate Committee, 18; steel 
investigation, 29 

U. S. Steel Corporation, division 
of wage budget, 91-92, 96, 98; 
dominates steel industry, 8-9, 
13; financial control, 200-207; 
finance committee quoted, 201- 
207 ; influence on public opinion, 
184-185; labor policy, 5-6, 23-30, 
51, 99, 197, 241; sub-report 
cited, 199 ; military organization, 
128-129; minutes, 126, 200-207; 
rejects Interchurch mediation, 
7-8; report of, 123; seven-day 
week, 68-75 ; shut down of union 



INDEX 



277 



mills, 204; size, 84; twelve-hour 
day, 44-84; use of spies, 26-30; 
wages, 85-118 

U. S. War Labor Board, 149, 185, 
248 

Unskilled workers, backbone of 
strike, 8, 44; classification, 270- 
271; mistrust skilled, 179; 
grievances, 135-143; housing, 
104-118; job description, 132- 
134; job discrimination, 128; 
promotion, 136; standard of 
living, 85; wages, 5, 12, 13, 90, 
92, 93, 101 

Violence, 30, 236, 241 

Wages, annual average, 97; build- 
ing trades, 102; coal miners, 
102; compared with family- 
budgets, 93-101; compared with 



wages of other trades, 101-102, 
264-268; metal trades, 103; 
printers, 103, 268; railroad 
workers, 103, 268; shipyard 
workers, 268; skilled workers, 
12-13; sources of data, 269; un- 
skilled workers, 5, 12, 90 

War aims (Labor's), 182-183 

Welfare work, 22, 39, 120, 126, 
127, 137 

West, George F., steel strike re- 
port, 18 

Williams, H. D., 49, 66, 76; on 
Bolshevism of strikers, 32; on 
twelve-hour day, 59 

Wilson, Woodrow, 182; asks strike 
postponement, 174-175; attempts 
to mediate, 165, 166 

Wood, Leonard, 240-242 

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 
hours of labor, 49 



